X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Received: from fed1rmmtao107.cox.net ([68.230.241.39] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 5.2.14) with ESMTP id 3672374 for flyrotary@lancaironline.net; Thu, 04 Jun 2009 21:40:15 -0400 Received-SPF: none receiver=logan.com; client-ip=68.230.241.39; envelope-from=rv-4mike@cox.net Received: from fed1rmimpo03.cox.net ([70.169.32.75]) by fed1rmmtao107.cox.net (InterMail vM.7.08.02.01 201-2186-121-102-20070209) with ESMTP id <20090605013936.IDCD18948.fed1rmmtao107.cox.net@fed1rmimpo03.cox.net> for ; Thu, 4 Jun 2009 21:39:36 -0400 Received: from wills ([68.105.85.56]) by fed1rmimpo03.cox.net with bizsmtp id 01fZ1c00F1CvZmk041fcnD; Thu, 04 Jun 2009 21:39:37 -0400 X-VR-Score: -100.00 X-Authority-Analysis: v=1.0 c=1 a=_vl8Xygvyp8A:10 a=ayC55rCoAAAA:8 a=arxwEM4EAAAA:8 a=QdXCYpuVAAAA:8 a=7g1VtSJxAAAA:8 a=kviXuzpPAAAA:8 a=UretUmmEAAAA:8 a=Ia-xEzejAAAA:8 a=YQFHdWNnY2OcgQ_8zaMA:9 a=GQ_v7DEnzHXyU8ZBoQwA:7 a=PB1ZnGBEoBQ7bBoUoDUKGJE8IZ0A:4 a=EzXvWhQp4_cA:10 a=3JoA1Ab3VvRtXd6-:21 a=OlTxd9hr_djWRY8d:21 a=SSmOFEACAAAA:8 a=PBShdU01UtohaCJZic0A:9 a=UoLSlRCTV4U102lHLscA:7 a=t2vyGBbcdQQG5kgtONHh_ZaNbVMA:4 a=O334kGInd3cIyrHB:21 X-CM-Score: 0.00 Message-ID: <09DBDE84F7874D56829C473A83EBFA67@wills> From: "Mike Wills" To: "Rotary motors in aircraft" References: Subject: Re: [FlyRotary] Re: Incident No. 5119 Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2009 18:39:34 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_002B_01C9E543.CE3B92B0" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2900.5512 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.5579 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_002B_01C9E543.CE3B92B0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable One last comment on this. Are you guys aware that Sully, the pilot of = the Airbus that went in the Hudson, is an accomplished glider pilot? I = wonder how many airline pilots in the same situation without his glider = experience would have tried to turn back or tried to stretch a glide to = Teeterboro? Mike Wills RV-4 N144MW ----- Original Message -----=20 From: Ed Anderson=20 To: Rotary motors in aircraft=20 Sent: Thursday, June 04, 2009 6:14 PM Subject: [FlyRotary] Re: Incident No. 5119=20 Mike makes a good point about glider time. I actually acquired a = glider's endorsement back in 1964, but had not flown one since then - = well, up until my first renewed interest in gliders {:>). While the = Rv-6A sans propulsion does not act like any glider you want to ride in, = having experienced flight without engine in a glider undoubtedly helped = control the consternation factor (at least to some degree). Besides, = that it is actually great fun - when in a real glider of course. Less = fun with an unintentional glide. =20 Ed =20 Ed Anderson Rv-6A N494BW Rotary Powered Matthews, NC eanderson@carolina.rr.com http://www.andersonee.com http://www.dmack.net/mazda/index.html http://www.flyrotary.com/ http://members.cox.net/rogersda/rotary/configs.htm#N494BW http://www.rotaryaviation.com/Rotorhead%20Truth.htm -------------------------------------------------------------------------= ----- From: Rotary motors in aircraft [mailto:flyrotary@lancaironline.net] = On Behalf Of Mike Wills Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 2009 11:36 PM To: Rotary motors in aircraft Subject: [FlyRotary] Re: Incident No. 5119=20 =20 Ed, =20 That's a great story. I think you secretly or sub-consciously are = trying to set some sort of record for in-flight emergencies. Personally = my goal is to make sure that all of my glider flights actually occur in = my glider. =20 In all seriousness, considering the possibilities of in flight engine = stoppage with our very experimental power plant installations, I would = highly encourage you guys to add a glider rating, or at least take some = glider dual. If the noise up front stops your confidence level will be = much higher and laundry bills much lower if you've had experience = landing without power. =20 The only downside to glider flying is the time it takes away from = airplane flying! =20 Mike Wills RV-4 N144MW (and homebuilt glider RS-15 N15LQ) ----- Original Message -----=20 From: Ed Anderson=20 To: Rotary motors in aircraft=20 Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 2009 8:16 AM Subject: [FlyRotary] Incident No. 5119=20 =20 Certainly not trying to "TOP" Al's door incident - by the way, good = airman ship and decisions, Al! Glad the damage was no worst that it = was. =20 But several folks who were not at the Texas Round up have asked = about the "Ed's Incident". For those of you who were at the roundup, = you will probably want to skip this repeat. =20 Incident No. 5119 =20 One the way to Texas I had an incident that ended up in with me and = aircraft making a 7 mile engine-out glide into Craig Field (Selma, = Alabama). Again - NO! It was not fault of the engine or even the = subsystems. But, the complete answer is not provided until after my = litany of the conditions and symptoms - can you figure it out? =20 I took off on Thursday AM planning on stopping in Mississippi to = join up with Charlie England and Tracy. After spending the night there, = we all three would head for Texas. But, the weather (as you are aware) = has been laying over the southeast for days with rain and more rain - = but I launched into it anyway as past Atlanta, GA things were forecast = to improve.. =20 Other than dodging lines of clouds and a bit of scud running, but = not much, I landed at Alexandria City to the southwest of Atlanta, GA to = take on fuel. I then climbed back in and fire it up and took off. =20 =20 I noticed