Jeff,
I am not an official accident investigator, but I've played one in skits
presented to fellow pilots gathered around the pot-bellied stove in my
hangar. The easiest discussions are those about accidents that
have exposed the chain of errors, frequently seeing the subject pilot sink
into the quicksand of bad judgements while the option tree is viciously and
rapidly pruned. If there is any benefit from these crashes, it is to those
of us with fat heads that think we know it all until the next
"Oops." I think of our discussions as learning from simulated
error flying opposed to experiencing the real errors with painful
consequences. Your contributions are greatly appreciated along with
those from others.
Another class of mishaps are more difficult to deal with - those where
the evidence is all burned up or circumstances are not fully explained or NTSB
investigations (if any) are still "preliminary" and the aircraft
involved were "experimental, high performance" (Hmm.. Like little Lancairs
perhaps). For these, speculation enters into the discussions - Not only
extravagant wild a$$ed guesses (EWAGs, showing pilot creativity), but
thoughtful WAGs (showing capability to think critically about something other
than women or the next Krispy Kreme encounter). These too are
beneficial because they expand the simulations to "what if that were me?"
Navel lint picking at its' finest.
Will we ever know what happened when Dick Reichel crashed on approach
(LAX06LA096)?
What went wrong on the return to land (NYC06LA039)?
It has been my observation (after spending a night at a Holiday Inn
Express) that there also have been a great number of "flight mistakes" made
by those that recently (or not so recently) purchased a high performance
experimental aircraft - I.E. Not having built one (or
it) themselves.
With 2 aboard, what possessed the pilot (not builder) to fly so low as
to stumble on the airport perimeter fence (LAX05LA064)?
With 2 aboard, how did the stall-spin start (LAX05FA061,
built 1990, bought 10/04, crashed 1/05)?
With 2 aboard, what caused the engine to stop
(LAX06LA067), newly owned 1 day)?
With 2 aboard, what was he thinking (LAX06LA110, built
1996, bought 11/29/05, crashed 2/12/06)?
On the last crash, the Glasair, one might speculate that prior aerobatics
were done solo and the plane behaved differently with 2 aboard. FAR
violations contributed to the extent of the post crash disaster, the pilot did
the rest on his own. After stepping into the quicksand of FAR violations,
he probably sunk further by a common pre-crash phrase, "Watch This!"
One might even EWAG that in all these cases, the possibly
unfamiliar operation with the weight of two people was contributory to the
outcome.
Another WAG is that "experimental, high performance" is not well
understood by a subset of pilots trained in part 23 (?, Standard Type
Certificate) clunkers that were designed to make the inattentive operator
whole again after some slow-speed dunderheaded goof-up. There are
frequent demonstrations that the price for high performance is paid for at other
parts of the flight regime - especially slow flight.
Even though we can boost our egos by claiming to be test pilots, for
the most part we are not. We are not trained to operate on the edge of the
envelope nor to lick and re-seal it after falling outside (cute, but I hate
analogies). It is not our everyday job to practice recovery from every
manner of system failure or flight extreme. It is certainly not our
purpose to regularly cause flight emergencies and then fix them. It is my
purpose to learn how to avoid the self-created ones as best I can
from other's experiences and narratives. This is not to diminish the
importance of knowing your limits and those of your own plane, whether you
built it or bought it and the FARs that provide a proven framework within
which safe operation has a better chance.
Anyway, thanks for lighting the fires and kicking the tires of
thought.
Scott Krueger
AKA Grayhawk
Lancair N92EX IO320 SB 89/96
Aurora, IL
(KARR)
PPS Remain safe by following the F-16 that intercepted you in a TFR, even
if you have to slow down.
In a message dated 2/18/2006 12:52:35 A.M. Central Standard Time,
VTAILJEFF@aol.com writes:
The purpose of this forum is to discuss items of interest be it building,
flying, Lancairs, experitmental, etc. This forum includes items related to
aviation safety. If you do not want to participate, fine. Hit the delete key.
The only person(s) who brought discredit onto our aviation
community and smaller experimental community is the pilot(s) of the
Roseville Glasair. I am simply the messenger. 98% of what was posted was
straight out of the paper.
Unfortunately, their actions bring reactions from within and without the
aviation community that we (the pilot community) have to bear:
1. Insurance will not be cheaper. If you're not bitching here about his
actions and similar actions we have been discussing then don't bitch when you
get your premium notice next year.
2. Regulations may get tighter--- the LA FSDO announced plans last year
restricting flights by experimental amateur built aircraft over populated
ares-- this won't help.
3. AOPA is going to Sacramento this weekend to put on a presentation
about the hazards of "maneuvering flight" to other local pilots there who
might be similarly minded.
4. EAA and the FAA public relations folks are trying to smooth ruffled
feathers because some knuckleheads think the regulations do not apply to
themselves.
What this guy did in Roseville was stupid -- It was beyond stupid,
it was gross negligence. IMHO its not a pumkin pie/ splattered orange
comparison. If this pilot was willing to do aerobatics over his neighborhood
I'll bet he was probably shining his ass elsewhere and a bunch of his buddies
are now telling the NTSB he did it at the home field all the time-- How
do I know? As an aircraft accident investigator I have seen it many times
before.
In recent years we have lost pilots and passengers from thunderstorm
penetration (Sterling Ainsworth, Wendell Durr, & others); failing to apply
basic airworthiness standards (Shannon Knoepflin, Tony Durrizzi) and loss of
control/ stall spin (Chuck Brenner). My message has always been to fly within
the regulations and the advisory material. The above people did not think
these things applied to them. How do I know? I counselled Shannon on numerous
occasions about airworthiness. The last time at Oshkosh less than 24 hours
before he took off on his fatal flight. Shannon thought he knew everything
with his 300 hours of flight time and you could not tell him anything. I was
parked next to Sterling Ainsworth at Oshkosh this past year-- a week before he
was killed flying into a thunderstorm. He was just an older, richer
version of Shannon. I spoke to both the NTSB investigator and the
Canadian investiagtor in their cases and passed along what I knew of their
situations. Several others already spoke to them as well.
The bottom line is this. I have always counselled pilots to follow the
regs, the advisory circular material, etc. Opposing views say that this stuff
does not apply. I then quote the regulation/AC/ whatever for the benefit
of the group who may not be familiar with it. (Sound familiar?) Then somebody
goes out and splats themselves doing something like Chuck Brenner or this
Roseville guy did and a few guys say, "I knew him, he was my best friend, what
could have gone so wrong?" (Still sound familiar) I then say, "I told you so."
And you say, "Jeff, You heartless bastard."
If you do not think regulations and advisory material does not apply
to you-- then fine, good luck.