X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Sender: To: lml@lancaironline.net Date: Fri, 05 Aug 2011 10:37:37 -0400 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from elasmtp-masked.atl.sa.earthlink.net ([209.86.89.68] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 5.4.1) with ESMTP id 5082328 for lml@lancaironline.net; Thu, 04 Aug 2011 20:54:06 -0400 Received-SPF: none receiver=logan.com; client-ip=209.86.89.68; envelope-from=colyncase@earthlink.net DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=dk20050327; d=earthlink.net; b=k6OpPBLEehAvx0/6xNtPtrJHwiAl9g4qhF3VFoQDG1k7cEBCe04W7yksRugZAm3z; h=Received:From:Mime-Version:Content-Type:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:To:References:Message-Id:X-Mailer:X-ELNK-Trace:X-Originating-IP; Received: from [64.223.163.164] (helo=[192.168.1.24]) by elasmtp-masked.atl.sa.earthlink.net with esmtpa (Exim 4.67) (envelope-from ) id 1Qp8fM-0007TR-Gv for lml@lancaironline.net; Thu, 04 Aug 2011 20:53:32 -0400 From: Colyn Case Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v1084) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-246--809036740 Subject: Re: [LML] Fw: Re: Re-doing my panel - carefully thinking through failures X-Original-Date: Thu, 4 Aug 2011 20:53:32 -0400 In-Reply-To: X-Original-To: "Lancair Mailing List" References: X-Original-Message-Id: <1542D455-9D02-4EC4-A03C-1D3D4419233F@earthlink.net> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1084) X-ELNK-Trace: 63d5d3452847f8b1d6dd28457998182d7e972de0d01da9400ff80f479a121ffb64bd24f331012c6b350badd9bab72f9c350badd9bab72f9c350badd9bab72f9c X-Originating-IP: 64.223.163.164 --Apple-Mail-246--809036740 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Nice Fred. What 19 ah battery are you using? On Aug 4, 2011, at 9:30 AM, Frederick Moreno wrote: > =20 > Brent has written much on this topic including "In my "Glazed and = Confused" presentation on "Glass Cockpits" I say that flying an aircraft = with a non-certified, non TSO'ed glass standby (Dynon et al) is like = jumping out of an airplane with only your main parachute and your = standby plan is the fact you are wearing real soft socks." > =20 > I concur.=20 > =20 > When I was young and stupid (not long ago) I had thoughts of long = overwater (think trans-Pacific) flights. I also have experience with = failure modes assessment analysis (FMEA) which frequently shows up = failure modes easily over looked. After reviewing various electrical = and instrument configurations I arrived at a system design which is = shown in simplified form in the attached sketch. It consists of two = alternators, two batteries, four busses, and a lot of opportunities for = cross tie. I use dual Chelton screens, with PFD off the essential buss = (many sources of power), the MFD off of the avionics bus (which has many = sources of power), and back up electric attitude indicator (on = essential buss), turn and bank (essential buss) and air speed and = altitude indicators. > =20 > You show me the failure and I can show you the automated or manual = work around. And critical stuff is all double protected with circuit = breakers and surge arresters (not shown). > =20 > But even this diagram is not as safe as it could be. What about = something simple like: a battery relay decides to go flotch? (One = already has done so.) That causes a main bus to go south forcing you to = a cross tie solution, not ideal. So not shown are by-pass switches and = fuses around the relay solenoids I added "just in case" to provide = redundancy on all supply routes. > =20 > I have a mechanical and electrical fuel pump. And I have an = electronic ignition and a magneto. > =20 > Two of everything, independent power modes, independent pathways, = cross connects, multiple layers of electrical spike and surge protection = and independent and different principles of gyroscopic display and = electrical power supply. Now one begins to achieve realistically (and = defensible) high levels of reliability. =20 > =20 > If I could only achieve the same with the pilot. > =20 > Fred Moreno > =20 >=20 >=20 > =20 > =20 > -- > For archives and unsub = http://mail.lancaironline.net:81/lists/lml/List.html --Apple-Mail-246--809036740 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii Nice Fred.   What 19 ah battery are you = using?

On Aug 4, 2011, at 9:30 AM, Frederick Moreno = wrote:

 
I = concur. 
 
When I was young and stupid = (not long ago) I had thoughts of long overwater (think trans-Pacific) = flights.  I also have experience with failure modes assessment = analysis (FMEA) which frequently shows up failure modes easily over = looked.  After reviewing various electrical and instrument = configurations I arrived at a system design which is shown in simplified = form in the attached sketch.  It consists of two alternators, two = batteries, four busses, and a lot of opportunities for cross tie.  = I use dual Chelton screens, with PFD off the essential buss (many = sources of power), the MFD off of the avionics bus (which has many = sources of power), and back up electric attitude  indicator (on = essential buss), turn and bank (essential buss) and air speed and = altitude indicators.
 
You show me the failure = and I can show you the automated or manual work around.  And = critical stuff is all double protected with circuit breakers and surge = arresters (not shown).
 
But even this = diagram is not as safe as it could be.  What about something = simple like: a battery relay decides to go flotch?  (One already = has done so.)  That causes a main bus to go south forcing you to a = cross tie solution, not ideal.  So not shown are by-pass switches = and fuses around the relay solenoids I added "just in case" to = provide redundancy on all supply = routes.
 
 I have a mechanical and = electrical fuel pump.  And I have an electronic ignition and a = magneto.
 
Two of everything, independent power = modes, independent pathways, cross connects, multiple layers of = electrical spike and surge protection and independent and different = principles of gyroscopic display and  electrical power = supply.  Now one begins to achieve realistically (and = defensible) high levels of = reliability.  
 
If I could only = achieve the same with the pilot.
 
Fred = Moreno
 


 
 
<Simplified-Power-Distributi.jpg>--
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