that during climb-out the engine would occasionally miss = and thought the fuel might have had a bit of water in it, but was not = really concerned. So I fly on for approx another 45 minutes and had = just passed Selma, Alabama and old Craig Air Force base, and turned west = toward Mississippi, when more symptoms began to occur. =20 It started to act like a case of SAG (fouled spark plugs) where the = rpm will drop a bit - not dangerous - just nerve racking. But, shortly = things began to go beyond the SAG symptoms, so I though I might have an = injector problem (like one sticking open or not opening at all). Since = our injectors are in pairs, I tried turning off one figuring if things = got better, then that pair might have a bad injector. =20 So I turned off one pair and sure enough the symptoms abated a bit = (more on this later) so I figured I had a bad injector in that pair. To = be certain I turned this "bad" pair back on and turn off the "good" pair = expecting the symptoms to really get bad as I would now be running on = only the "bad" pair - much to my surprise when I turned off the "good" = pair - the symptoms also abated. So that indicated it was not an = injector problem - but what? =20 =20 About this time, I decided to turn the aircraft back around toward = Craig Field and dodging clouds headed back with the engine progressively = getting worst. It appeared to be a fuel problem (and while that is = ultimately the subsystem affected - it was not the root cause). The = fuel pressure was ranging from zero to 80 psi, other electrical things = were also misbehaving. I check the voltmeter thinking perhaps the = alternator had died - but it showed 14 volts. So back to the fuel = system. =20 Finally, the engine just stops with the prop standing still - like = a hood ornament, I'm at around 4500-5000 MSL at this point having lost = some altitude dodging a cloud (good old GPS just kept pointing to Craig = Field). At that time I am 7 miles out from Craig Field at 4500 msl with = at stopped prop, a crippled seat cushion and a dry mouth. Yes, I know = I've been there before, but I don't think you ever get "use" to it. I = recalled thinking things just can't get worst when they very shortly and = suddenly - did. =20 I keyed the radio and made a call to Craig Field at 4 miles on the = GPS (I'm starting to get good at this) but before I could get their = reply, I heard a "CLANK" (without the engine running you can hear things = like that) like a relay springing open (it was) and the entire panel = goes dead!!!! No radio, no engine instruments, not even a stinking LED = was lit - only the battery powered GPS. Can you spell "total electrical = failure?" Talk about a lonely feeling - amazing how comforting having = lights on and radio - you could almost convince yourself this was just a = practice engine-out landing, but not when the panel goes dark. No engine = gauges, no radio, nada! =20 Well not being one inclined to panic (but I seriously considered it = for a moment {:>)), I continued toward Craig field - I mean like there = were lots of other alternatives. Well Once again I found myself in the = "fortunate position" of being too high, too much altitude. So I put in = 40 degs of flaps to steepen my rate of descent. But, then I decided this = time that rather than do the 360 I had done on a previous Incident to = lose "excessive" altitude, I would try to glide - a more or less - = regular traffic pattern. =20 However, I neglected to remember to retract the flaps. So I found = myself on the downwind around mid-field at pattern altitude (which felt = normal) until I suddenly realized that you CAN NOT maintain that pattern = altitude without an engine!!! Duh! =20 I knew I could never make it to the far end of the runway before = turning base (toward the runway), so I started my turn immediately, to = make matters a bit worst - I had been paralleling the runway on the = downwind leg a bit too close - must have been the comforting feeling of = being close to safety. This position naturally required a tighter turn = and as I turned I saw I was likely to miss the runway and land in the = grass. So I though I need to steepen this turn further (this is called = COFFIN CORNER), but fortunately glanced at my airspeed indicator to see = it only registering 80 MPH and my rate of descent (normally 400-500 feet = per minute) up to over 1000 feet per minute. The seat cushion suddenly = vanished from this universe. =20 But the REAL danger in this situation, as you all know, is your = airspeed gets low, you are in a steep bank which greatly raises the = stall speed - meaning at 80 mph you are close to a stall in a steep = turn while your are not in straight and level. So I immediately = straighten out of the turn - the little voice saying "better to land in = the grass than get their concrete runway all messed up". So the = immediate danger of a stall was adverted, but I was still pointed toward = the ground with a sink rate twice as high as normal (and I've manage a = few hard landings even with a normal sink rate). =20 The hardest thing to do when you are sinking at a 1000 fpm a couple = hundred feet above the ground (with your nose already pointed at the = ground) is to push the stick forward steeping the dive even more. But, = I manage to do that and picked enough air speed and energy to flair to a = nice touch down - not even a bump. I've always been amazed at what = total concentration does to improve you landing {:>). =20 Rolled to the end of the runway and had energy to roll off onto the = taxiway. Got out, check under the aircraft for any evidence of leaks = and started pulling the aircraft