X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Sender: To: lml@lancaironline.net Date: Sat, 18 Feb 2006 20:42:23 -0500 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from imo-m26.mx.aol.com ([64.12.137.7] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 5.0.8) with ESMTP id 990192 for lml@lancaironline.net; Sat, 18 Feb 2006 13:24:41 -0500 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=64.12.137.7; envelope-from=Sky2high@aol.com Received: from Sky2high@aol.com by imo-m26.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v38_r7.3.) id q.2a5.5c63623 (57365) for ; Sat, 18 Feb 2006 13:23:46 -0500 (EST) From: Sky2high@aol.com X-Original-Message-ID: <2a5.5c63623.3128c032@aol.com> X-Original-Date: Sat, 18 Feb 2006 13:23:46 EST Subject: Roseville Glasair crash and others X-Original-To: lml@lancaironline.net MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="-----------------------------1140287026" X-Mailer: 9.0 Security Edition for Windows sub 5300 X-Spam-Flag: NO -------------------------------1140287026 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Jeff, I am not an official accident investigator, but I've played one in skits presented to fellow pilots gathered around the pot-bellied stove in my hangar. The easiest discussions are those about accidents that have exposed the chain of errors, frequently seeing the subject pilot sink into the quicksand of bad judgements while the option tree is viciously and rapidly pruned. If there is any benefit from these crashes, it is to those of us with fat heads that think we know it all until the next "Oops." I think of our discussions as learning from simulated error flying opposed to experiencing the real errors with painful consequences. Your contributions are greatly appreciated along with those from others. Another class of mishaps are more difficult to deal with - those where the evidence is all burned up or circumstances are not fully explained or NTSB investigations (if any) are still "preliminary" and the aircraft involved were "experimental, high performance" (Hmm.. Like little Lancairs perhaps). For these, speculation enters into the discussions - Not only extravagant wild a$$ed guesses (EWAGs, showing pilot creativity), but thoughtful WAGs (showing capability to think critically about something other than women or the next Krispy Kreme encounter). These too are beneficial because they expand the simulations to "what if that were me?" Navel lint picking at its' finest. Will we ever know what happened when Dick Reichel crashed on approach (LAX06LA096)? What went wrong on the return to land (NYC06LA039)? It has been my observation (after spending a night at a Holiday Inn Express) that there also have been a great number of "flight mistakes" made by those that recently (or not so recently) purchased a high performance experimental aircraft - I.E. Not having built one (or it) themselves. With 2 aboard, what possessed the pilot (not builder) to fly so low as to stumble on the airport perimeter fence (LAX05LA064)? With 2 aboard, how did the stall-spin start (LAX05FA061, built 1990, bought 10/04, crashed 1/05)? With 2 aboard, what caused the engine to stop (LAX06LA067), newly owned 1 day)? With 2 aboard, what was he thinking (LAX06LA110, built 1996, bought 11/29/05, crashed 2/12/06)? On the last crash, the Glasair, one might speculate that prior aerobatics were done solo and the plane behaved differently with 2 aboard. FAR violations contributed to the extent of the post crash disaster, the pilot did the rest on his own. After stepping into the quicksand of FAR violations, he probably sunk further by a common pre-crash phrase, "Watch This!" One might even EWAG that in all these cases, the possibly unfamiliar operation with the weight of two people was contributory to the outcome. Another WAG is that "experimental, high performance" is not well understood by a subset of pilots trained in part 23 (?, Standard Type Certificate) clunkers that were designed to make the inattentive operator whole again after some slow-speed dunderheaded goof-up. There are frequent demonstrations that the price for high performance is paid for at other parts of the flight regime - especially slow flight. Even though we can boost our egos by claiming to be test pilots, for the most part we are not. We are not trained to operate on the edge of the envelope nor to lick and re-seal it after falling outside (cute, but I hate analogies). It is not our everyday job to practice recovery from every manner of