Michael, etal,
I’m not a turbine expert (not even
close) and don’t have turbine horse in the race. However, seems that
hitting the ground (or water), loss of control due to icing, or in-flight
breakup are factors that should not enter into the factual consideration of
turbine reliability. In those cases, it’s true the engines did stop
(eventually), however it was after the fact. Since, recips also stop with
fuel starvation; I’d also eliminate that from my engine reliability
consideration. You could argue it from an overall “systems” perspective
– however fuel management is not uniquely a turbine issue.
If you disregard incidents due to terrain,
icing, in-flight breakup, etc from the Lancair turbine crash statistics, there
is not much (any) data left to support you thoughts that there is a “high
rate of unexplained engine failures”. Unless there is data
to show otherwise, your perceptions are simply incorrect. Nothing
wrong with that – the scientific method is to start with a theory and
then prove or disprove it with facts, logic and/or experimentation. The
outcome is usually valuable either way.
Overall, #1 cause of light plane crashes
and fatalities is pilot error (and has been historically). It seems this
most recent accident (along with many others) reinforces this and shows we
should all spend more time training (assuming training helps reduce pilot errors).
It would be interesting to be able to factually
review historic accident statistics (especially the pilot error ones), relative
to the amount of recurrent training the pilots had.
Perhaps this is something that NAFI
could/should attempt. Of course, we need to be careful here, if
the Feds come to the conclusion that x hrs of re-current training results in x%
reduction in GA accidents, we might find ourselves with additional FARs. Luckily they typically move slowly and have
plenty of other stuff to worry about or… perhaps that would be a good
thing???
An interesting discussion thread would be;
“what are the factors that tend to discourage pilots from getting more
recurrent training”? Upon better understanding this, we can
individually consider and address those causes and how they may effect our
behavior. We should all be concerned with this as it ultimately effects
what we pay in insurance, the loss of friends & planes, and the public’s
perceptions of general aviation.
I propose the reasons we (I) don’t do
more recurrent training is:
- Natural
aversion to receiving critical feedback (even if constructive)
- Uncomfortable
with potential realization that we are not as skilled as we think we are
(simulated engine out practice - touchdown accuracy)
- Expense
(actually small relative to the overall cost of ownership and flying)
- Time
(I enjoy flying, so this should not really be a reason)
- The
results/benefits of re-current training are not often directly observable or
quantifiable
Seems each of these is easily over-come-able
with rational thinking/behavior.
There is also the issue/concern of the
quality/appropriateness of the training. In addition to approaches flown
during normal IFR flights, I do my required 6 approaches, holds, and course
intercepts every 6 months (IFR currency) as separate flights/training. I
make it a point to do at least 6 in the spring and 6 in the fall, in actual low
IMC whenever possible (not possible in the winter in Mich due to icing). However, I’ve
always done those at YIP a large local airport (my local, really bad weather alternate).
I’ve told myself this is good because I want to be able to land there
under the worst of conditions (if necessary). Now, after years of that, I’m
pretty good at it - “turn me in at the marker and make it tight”,
partial panel, purposely out of trim, etc.
Perhaps that’s not the best bang for
my buck anymore. Perhaps, I should purposely go somewhere where I’ve
never reviewed the approach chart, and don’t look at it until after being
cleared for the approach. Perhaps I should do a few ASR approaches –
haven’t done any of those in years. Perhaps I should do some more IFR
unusual-attitude work (dual with foggles). Perhaps I need to really
rethink my personal approach to currency, practice, and training. How
real is it for me go out and practice engine out procedures, when I know that
is what I am going to do ahead of time. Better than nothing, but perhaps
not the best way.
Your thoughts???
Rick Titsworth