toward the far -off - hangar which had = an airplane parked in front of it. A nice looking young woman comes = riding a bicycle out to meet me. Hopped off and holding out her hand = said "Hi I'm Angie, looks like we'll be spending time together" - so = things are starting to look up {:>) =20 So pulled the aircraft in to the hangar where the mechanic came over = and ask what the problem was. Well, I looked at the volt meter and it = said the battery was dead. Mechanic put on a battery charger and = announced "Yep! The battery is dead". So we both concluded that the = alternator must have failed and not being able to replenish the drain on = the battery by all the electrical systems such as fuel pumps, injectors, = ignition coils, etc had drained the battery. =20 =20 However, there were a few problems with the analysis of a failed = alternator. First, the low voltage warning light never came on to warn = of an alternator problem, 2nd I never notice the voltmeter showing = anything other than what it should for alternator voltage - like around = 14 volts. While checking the voltage after the Mechanic had charged the = battery, I noticed down below that the "essential bus" switch was in the = battery rather than the alternator position, so flicked it back to the = alternator position figuring I must have accidentally kicked it while = getting to some stuff in the baggage compartment of my RV-6A. =20 It was getting late and being a bit tired not to mention stressed, I = needed to get a rental car and a motel for the night. Did that, eat = dinner and went to bed after sitting down and drawing out a problem tree = with the entire major elements of the electrical system. =20 So next morning I show up at the hangar early and meet Ben, the = mechanic, the battery had received a charge of only 45 minutes the = evening before, So I suggested we charged it for another hour and try to = start the aircraft. Ben suggested a real stress test of the battery and = NOT charge it anymore. Made sense, so we rolled the aircraft out of the = hangar. I hopped in, threw a half dozen switches and punched the = starter button. The engine started on the first prop blade rotation - = so the battery was clearly OK. The engine is humming like a top. So I = looked over at the voltmeter expecting it to show only around 12.8 volts = instead of the 14 volts a functioning alternator would produce. Much to = my and Ben's surprise the alternator voltage read 14 volts. We loaded = the alternator by turning on the both l00 watt landing lights, all fuel = pumps, the pitot heat, etc. The alternator voltage only drops perhaps = 0.4 volts clearly indicating the alternator could carry the load and was = OK. =20 So here I am - battery is OK, alternator is OK - engine is purring = normally, so clearly this was all a figment of my deteriorating brain = cells. I loaded up the aircraft and launched to do a few circuits of = the airport - I did so and all was operating normally and so I radio = them I was head onward to Texas. While flying, my mind could not let go = of the problem and finally the light came on. =20 =20 The essential bus switch had (for my entire 10 + years of flying) = been in the alternator position. The purpose of this switch is to = isolate the battery from the alternator should the alternator fail - to = prevent an alternator problem from draining the battery. So in event of = an alternator problem, you move the switch from alternator to battery. = Its call the essential bus because you only have the essential things = drawing from the battery so you wont' drain it as quickly. The idea is = to give you time (generally around 30 minutes) to find a safe place to = land in case of alternator failure. =20 =20 Well, at some point I had either (not paying attention) turned the = switch to battery thinking I was turning the voltmeter switch to battery = - or accidentally had move the switch from alternator to battery = without noticing it by kicking it, etc. However, it was sort of = protected in its position from accidental activation. It must have = happened during refueling - as I got approx 45 minutes down the road on = the battery after take off before quality battery time started to = deteriorate. As the battery voltage fell due to the load (and no = alternator link to replenish it), electrical things (mainly computers = first) started acting up until they could not longer run the engine. The = injectors would not open fully, etc. Then as the voltage level further = decreased, the master relay which the battery held closed and which = connected the (fully functional) alternator to the rest of the = electrical system - opened up and removed ALL power from the electrical = system. So no radio, no gauges, etc.=20 =20 Oh, another little factor that may have contributed, the voltmeter = has a tiny toggle switch by it marked ALT BAT1 BAT2 for checking = alternator battery 1 and battery 2 (which I no longer fly with) = voltages. Down below It a couple of inches and off to the right is the = essential bus normal size toggle switch - also marked ALT BAT1 BAT1. I = normally never touch it and don't even think about it. But I could have = reached for the voltmeter toggle thinking to check my battery voltage = (which I do as a regular thing) and perhaps distracted by something = reach a bit further down and instead moved the essential bus switch from = Alternator to Battery cause this entire event. I know that I did not = consciously do it. So it is either accidental or absence minded = activation - either way ends with the same results {:>) =20 =20 Now it became clear why it didn't matter which pair of fuel = injectors I