X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Sender: To: lml Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2006 12:47:13 -0500 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net ([209.86.89.66] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 5.1.2) with ESMTP id 1564635 for lml@lancaironline.net; Tue, 14 Nov 2006 10:44:19 -0500 Received-SPF: none receiver=logan.com; client-ip=209.86.89.66; envelope-from=rtitsworth@mindspring.com DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=dk20050327; d=mindspring.com; b=AT1nba8j6waFAEgptr/cD+WQb+qo9V1jaJgx3t69SL73TlDHULV4eAG9j/06BEn6; h=Received:From:To:Subject:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type:X-Mailer:X-MimeOLE:In-reply-to:Thread-Index:X-ELNK-Trace:X-Originating-IP; Received: from [69.3.204.7] (helo=RDTVAIO) by elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net with asmtp (Exim 4.34) id 1Gk0S4-0002Hb-28 for lml@lancaironline.net; Tue, 14 Nov 2006 10:43:56 -0500 From: "rtitsworth" X-Original-To: "'Lancair Mailing List'" Subject: RE: [LML] Re: Lancair down in Georgia - Training X-Original-Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2006 10:43:44 -0500 X-Original-Message-ID: <00d401c70803$ab093560$84affea9@RDTVAIO> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_00D5_01C707D9.C2332D60" X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.2962 In-reply-to: Thread-Index: AccHr6rTq8judqHWTJKofyR972Id8gARd3Kw X-ELNK-Trace: b17f11247b2ac8f0a79dc4b33984cbaa0a9da525759e2654c37f8cd055380ec852033bb8050315de93caf27dac41a8fd350badd9bab72f9c350badd9bab72f9c X-Originating-IP: 69.3.204.7 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_00D5_01C707D9.C2332D60 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Michael, etal, I'm not a turbine expert (not even close) and don't have turbine horse in the race. However, seems that hitting the ground (or water), loss of control due to icing, or in-flight breakup are factors that should not enter into the factual consideration of turbine reliability. In those cases, it's true the engines did stop (eventually), however it was after the fact. Since, recips also stop with fuel starvation; I'd also eliminate that from my engine reliability consideration. You could argue it from an overall "systems" perspective - however fuel management is not uniquely a turbine issue. If you disregard incidents due to terrain, icing, in-flight breakup, etc from the Lancair turbine crash statistics, there is not much (any) data left to support you thoughts that there is a "high rate of unexplained engine failures". Unless there is data to show otherwise, your perceptions are simply incorrect. Nothing wrong with that - the scientific method is to start with a theory and then prove or disprove it with facts, logic and/or experimentation. The outcome is usually valuable either way. Overall, #1 cause of light plane crashes and fatalities is pilot error (and has been historically). It seems this most recent accident (along with many others) reinforces this and shows we should all spend more time training (assuming training helps reduce pilot errors). It would be interesting to be able to factually review historic accident statistics (especially the pilot error ones), relative to the amount of recurrent training the pilots had. Perhaps this is something that NAFI could/should attempt. Of course, we need to be careful here, if the Feds come to the conclusion that x hrs of re-current training results in x% reduction in GA accidents, we might find ourselves with additional FARs. Luckily they typically move slowly and have plenty of other stuff to worry about or. perhaps that would be a good thing??? An interesting discussion thread would be; "what are the factors that tend to discourage pilots from getting more recurrent training"? Upon better understanding this, we can individually consider and address those causes and how they may effect our behavior. We should all be concerned with this as it ultimately effects what we pay in insurance, the loss of friends & planes, and the public's perceptions of general aviation. I propose the reasons we (I) don't do more recurrent training is: * Natural aversion to receiving critical feedback (even if constructive) * Uncomfortable with potential realization that we are not as skilled as we think we are (simulated engine out practice - touchdown accuracy) * Expense (actually small relative to the overall cost of ownership and flying) * Time (I enjoy flying, so this should not really be a reason) * The results/benefits of re-current training are not often directly observable or quantifiable Seems each of these is easily over-come-able with rational thinking/behavior. There is also the issue/concern of the quality/appropriateness of the training. In addition to approaches flown during normal IFR flights, I do my required 6 approaches, holds, and course intercepts every 6 months (IFR currency) as separate flights/training. I make it a point to do at least 6 in the spring and 6 in the fall, in actual low IMC whenever possible (not possible in the winter in Mich due to icing). However, I've always done those at YIP a large local airport (my local, really bad weather alternate). I've told myself this is good because I want to be able to land there under the worst of conditions (if necessary). Now, after years of that, I'm pretty good at it - "turn me in at the marker and make it tight", partial panel, purposely out of trim, etc. Perhaps that's not the best bang for my buck anymore. Perhaps, I should purposely go somewhere where I've never reviewed the approach chart, and don't look at it until after being cleared for the approach. Perhaps I should do a few ASR approaches - haven't done any of those in years. Perhaps I should do some more IFR unusual-attitude work (dual with foggles). Perhaps I need to really rethink my personal approach to currency, practice, and training. How real is it for me go out and practice engine out procedures, when I know that is what I am going to do ahead of time. Better than nothing, but perhaps not the best way. Your thoughts??? Rick Titsworth -- For archives and unsub http://mail.lancaironline.net/lists/lml/ ------=_NextPart_000_00D5_01C707D9.C2332D60 Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Michael, = etal,