system failure or flight extreme. It is certainly not our purpose to regularly cause flight emergencies and then fix them. It is my purpose to learn how to avoid the self-created ones as best I can from other's experiences and narratives. This is not to diminish the importance of knowing your limits and those of your own plane, whether you built it or bought it and the FARs that provide a proven framework within which safe operation has a better chance. Anyway, thanks for lighting the fires and kicking the tires of thought. Scott Krueger AKA Grayhawk Lancair N92EX IO320 SB 89/96 Aurora, IL (KARR) PS: The descriptions are found at: _http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/query.asp#query_start_ (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/query.asp#query_start) enter the accident number. PPS Remain safe by following the F-16 that intercepted you in a TFR, even if you have to slow down. In a message dated 2/18/2006 12:52:35 A.M. Central Standard Time, VTAILJEFF@aol.com writes: The purpose of this forum is to discuss items of interest be it building, flying, Lancairs, experitmental, etc. This forum includes items related to aviation safety. If you do not want to participate, fine. Hit the delete key. The only person(s) who brought discredit onto our aviation community and smaller experimental community is the pilot(s) of the Roseville Glasair. I am simply the messenger. 98% of what was posted was straight out of the paper. Unfortunately, their actions bring reactions from within and without the aviation community that we (the pilot community) have to bear: 1. Insurance will not be cheaper. If you're not bitching here about his actions and similar actions we have been discussing then don't bitch when you get your premium notice next year. 2. Regulations may get tighter--- the LA FSDO announced plans last year restricting flights by experimental amateur built aircraft over populated ares-- this won't help. 3. AOPA is going to Sacramento this weekend to put on a presentation about the hazards of "maneuvering flight" to other local pilots there who might be similarly minded. 4. EAA and the FAA public relations folks are trying to smooth ruffled feathers because some knuckleheads think the regulations do not apply to themselves. What this guy did in Roseville was stupid -- It was beyond stupid, it was gross negligence. IMHO its not a pumkin pie/ splattered orange comparison. If this pilot was willing to do aerobatics over his neighborhood I'll bet he was probably shining his ass elsewhere and a bunch of his buddies are now telling the NTSB he did it at the home field all the time-- How do I know? As an aircraft accident investigator I have seen it many times before. In recent years we have lost pilots and passengers from thunderstorm penetration (Sterling Ainsworth, Wendell Durr, & others); failing to apply basic airworthiness standards (Shannon Knoepflin, Tony Durrizzi) and loss of control/ stall spin (Chuck Brenner). My message has always been to fly within the regulations and the advisory material. The above people did not think these things applied to them. How do I know? I counselled Shannon on numerous occasions about airworthiness. The last time at Oshkosh less than 24 hours before he took off on his fatal flight. Shannon thought he knew everything with his 300 hours of flight time and you could not tell him anything. I was parked next to Sterling Ainsworth at Oshkosh this past year-- a week before he was killed flying into a thunderstorm. He was just an older, richer version of Shannon. I spoke to both the NTSB investigator and the Canadian investiagtor in their cases and passed along what I knew of their situations. Several others already spoke to them as well. The bottom line is this. I have always counselled pilots to follow the regs, the advisory circular material, etc. Opposing views say that this stuff does not apply. I then quote the regulation/AC/ whatever for the benefit of the group who may not be familiar with it. (Sound familiar?) Then somebody goes out and splats themselves doing something like Chuck Brenner or this Roseville guy did and a few guys say, "I knew him, he was my best friend, what could have gone so wrong?" (Still sound familiar) I then say, "I told you so." And you say, "Jeff, You heartless bastard." If you do not think regulations and advisory material does not apply to you-- then fine, good luck. -------------------------------1140287026 Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Jeff,
 