turned off - turning off either pair improved the situation = because it slightly reduced the electrical load by a few amps - and the = engine ran slightly better for a few moments. The same thing had = happened when turning off one of the EFI fuel pumps - but what threw me = was the alternator voltage continued to be normal during this. =20 =20 After I knew the cause (switch in wrong position), I decided the = problem was fixed so no reason to return to NC, and I just continued on = to Texas. =20 I know some of you may think that removing my second battery was a = mistake - but, consider this, having another battery could have meant I = would have been much further from a suitable airfield before they both = went south. On the other hand, it might have caused me to at least = think to throw the essential bus switch to the second battery and have = the Light bulb come on. Who really knows. But, I have in mind a simply = addition to my electrical circuit that should help in the future.=20 =20 =20 I do want to state that this time when the problems started I DID = switch fuel tanks - but naturally it had no effect because this time it = turned out, it was not a fuel problem - not the root cause at least. =20 So what are the lessons learned: =20 1.. Put EVERY critical switch on your before-takeoff Check list=20 2.. Perhaps put a guard around such critical switches to force = conscious activation=20 3.. Don't (hard not to) get overly focused on what you think is = the problem - consider other possibilities. I thought it was a fuel = problem (I even switched fuel tanks this time) - it turned out to be = electrical in its root cause.=20 4.. While the fuel pressure was jumping all over the place and the = EGT was erratic and engine surging strongly indicating a fuel problem - = the ultimate cause was electrical. Once the voltage got below a certain = point the EC2 was still trying to pull the injectors open, but with the = voltage so low it could not do it properly.=20 5.. When the battery voltage dropped below a certain point, the = master relay released and removed the alternator from the electrical = system and the panel went dark - even though the alternator was still = working=20 6.. Immediately turn to the nearest airfield when serious problems = occur - THEN work on fixing them. I only delayed for perhaps 2-3 = minutes, but that could have made a difference.=20 7.. Watch out for Coffin Corner turn when turning base to final - = airspeed really bleeds off fast with no engine pulling you along (and = especially with flaps deployed!)=20 8.. IF you change your mind about landing approach type - remember = to reconfigure your aircraft for the last decision - I had left my flaps = deployed when I should have remembered to retracted them. Did that help = prevent a Coffin Corner stall and spin or would it have put me closer to = it?=20 9.. You must increase airspeed over the wing to get the sufficient = energy to over come a high sink rate. Pulling back on the stick when = the ground is staring you in the face is the natural reaction - but, = pushing forward to lower the nose is the correct action - providing of = course you have sufficient altitude!=20 10.. Battery life - I had a two year old 680 odyssey battery which = I maintain a trickle charge on whenever I'm not flying. With two EFI = fuel pumps, boost pump, injectors, coils, EC2 and radio and just having = started the engine before take off - this battery lasted 55 minutes. = Well, the last 5 minutes was not quality battery time. So in my case, = 30 minutes appears to be a very realistic battery life. In fact, had I = turned off one EFI pump and the boost pump would have gained a few more = miles. But, if I had recognized the need to turn them off at that time = (I normally turn them off at cruise altitude), then I would have known = how to "fix" the problem.=20 11.. I've decided to add a Schokkty diode between my essential bus = and the alternator - so that as long as the alternator is producing = sufficient voltage, then the battery will be getting some charge to = replace the drain. I've also decided to make that switch position a = check-list item.=20 =20 So what it boils down to - if I had recognized early on that it was = an electrical problem and not focused so much on the fuel system, I may = have noticed the essential bus switch in the wrong position. Force = yourself to examine other possible causes (easy to say - harder to do).=20 =20 NEVER, NEVER forget that flying the airplane is the first and only = priority in this type of situation =20 NEVER, NEVER forget that saving your butt is the ultimately end-all = priority. When I decided that landing on the grass was preferable to = putting a hole in their concrete - I just may have made a life-saving = decision. =20 If anybody else wants to pick up this baton - I'm ready to hand it = over - what? no volunteers? {:>) =20 So that's my story and I'm sticking to it. =20 =20 Fly safe, guys!! =20 Ed Ed Anderson Rv-6A N494BW Rotary Powered Matthews, NC eanderson@carolina.rr.com http://www.andersonee.com http://www.dmack.net/mazda/index.html http://www.flyrotary.com/ http://members.cox.net/rogersda/rotary/configs.htm#N494BW http://www.rotaryaviation.com/Rotorhead%20Truth.htm =20 ------=_NextPart_000_002B_01C9E543.CE3B92B0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
One last comment on this. Are you guys = aware that=20 Sully, the pilot of the Airbus that went in the Hudson, is an = accomplished=20 glider pilot? I wonder how many airline pilots in the same situation = without his=20 glider experience would have tried to turn back or tried to stretch = a glide=20 to Teeterboro?
 