 

I’m not a turbine expert (not = even close) and don’t have turbine horse in the race.  However, = seems that hitting the ground (or water), loss of control due to icing, or = in-flight breakup are factors that should not enter into the factual consideration = of turbine reliability.  In those cases, it’s true the engines = did stop (eventually), however it was after the fact.  Since, recips also = stop with fuel starvation; I’d also eliminate that from my engine = reliability consideration.  You could argue it from an overall = “systems” perspective – however fuel management is not uniquely a turbine = issue.

 

If you disregard incidents due to = terrain, icing, in-flight breakup, etc from the Lancair turbine crash statistics, = there is not much (any) data left to support you thoughts that there is a = “high rate of unexplained engine failures”.  Unless there is = data to show otherwise, your perceptions are simply incorrect.  = Nothing wrong with that – the scientific method is to start with a theory = and then prove or disprove it with facts, logic and/or = experimentation.  The outcome is usually valuable either way.

 

Overall, #1 cause of light plane = crashes and fatalities is pilot error (and has been historically).  It = seems this most recent accident (along with many others) reinforces this and shows = we should all spend more time training (assuming training helps reduce = pilot errors).

 

It would be interesting to be able = to factually review historic accident statistics (especially the pilot error ones), = relative to the amount of recurrent training the pilots = had.

Perhaps this is something that NAFI could/should attempt.    Of course, we need to be careful = here, if the Feds come to the conclusion that x hrs of re-current training = results in x% reduction in GA accidents, we might find ourselves with additional = FARs.  Luckily they typically move slowly = and have plenty of other stuff to worry about or… perhaps that would be a = good thing???

 

An interesting discussion thread = would be; “what are the factors that tend to discourage pilots from getting = more recurrent training”?  Upon better understanding this, we can individually consider and address those causes and how they may effect = our behavior.  We should all be concerned with this as it ultimately = effects what we pay in insurance, the loss of friends & planes, and the = public’s perceptions of general aviation.

 

I propose the reasons we (I) = don’t do more recurrent training is:

 

  • Natural aversion to receiving critical feedback (even if = constructive)
  • Uncomfortable with potential realization that we are not as skilled as we think = we are (simulated engine out practice - touchdown = accuracy)
  • Expense  (actually small relative to the overall cost of ownership and = flying)
  • Time  (I enjoy flying, so this should not really be a = reason)
  • The results/benefits of re-current training are not often directly = observable or quantifiable

 

Seems each of these is easily = over-come-able with rational thinking/behavior.

 

There is also the issue/concern of = the quality/appropriateness of the training.  In addition to approaches = flown during normal IFR flights, I do my required 6 approaches, holds, and = course intercepts every 6 months (IFR currency) as separate = flights/training.  I make it a point to do at least 6 in the spring and 6 in the fall, in = actual low IMC whenever possible (not possible in the winter in Mich due to icing).  However, = I’ve always done those at YIP a large local airport (my local, really bad = weather alternate).  I’ve told myself this is good because I want to be able to land = there under the worst of conditions (if necessary).  Now, after years of = that, I’m pretty good at it - “turn me in at the marker and make it = tight”, partial panel, purposely out of trim, etc.  =

 

Perhaps that’s not the best = bang for my buck anymore.  Perhaps, I should purposely go somewhere where = I’ve never reviewed the approach chart, and don’t look at it until = after being cleared for the approach.  Perhaps I should do a few ASR approaches = – haven’t done any of those in years.  Perhaps I should do some = more IFR unusual-attitude work (dual with foggles).  Perhaps I need to = really rethink my personal approach to currency, practice, and training.  = How real is it for me go out and practice engine out procedures, when I know = that is what I am going to do ahead of time.  Better than nothing, but = perhaps not the best way.

 

Your = thoughts???

 

Rick = Titsworth

 

 

 

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