From: "Marvin Kaye" <marv@lancaironline.net>
Subject: Re: [LML] Re: Single Pilot IFR
To: lml
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2005 19:59:18 -0400
Message-ID: <web-679834@logan.com>
In-Reply-To: <17E9FE5945A57A41B4D8C07737DB60721981A8@PDX-MX6.stoel.com>
References: <17E9FE5945A57A41B4D8C07737DB60721981A8@PDX-MX6.stoel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"; format="flowed"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Posted for "Halle, John" <JJHALLE@stoel.com>:

  I agree with everything you say about the virtues of training except for the
implication that it is a valid substitute for good judgment.  As an ex-Navy
pilot, I am the product of what is (along with the Airforce program) probably
the best aviation training program on earth.  At no point in that program was
there any excuse for not knowing your airplane and its performace parameters
cold.  I absolutely subscribe to that principle.  That said, training (at
least the kind of emergency procedures training that we have been discussing
in this forum recently) is what you rely on when you find yourself in an
emergency.  Judgment is what you use not to get there in the first place.
  After five years of reading Lancair accident stats what strikes me is that
there is relatively little evidence of accidents resulting from bad training
(for example, there is no evidence that the recent IV-P in CB crash resulted
from a failure to observe the appropriate CB penetration procedures which, for
all I know, were meticulously followed) there is a strikingly large body of
evidence of crashes that would not have occured but for lapses in judgment.  I
am therefore all for training because of the marginal difference that it may
make in case one of us finds him/herself in an emergency situation but I am
dismayed when I read detailed analyses of how to deal with CB penetration that
seem not to be accompanied by any indication that the first thing that went
inexcusably wrong was being there in the first place.  (I am left slack-jawed
when I read a description of being "sucked" into a CB because there was a
second and merging CB behind the first one.  The Navy, with all its emphasis
on training would never have accepted that as an excuse.)  For me, the bottom
line is simply this: we are being killed and our a/c are being wrecked
primarily by errors in judgment.  If we are willing to accept that errors in
judgment will continue at their current alarming rate, then, as you point out,
we need to do better on training because that it all we have left.  My hope is
that we don't have to accept the current rate of judgment errors and that all
of the careful training that I hope, as you do, that we continue to do, will
be necessary less often.
  
  I do want to comment on the "high performance" stuff.  I started out flying
Cherokee 140s and went from that to T-34s, T-2s, TF-9s, T-33s and TF102s.  The
latter were all considered high performance at the time but, compared to
today's front line fighters, they are all camels.  In terms of performance, my
Legacy is somewhere between T-34 and T-2 but much closer to T-34.  My take
from this experience is that high performance is a relative term and that the
only way in which high performance affects safety is when it applies to pilots
who are not used to whatever the performance level is.  In that sense, the
high performance issue is a transition problem.  But we are not seeing
accidents, by and large, that result from transition issues.  Some of the most
experienced pilots (both generally and in Lancairs) have been involved in
fatal Lancair accidents.  In fact, I would guess that the statistics would
show a higher risk among experienced high-performance Lancair pilots than
among transitioners.  What is true about Lancairs is that, in addition to
being "high performance" relative to what many flew before transitioning to
Lancairs, Lancairs are experimental and therefore do not benefit from either
the level of standardization that applies to certified a/c or the level of
testing required to obtain certification.  What this means to me is that
pushing the envelope is a riskier proposition in a Lancair than it is in, for
example, a citabria, edge or other airplane that is more closely identical to
hundreds of other a/c of the same type and in which it is likely that hundreds
have already tried, and reported on, whatever you are trying.  For this
reason, while I would gladly go out any time and do a stall series in a 172,
my experience in my Legacy consists of an approach to stall, done with Don
Goetz on board as a part of initial flight testing.  Even with ACM experience
under my belt, I not only don't stall my Legacy, I don't come close at any
time at which I am not within ten feet of a runway.  It's not because the a/c
is too high performance for me; it's because I don't know for sure what it
will do and neither does anyone else.
  
  All I am trying to do is make a pitch for more focus on good judgment.
  Lancairs don't do well in CBs.  Neither does any other a/c.  The correct
attitude in light of this fact is not to accept any significant risk of
getting into one.  Lancairs are substantially more unpretictable in stall than
is the typical certified piston single.  The correct attidude in light of this
fact is not to accept any significant risk of an unintentional stall (and to
be very careful about doing intentional stalls.)  No a/c has reliable fuel
indicators.  The correct attitude is not to accept any significant risk of
fuel exhaustion.  If all this fails, we will have to fall back on our training
and I hope that will help but I would much rather see a drastic reduction in
opportunities to demonstrate the benefits of training than I would a new
series of war stories about how training saved the day.
  
  Just one pilot's opinion.