Mike Wills
RV-4 N144MW
----- Original Message -----
From:=20 Ed=20 Anderson
Sent: Thursday, June 04, 2009 = 6:14=20 PM
Subject: [FlyRotary] Re: = Incident No.=20 5119

Mike makes = a good=20 point about glider time.  I actually acquired a glider=92s = endorsement back=20 in 1964, but had not flown one since then =96 well, up until my first = renewed=20 interest in gliders {:>).  While the Rv-6A sans propulsion = does not=20 act like any glider you want to ride in, having experienced flight = without=20 engine in a glider undoubtedly helped control the consternation factor = (at=20 least to some degree).  Besides, that it is actually great fun = =96 when in=20 a real glider of course.  Less fun with an unintentional=20 glide.

 

Ed

 

Ed=20 Anderson

Rv-6A = N494BW Rotary=20 Powered

Matthews,=20 NC

eanderson@carolina.rr.com

http://www.andersonee.com

http://www.dmack.net/mazda/index.html

http://www.flyrotary.com/

http://members.cox.net/rogersda/rotary/configs.htm#N494BW

http://www.r= otaryaviation.com/Rotorhead%20Truth.htm

From:=20 Rotary motors in aircraft = [mailto:flyrotary@lancaironline.net] On=20 Behalf Of Mike Wills
Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 2009 = 11:36=20 PM
To: = Rotary motors in aircraft
Subject: [FlyRotary] Re: = Incident No.=20 5119

 

Ed,

 

 That's a great = story. I=20 think you secretly or sub-consciously are trying to set some sort of = record=20 for in-flight emergencies. Personally my goal is to make sure that all = of my=20 glider flights actually occur in my = glider.

 

 In all = seriousness,=20 considering the possibilities of in flight engine stoppage with our = very=20 experimental power plant installations, I would highly encourage you = guys to=20 add a glider rating, or at least take some glider dual. If the noise = up front=20 stops your confidence level will be much higher and laundry bills much = lower=20 if you've had experience landing without=20 power.

 

The only downside to = glider flying=20 is the time it takes away from airplane=20 flying!

 

Mike=20 Wills

RV-4 N144MW (and = homebuilt glider=20 RS-15 N15LQ)

----- Original Message = -----=20

From: Ed=20 Anderson

To: Rotary motors in = aircraft=20

Sent:=20 Wednesday, June 03, 2009 8:16 AM

Subject:=20 [FlyRotary] Incident No. 5119

 

Certainly = not=20 trying to =93TOP=94 Al=92s door incident =96 by the way, good airman = ship and=20 decisions, Al!  Glad the damage was no worst that it=20 was.

 

But = several folks=20 who were not at the Texas Round up have asked about the =93Ed=92s=20 Incident=94.  For those of you who were at the roundup, you = will probably=20 want to skip this repeat.

 

Incident = No.=20 5119

 

One the = way to=20 Texas I had an incident that = ended up in=20 with me and aircraft making a 7 mile engine-out glide into Craig = Field=20 (Selma, = Alabama).  Again =96 NO! It = was not=20 fault of the engine or even the subsystems.  But, the complete = answer=20 is not provided until after my litany of the conditions and symptoms = =96 can=20 you figure it out?

 

I took = off on=20 Thursday AM planning on stopping in Mississippi to join up with = Charlie=20 England and Tracy.  After spending the night there, we all = three would=20 head for Texas.  But, the weather = (as you are=20 aware) has been laying over the southeast for days with rain and = more rain =96=20 but I launched into it anyway as past Atlanta, GA things were forecast to=20 improve..

 

Other = than dodging=20 lines of clouds and a bit of scud running, but not much, I landed at = Alexandria City to the southwest of Atlanta, GA to take on fuel.  I then = climbed=20 back in and fire it up and took off.  =

 

I noticed = that=20 during climb-out the engine would occasionally miss and thought the = fuel=20 might have had a bit of water in it, but was not really = concerned.  So=20 I fly on for approx another 45 minutes and had just passed Selma, Alabama and old=20 Craig Air Force base, and turned west toward Mississippi, when more symptoms = began to=20 occur.

 

It = started to act=20 like a case of SAG (fouled spark plugs) where the rpm will drop a = bit =96 not=20 dangerous - just nerve racking.  But, shortly things began to = go beyond=20 the SAG symptoms, so I though I might have an injector problem (like = one=20 sticking open or not opening at all).  Since our injectors are = in=20 pairs, I tried turning off one figuring if things got better, then = that pair=20 might have a bad injector.