I am not an official accident investigator, but I've played one in skit= s=20 presented to fellow pilots gathered around the pot-bellied stove in my=20 hangar.  The easiest discussions are those about accidents that=20 have exposed the chain of errors, frequently seeing the subject pilot s= ink=20 into the quicksand of bad judgements while the option tree is viciously and=20 rapidly pruned.  If there is any benefit from these crashes, it is to t= hose=20 of us with fat heads that think we know it all until the next=20 "Oops."  I think of our discussions as learning from simulate= d=20 error flying opposed to experiencing the real errors with painful=20 consequences.  Your contributions are greatly appreciated along with=20 those from others.
 
Another class of mishaps are more difficult to deal with - those w= here=20 the evidence is all burned up or circumstances are not fully explained or NT= SB=20 investigations (if any) are still "preliminary" and the aircraft=20 involved were "experimental, high performance" (Hmm.. Like little Lanca= irs=20 perhaps). For these, speculation enters into the discussions - Not only= =20 extravagant wild a$$ed guesses (EWAGs, showing pilot creativity), but=20 thoughtful WAGs (showing capability to think critically about something othe= r=20 than women or the next Krispy Kreme encounter).  These too are=20 beneficial because they expand the simulations to "what if that were me?"&nb= sp;=20 Navel lint picking at its' finest.
 
Will we ever know what happened when Dick Reichel crashed on appro= ach=20 (LAX06LA096)?
What went wrong on the return to land (NYC06LA039)?
 
It has been my observation (after spending a night at a Holiday Inn=20 Express) that there also have been a great number of "flight mistakes"=20= made=20 by those that recently (or not so recently) purchased a high performanc= e=20 experimental aircraft - I.E. Not having built one (or=20 it) themselves.
 
With 2 aboard, what possessed the pilot (not builder) to fly so lo= w as=20 to stumble on the airport perimeter fence (LAX05LA064)?
With 2 aboard, how did the stall-spin start (LAX05FA061,=20 built 1990, bought 10/04, crashed 1/05)?
With 2 aboard, what caused the engine to stop=20 (LAX06LA067), newly owned 1 day)?
With 2 aboard, what was he thinking (LAX06LA110, built= =20 1996, bought 11/29/05, crashed 2/12/06)?
 
On the last crash, the Glasair, one might speculate that prior aerobati= cs=20 were done solo and the plane behaved differently with 2 aboard.  FAR=20 violations contributed to the extent of the post crash disaster, the pilot d= id=20 the rest on his own.  After stepping into the quicksand of FAR violatio= ns,=20 he probably sunk further by a common pre-crash phrase, "Watch This!"&nb= sp;=20
 
One might even EWAG that in all these cases, the possibly=20 unfamiliar operation with the weight of two people was contributory to=20= the=20 outcome. 
 
Another WAG is that "experimental, high performance" is not well=20 understood by a subset of pilots trained in part 23 (?, Standard Type=20 Certificate) clunkers that were designed to make the inattentive operat= or=20 whole again after some slow-speed dunderheaded goof-up.  There are= =20 frequent demonstrations that the price for high performance is paid for at o= ther=20 parts of the flight regime - especially slow flight.
 
Even though we can boost our egos by claiming to be test pilots, f= or=20 the most part we are not.  We are not trained to operate on the edge of= the=20 envelope nor to lick and re-seal it after falling outside (cute, but I hate=20 analogies).  It is not our everyday job to practice recovery from every= =20 manner of system failure or flight extreme.  It is certainly not our=20 purpose to regularly cause flight emergencies and then fix them.  It is= my=20 purpose to learn how to avoid the self-created ones as best I can=20 from other's experiences and narratives.  This is not to diminish=20= the=20 importance of knowing your limits and those of your own plane, whether=20= you=20 built it or bought it and the FARs that provide a proven framework with= in=20 which safe operation has a better chance. 
 
Anyway, thanks for lighting the fires and kicking the tires of=20 thought.
 
