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Well, weight and balance, removal of 2 out of 4 props, just the general
attitude towards compliance. Fudging an hour or two to get to OSH is one
thing. If he'd had a lot of high performance time, some shortcuts might not
raise as many questions, but 200 hours in a Cherokee? I thought the battery
was determined to be the cause of the accident. I know it's not spelled out
here, perhaps I heard/read about it somewhere else. Didn't John Denver meet
a similar fate? Something about using vise grips on a fuel selector valve?
This guy overloaded himself, and sometimes "not following procedure" is the
cause of an accident.
BTW, Good decision Chris M. on figuring your engine problem out after the
move to NC. BW -----Original Message-----
From: Rotary motors in aircraft [mailto:flyrotary@lancaironline.net] On
Behalf Of Ernest Christley
Sent: Friday, June 26, 2009 4:17 PM
To: Rotary motors in aircraft
Subject: [FlyRotary] Re: AeroElectric-List: Complex aircraft NTSB report
Robert L. Nuckolls, III wrote:
At 06:50 AM 6/26/2009, you wrote:
All,
I found this link on the rotary engine news group. It's a thorough NTSB report about a complex engine/electrical installation that the builder/pilot was unwilling and unprepared to finish correctly.
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20071120X01821&ntsbno=NYC08FA023&a
key=1
<http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20071120X01821&ntsbno=NYC08FA023&
akey=1>
I've had several private links to this posting.
Very sad. It's an unfortunate fact of the human
condition that rational thought processes and
understanding of simple-ideas can be so terribly
diminished by hazardous behaviors.
Let's not let simple ideas get lost in our sympathy for the pilot in this accident. Most of this report is superfluous fluff with little bearing on what could have caused the accident. In fact, there is no statement of what caused the accident that could be blamed on the lack of a rational thought processes on the part of the builder.
Most of the report was dedicated to pointing out how the high-end EFIS was not calibrated. At no point was the lack of calibration cited as a contributing factor to the accident. The man was flying day VFR. The instrument was superfluous for the mission. The fact that the pilot was not familiar with the instrument's operation was superfluous to the report. The fact that the instrument was in the plane at all was superfluous to the report. How could anything displayed on an uncalibrated EFIS translate into a plane taking a 35 to 60 degree nosedive during a day VFR flight?
Most of the remainder of the report was equally superfluous. The first flight occurred on July 12. The accident occurred on November 2. The fact that clecoes held the cowling on for the first flight was superfluous to the accident report. It might have been germane if an accident had occurred with the clecoes still in use, but that was not the case. The fact that the propeller was under manual control vs some sort of electronics is superfluous. Are there not many examples of airplanes flying just fine with manual control? And I hear that there are a few flying with no pitch control at all. There is some information that the pilot was having issues with coordinating the engine power with the propeller pitch controls. But that does not translate to taking a 35 to 60 degree nose dive into terra firma. I can't even translate it to a situation where the pilot would not be able to maintain altitude. It might translate to an inability to maintain smooth level flight, but there is a wide gulf between smooth level flight and a dirt bath.
The report pointed out that the rudder trim was attached with duct tape. The key word is "attached". How did a *rudder* trim that was *attached* contribute to a 60 degree nosedive? How does an *attached* rudder trim even make it difficult to maintain altitude? An aileron trim tab rod had been broken and poorly repaired. Was the weak attachment cause of an accident, or more superfluous data?
The report makes hay of the pilots lack of high performance training. He was flying the plane for nearly 4 months before the accident. I would imagine that high performance training would cover issues like severe P factors and overspeeding the airplane. Is "maintaining altitude" taught exclusively in high performance trainging now? If not, why is the lack of such training an issue? The report details the pilots rush to get to Oshkosh, and the pilots willingness to falsify records in order to meet legal requirements. How did any of that contribute to an accident that occurred months later?
There were some wires not connected. So? Did any of them contribute to the inability to maintain altitude? I have several wires in my project that are slated for future upgrades. It's much easier to run them now than when everything is closed up. They are not connected to anything. If something really bad happens to me, those wires will have nothing to do with it, but will "unconnected cables" be cited in the report anyway?
I suggest reading the report again...but cross out all the superfluous lines that obviously have nothing at all to do with the accident. Cross out the parts that point out "He didn't follow the rules. He was a BAAAAD man." It'll be a much shorter report. The pilot of N289DT may very well be a prime candidate for a Darwin Award, but we can't know that from reading this report. All I can tell is that the investigator was much more concerned with pointing out how the pilot was not following procedure than about what occurred.
--
http://www.ernest.isa-geek.org
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