 

So I = turned off one=20 pair and sure enough the symptoms abated a bit (more on this later) = so I=20 figured I had a bad injector in that pair.  To be certain I = turned this=20 =93bad=94 pair back on and turn off the =93good=94 pair expecting = the symptoms to=20 really get bad as I would now be running on only the =93bad=94 pair = =96 much to my=20 surprise when I turned off the =93good=94 pair =96 the symptoms also = abated. =20 So that indicated it was not an injector problem =96 but what?  =

 

About = this time, I=20 decided to turn the aircraft back around toward Craig Field and = dodging=20 clouds headed back with the engine progressively getting = worst. It=20 appeared to be a fuel problem (and while that is ultimately the = subsystem=20 affected - it was not the root cause).  The fuel pressure was = ranging=20 from zero to 80 psi, other electrical things were also = misbehaving.  I=20 check the voltmeter thinking perhaps the alternator had died =96 but = it showed=20 14 volts.  So back to the fuel = system.

 

  = Finally, the=20 engine just stops with the prop standing still - like a hood = ornament, I=92m=20 at around 4500-5000 MSL at this point having lost some altitude = dodging a=20 cloud (good old GPS just kept pointing to Craig Field).  At = that time I=20 am 7 miles out from Craig Field at 4500 msl with at stopped prop, a = crippled=20 seat cushion and a dry mouth.  Yes, I know I=92ve been there = before, but=20 I don=92t think you ever get =93use=94 to it.  I recalled = thinking things=20 just can=92t get worst when they very shortly and suddenly -=20 did.

 

I keyed = the radio=20 and made a call to Craig Field at 4 miles on the GPS (I=92m starting = to get=20 good at this) but before I could get their reply, I heard a=20 =93CLANK=94 (without = the engine=20 running you can hear things like that)  like a relay springing = open (it=20 was) and the entire panel goes dead!!!!   No radio, no = engine=20 instruments, not even a stinking LED was lit =96 only the battery = powered=20 GPS.  Can you spell =93total electrical failure?=94  Talk = about a=20 lonely feeling =96 amazing how comforting having lights on and radio = =96 you=20 could almost convince yourself this was just a practice engine-out = landing,=20 but not when the panel goes dark. No engine gauges, no radio,=20 nada!

 

Well not = being one=20 inclined to panic (but I seriously considered it for a moment = {:>)), I=20 continued toward Craig field =96 I mean like there were lots of = other=20 alternatives.  Well Once again I found myself in the = =93fortunate=20 position=94 of being too high, too much altitude. So I put in 40 = degs of flaps=20 to steepen my rate of descent. But, then I decided this time that = rather=20 than do the 360 I had done on a previous Incident to lose = =93excessive=94=20 altitude, I would try to glide - a more or less - regular traffic=20 pattern.

 

However, = I=20 neglected to remember to retract the flaps.  So I found myself = on the=20 downwind around mid-field at pattern altitude (which felt normal) = until I=20 suddenly realized that you CAN NOT maintain that pattern altitude = without an=20 engine!!! Duh!

 

I knew I = could=20 never make it to the far end of the runway before turning base = (toward the=20 runway), so I started my turn immediately, to make matters a bit = worst - I=20 had been paralleling the runway on the downwind leg a bit too close = =96 must=20 have been the comforting feeling of being close to safety.  = This=20 position naturally required a tighter turn and as I turned I saw I = was=20 likely to miss the runway and land in the grass. So I though I need = to=20 steepen this turn further (this is called COFFIN CORNER), but = fortunately=20 glanced at my airspeed indicator to see it only registering 80 MPH = and my=20 rate of descent (normally 400-500 feet per minute) up to over 1000 = feet per=20 minute. The seat cushion suddenly vanished from this=20 universe.

 

  = But the REAL=20 danger in this situation, as you all know, is your airspeed gets = low, you=20 are in a steep bank which greatly raises the stall speed  - = meaning at=20 80 mph you are close to a stall in a steep turn while your are not = in=20 straight and level.  So I immediately straighten out of the = turn =96 the=20 little voice saying =93better to land in the grass than get their = concrete=20 runway all messed up=94.  So the immediate danger of a stall = was=20 adverted, but I was still pointed toward the ground with a sink rate = twice=20 as high as normal (and I=92ve manage a few hard landings even with a = normal=20 sink rate).

 

The = hardest thing=20 to do when you are sinking at a 1000 fpm a couple hundred feet above = the=20 ground (with your nose already pointed at the ground) is to push the = stick=20 forward steeping the dive even more.  But, I manage to do that = and=20 picked enough air speed and energy to flair to a nice touch down =96 = not even=20 a bump.  I=92ve always been amazed at what total concentration = does to=20 improve you landing {:>).

 

Rolled to = the end=20 of the runway and had energy to roll off onto the = taxiway.   Got=20 out, check under the aircraft for any evidence of leaks and started = pulling=20 the aircraft toward the far =96off =96 hangar which had an airplane = parked in=20 front of it.  A nice looking young woman comes riding a bicycle = out to=20 meet me.  Hopped off and holding out her hand said =93Hi I=92m = Angie, looks=20 like we=92ll be spending time together=94 =96 so things are starting = to look up=20 {:>)

 

So pulled = the=20 aircraft in to the hangar where the mechanic came over and ask what = the=20 problem was.  Well, I looked at the volt meter and it said the = battery=20 was dead. Mechanic put on a battery charger and announced =93Yep! = The battery=20 is dead=94.  So we both concluded that the alternator must have = failed=20 and not being able to replenish the drain on the battery by all the=20 electrical systems such as fuel pumps, injectors, ignition coils, = etc had=20 drained the battery. 