Scott Krueger=20 AKA Grayhawk
Lancair N92EX IO320 SB 89/96
Aurora, IL=20 (KARR)
PS:  The descriptions are found at:  http://www.ntsb.gov/= ntsb/query.asp#query_start =20 enter the accident number.
 
PPS Remain safe by following the F-16 that intercepted you in a TFR, ev= en=20 if you have to slow down. 
 
 
In a message dated 2/18/2006 12:52:35 A.M. Central Standard Time,=20 VTAILJEFF@aol.com writes:
<= FONT=20 style=3D"BACKGROUND-COLOR: transparent" face=3DArial color=3D#000000 size= =3D2>
The purpose of this forum is to discuss items of interest be it build= ing,=20 flying, Lancairs, experitmental, etc. This forum includes items related to= =20 aviation safety. If you do not want to participate, fine. Hit the delete k= ey.=20 The only person(s)  who brought discredit onto our aviation=20 community and smaller experimental community is the pilot(s) of the=20 Roseville Glasair. I am simply the messenger. 98% of what was posted was=20 straight out of the paper.
 
Unfortunately, their actions bring reactions from within and without=20= the=20 aviation community that we (the pilot community) have to bear:
 
1. Insurance will not be cheaper. If you're not bitching here about h= is=20 actions and similar actions we have been discussing then don't bitch when=20= you=20 get your premium notice next year.
2. Regulations may get tighter--- the LA FSDO announced plans last ye= ar=20 restricting flights by experimental amateur built aircraft over populated=20 ares-- this won't help.
3. AOPA is going to Sacramento this weekend to put on a presentation=20 about the hazards of "maneuvering flight" to other local pilots there who=20 might be similarly minded.
4. EAA and the FAA public relations folks are trying to smooth ruffle= d=20 feathers because some knuckleheads think the regulations do not apply to=20 themselves.
 
What this guy did in Roseville was stupid -- It was beyond stupid,=20  it was gross negligence. IMHO its not a pumkin pie/ splattered orang= e=20 comparison. If this pilot was willing to do aerobatics over his neighborho= od=20 I'll bet he was probably shining his ass elsewhere and a bunch of his budd= ies=20 are now telling the NTSB  he did it at the home field all the time--=20= How=20 do I know? As an aircraft accident investigator I have seen it many times=20 before.
 
In recent years we have lost pilots and passengers from thunderstorm=20 penetration (Sterling Ainsworth, Wendell Durr, & others); failing to a= pply=20 basic airworthiness standards (Shannon Knoepflin, Tony Durrizzi) and loss=20= of=20 control/ stall spin (Chuck Brenner). My message has always been to fly wit= hin=20 the regulations and the advisory material. The above people did not think=20 these things applied to them. How do I know? I counselled Shannon on numer= ous=20 occasions about airworthiness. The last time at Oshkosh less than 24 hours= =20 before he took off on his fatal flight. Shannon thought he knew everything= =20 with his 300 hours of flight time and you could not tell him anything. I w= as=20 parked next to Sterling Ainsworth at Oshkosh this past year-- a week befor= e he=20 was killed flying into a thunderstorm.  He was just an older, richer=20  version of Shannon. I spoke to both the NTSB investigator and the=20 Canadian investiagtor in their cases and passed along what I knew of their= =20 situations. Several others already spoke to them as well.
 
The bottom line is this. I have always counselled pilots to follow th= e=20 regs, the advisory circular material, etc. Opposing views say that this st= uff=20 does not apply. I then quote the regulation/AC/ whatever  for the ben= efit=20 of the group who may not be familiar with it. (Sound familiar?) Then someb= ody=20 goes out and splats themselves doing something like Chuck Brenner or this=20 Roseville guy did and a few guys say, "I knew him, he was my best friend,=20= what=20 could have gone so wrong?" (Still sound familiar) I then say, "I told you=20= so."=20 And you say, "Jeff, You heartless bastard."
 
If you do not think regulations and advisory material does not a= pply=20 to you-- then fine, good luck.
 
 
 
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