X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Sender: To: lml Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2006 19:03:02 -0500 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from [206.229.254.14] (HELO smtp.perigee.net) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 5.1.2) with ESMTP id 1565233 for lml@lancaironline.net; Tue, 14 Nov 2006 14:06:31 -0500 Received-SPF: none receiver=logan.com; client-ip=206.229.254.14; envelope-from=jschroeder@perigee.net Received: from john-study-2 (dsl-208-26-41-145.perigee.net [208.26.41.145]) by smtp.perigee.net (8.12.10/8.12.10) with ESMTP id kAEJ6AvO004205 for ; Tue, 14 Nov 2006 14:06:11 -0500 X-Original-To: "Lancair Mailing List" Subject: Re: [LML] Re: Lancair down in Georgia - Training References: X-Original-Message-ID: X-Original-Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2006 14:06:04 -0500 From: "John Schroeder" Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; delsp=yes; charset=iso-8859-15 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Opera M2/8.54 (Win32, build 7730) Rick - Very well said. John Schroeder ============================== > > I'm not a turbine expert (not even close) and don't have turbine horse in > the race. However, seems that hitting the ground (or water), loss of > control due to icing, or in-flight breakup are factors that should not enter > into the factual consideration of turbine reliability. In those cases, it's > true the engines did stop (eventually), however it was after the fact. > Since, recips also stop with fuel starvation; I'd also eliminate that from > my engine reliability consideration. You could argue it from an overall > "systems" perspective - however fuel management is not uniquely a turbine > issue. > > > If you disregard incidents due to terrain, icing, in-flight breakup, etc > from the Lancair turbine crash statistics, there is not much (any) data left > to support you thoughts that there is a "high rate of unexplained engine > failures". Unless there is data to show otherwise, your perceptions are > simply incorrect. Nothing wrong with that - the scientific method is to > start with a theory and then prove or disprove it with facts, logic and/or > experimentation. The outcome is usually valuable either way. > > > Overall, #1 cause of light plane crashes and fatalities is pilot error (and > has been historically). It seems this most recent accident (along with many > others) reinforces this and shows we should all spend more time training > (assuming training helps reduce pilot errors). > > > It would be interesting to be able to factually review historic accident > statistics (especially the pilot error ones), relative to the amount of > recurrent training the pilots had. > > Perhaps this is something that NAFI could/should attempt. Of course, we > need to be careful here, if the Feds come to the conclusion that x hrs of > re-current training results in x% reduction in GA accidents, we might find > ourselves with additional FARs. Luckily they typically move slowly and have > plenty of other stuff to worry about or. perhaps that would be a good > thing??? > > > An interesting discussion thread would be; "what are the factors that tend > to discourage pilots from getting more recurrent training"? Upon better > understanding this, we can individually consider and address those causes > and how they may effect our behavior. We should all be concerned with this > as it ultimately effects what we pay in insurance, the loss of friends & > planes, and the public's perceptions of general aviation. > > > I propose the reasons we (I) don't do more recurrent training is: > > > * Natural aversion to receiving critical feedback (even if > constructive) > * Uncomfortable with potential realization that we are not as skilled > as we think we are (simulated engine out practice - touchdown accuracy) > * Expense (actually small relative to the overall cost of ownership > and flying) > * Time (I enjoy flying, so this should not really be a reason) > * The results/benefits of re-current training are not often directly > observable or quantifiable > > > Seems each of these is easily over-come-able with rational > thinking/behavior. > > > There is also the issue/concern of the quality/appropriateness of the > training. In addition to approaches flown during normal IFR flights, I do > my required 6 approaches, holds, and course intercepts every 6 months (IFR > currency) as separate flights/training. I make it a point to do at least 6 > in the spring and 6 in the fall, in actual low IMC whenever possible (not > possible in the winter in Mich due to icing). However, I've always done > those at YIP a large local airport (my local, really bad weather alternate). > I've told myself this is good because I want to be able to land there under > the worst of conditions (if necessary). Now, after years of that, I'm > pretty good at it - "turn me in at the marker and make it tight", partial > panel, purposely out of trim, etc. > > > Perhaps that's not the best bang for my buck anymore. Perhaps, I should > purposely go somewhere where I've never reviewed the approach chart, and > don't look at it until after being cleared for the approach. Perhaps I > should do a few ASR approaches - haven't done any of those in years. > Perhaps I should do some more IFR unusual-attitude work (dual with foggles). > Perhaps I need to really rethink my personal approach to currency, practice, > and training. How real is it for me go out and practice engine out > procedures, when I know that is what I am going to do ahead of time. Better > than nothing, but perhaps not the best way. > > > Your thoughts??? > > > Rick Titsworth > > > > > > -- > > > > For archives and unsub http://mail.lancaironline.net/lists/lml/ > >