 

However, = there were=20 a few problems with the analysis of a failed alternator.  = First, the=20 low voltage warning light never came on to warn of an alternator = problem,=20 2nd I never notice the voltmeter showing anything other = than what=20 it should for alternator voltage =96 like around 14 volts.  = While=20 checking the voltage after the Mechanic had charged the battery, I = noticed=20 down below that the =93essential bus=94 switch was in the battery = rather than=20 the alternator position, so flicked it back to the alternator = position=20 figuring I must have accidentally kicked it while getting to some = stuff in=20 the baggage compartment of my RV-6A.

 

It was = getting late=20 and being a bit tired not to mention stressed, I needed to get a = rental car=20 and a motel for the night.  Did that, eat dinner and went to = bed after=20 sitting down and drawing out a problem tree with the entire major = elements=20 of the electrical system.

 

So next = morning I=20 show up at the hangar early and meet Ben, the mechanic, the battery = had=20 received a charge of only 45 minutes the evening before, So I = suggested we=20 charged it for another hour and try to start the aircraft.  Ben = suggested a real stress test of the battery and NOT charge it = anymore. =20 Made sense, so we rolled the aircraft out of the hangar.  I = hopped in,=20 threw a half dozen switches and punched the starter button.  = The engine=20 started on the first prop blade rotation =96 so the battery was = clearly=20 OK. The engine is = humming like a=20 top.    So I looked over at the voltmeter expecting it to = show=20 only around 12.8 volts instead of the 14 volts a functioning = alternator=20 would produce.  Much to my and Ben=92s surprise the alternator = voltage=20 read 14 volts.  We loaded the alternator by turning on the both = l00=20 watt landing lights, all fuel pumps, the pitot heat, etc.  The=20 alternator voltage only drops perhaps 0.4 volts clearly indicating = the=20 alternator could carry the load and was OK.

 

So here I = am =96=20 battery is OK, = alternator is=20 OK =96 engine is = purring normally,=20 so clearly this was all a figment of my deteriorating brain = cells.  I=20 loaded up the aircraft and launched to do a few circuits of the = airport =96 I=20 did so and all was operating normally and so I radio them I was head = onward=20 to Texas.  While flying, my = mind could=20 not let go of the problem and finally the light came on. =20

 

The = essential bus=20 switch had (for my entire 10 + years of flying) been in the = alternator=20 position.  The purpose of this switch is to isolate the battery = from=20 the alternator should the alternator fail - to prevent an alternator = problem=20 from draining the battery.  So in event of an alternator = problem, you=20 move the switch from alternator to battery.  Its call the = essential bus=20 because you only have the essential things drawing from the battery = so you=20 wont=92 drain it as quickly.  The idea is to give you time = (generally=20 around 30 minutes) to find a safe place to land in case of = alternator=20 failure.

 

 

Well, at = some point=20 I had either (not paying attention) turned the switch to battery = thinking I=20 was turning the voltmeter switch to battery  - or accidentally = had move=20 the switch from alternator to battery without noticing it by kicking = it,=20 etc.  However, it was sort of protected in its position from = accidental=20 activation. It must have happened during refueling =96 as I got = approx 45=20 minutes down the road on the battery after take off before quality = battery=20 time started to deteriorate.  As the battery voltage fell due = to the=20 load (and no alternator link to replenish it), electrical things = (mainly=20 computers first) started acting up until they could not longer run = the=20 engine. The injectors would not open fully, etc.  Then as the = voltage=20 level further decreased, the master relay which the battery held = closed and=20 which connected the (fully functional) alternator to the rest of the = electrical system - opened up and removed ALL power from the = electrical=20 system.  So no radio, no gauges, etc. =

 

 Oh, = another=20 little factor that may have contributed, the voltmeter has a tiny = toggle=20 switch by it marked ALT BAT1 BAT2 for checking alternator battery 1 = and=20 battery 2 (which I no longer fly with) voltages.  Down below It = a=20 couple of inches and off to the right is the essential bus normal = size=20 toggle switch =96 also marked ALT BAT1 BAT1.  I normally never = touch it=20 and don=92t even think about it.  But I could have reached for = the=20 voltmeter toggle thinking to check my battery voltage (which I do as = a=20 regular thing) and perhaps distracted by something reach a bit = further down=20 and instead moved the essential bus switch from Alternator to = Battery cause=20 this entire event.  I know that I did not consciously do = it.  So=20 it is either accidental or absence minded activation - either way = ends with=20 the same results {:>)

 

 

Now it = became clear=20 why it didn=92t matter which pair of fuel injectors I turned off =96 = turning off=20 either pair improved the situation because it slightly reduced the=20 electrical load by a few amps =96 and the engine ran slightly better = for a few=20 moments.  The same thing had happened when turning off one of = the EFI=20 fuel pumps =96 but what threw me was the alternator voltage = continued to be=20 normal during this.

 

 

After I = knew the=20 cause (switch in wrong position), I decided the problem was fixed so = no=20 reason to return to NC, and I just continued on to Texas.

 

I know = some of you=20 may think that removing my second battery was a mistake =96 but, = consider=20 this, having another battery could have meant I would have been much = further=20 from a suitable airfield before they both went south.  On the = other=20 hand, it might have caused me to at least think to throw the = essential bus=20 switch to the second battery and have the Light bulb come on.  = Who=20 really knows.  But, I have in mind a simply addition to my = electrical=20 circuit that should help in the future. =

 

 

I do want = to state=20 that this time when the problems started I DID switch fuel tanks =96 = but=20 naturally it had no effect because this time it turned out, it was = not a=20 fuel problem =96 not the root cause at = least.

 

So what = are the=20 lessons learned:

 

  1. Put EVERY critical = switch on=20 your before-takeoff Check list
  2. Perhaps put a guard = around=20 such critical switches to force conscious activation =
  3. Don=92t (hard not = to) get overly=20 focused on what you think is the problem =96 consider other=20 possibilities.  I thought it was a fuel problem (I even = switched fuel=20 tanks this time) =96 it turned out to be electrical in its root=20 cause.
  4. While the fuel = pressure was=20 jumping all over the place and the EGT was erratic and engine = surging=20 strongly indicating a fuel problem =96 the ultimate cause was=20 electrical.  Once the voltage got below a certain point the = EC2 was=20 still trying to pull the injectors open, but with the voltage so = low it=20 could not do it properly.
  5. When the battery = voltage=20 dropped below a certain point, the master relay released and = removed the=20 alternator from the electrical system and the panel went dark =96 = even=20 though the alternator was still working
  6. Immediately turn to = the=20 nearest airfield when serious problems occur - THEN work on fixing = them.  I only delayed for perhaps 2-3 minutes, but that could = have=20 made a difference.
  7. Watch out for = Coffin Corner turn when = turning base=20 to final =96 airspeed really bleeds off fast with no engine = pulling you=20 along (and especially with flaps deployed!)
  8. IF you change your = mind about=20 landing approach type - remember to reconfigure your aircraft for = the last=20 decision =96 I had left my flaps deployed when I should have = remembered to=20 retracted them.  Did that help prevent a Coffin Corner stall = and spin=20 or would it have put me closer to it?
  9. You must increase = airspeed=20 over the wing to get the sufficient energy to over come a high = sink=20 rate.  Pulling back on the stick when the ground is staring = you in=20 the face is the natural reaction =96 but, pushing forward to lower = the nose=20 is the correct action =96 providing of course you have sufficient=20 altitude!
  10. Battery life=20 =96 I had a two year old 680 odyssey battery which I maintain a = trickle=20 charge on whenever I=92m not flying.  With two EFI fuel = pumps, boost=20 pump, injectors, coils, EC2 and radio and just having started the = engine=20 before take off =96 this battery lasted 55 minutes.  Well, = the last 5=20 minutes was not quality battery time.  So in my case, 30 = minutes=20 appears to be a very realistic battery life.  In fact, had I = turned=20 off one EFI pump and the boost pump would have gained a few more=20 miles.  But, if I had recognized the need to turn them off at = that=20 time (I normally turn them off at cruise altitude), then I would = have=20 known how to =93fix=94 the problem.
  11. I=92ve decided to = add a Schokkty=20 diode between my essential bus and the alternator =96 so that as = long as the=20 alternator is producing sufficient voltage, then the battery will = be=20 getting some charge to replace the drain.  I=92ve also = decided to make=20 that switch position a check-list item.

 

 So = what it=20 boils down to =96 if I had recognized early on that it was an = electrical=20 problem and not focused so much on the fuel system, I may have = noticed the=20 essential bus switch in the wrong position.  Force yourself to = examine=20 other possible causes (easy to say =96 harder to do).=20

 

NEVER, = NEVER forget=20 that flying the airplane is the first and only priority in this type = of=20 situation

 

NEVER, = NEVER forget=20 that saving your butt is the ultimately end-all priority.  When = I=20 decided that landing on the grass was preferable to putting a hole = in their=20 concrete =96 I just may have made a life-saving=20 decision.

 

If = anybody else=20 wants to pick up this baton =96 I=92m ready to hand it over =96 = what? no=20 volunteers? {:>)

 

So = that=92s my story=20 and I=92m sticking to it. 

 

Fly safe,=20 guys!!

 

Ed

Ed=20 Anderson

Rv-6A N494BW Rotary=20 Powered

Matthews,=20 NC

eanderson@carolina.rr.com

http://www.andersonee.com

http://www.dmack.net/mazda/index.html

http://www.flyrotary.com/

http://members.cox.net/rogersda/rotary/configs.htm#N494BW

http://www.r= otaryaviation.com/Rotorhead%20Truth.htm

 

= ------=_NextPart_000_002B_01C9E543.CE3B92B0--