X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Received: from outbound-mail.vgs.untd.com ([64.136.55.15] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 5.2.14) with SMTP id 3672345 for flyrotary@lancaironline.net; Thu, 04 Jun 2009 20:48:52 -0400 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=64.136.55.15; envelope-from=alwick@juno.com Received: from Penny (c-98-246-117-71.hsd1.or.comcast.net [98.246.117.71]) by smtpout02.vgs.untd.com with SMTP id AABFCS43YABB39BS for (sender ); Thu, 4 Jun 2009 17:47:50 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <0A04D34271854839B2D894294A4831C4@Penny> From: "Al Wick" To: "Rotary motors in aircraft" References: In-Reply-To: Subject: Re: [FlyRotary] Lessons learned Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2009 17:47:50 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0072_01C9E53C.942E71C0" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Mail 6.0.6002.18005 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.0.6002.18005 X-ContentStamp: 29:14:3847786869 X-MAIL-INFO:33a4a4543135d41d94d189544089dd1050c97589f1e500a031f175c9f115f1fd2db561f9a4a954b154513165dd80ed651d3530b58d70b45441b5dd193425344179f13025b9910439b94d54b4157901440d05810481cd35d5d93da1b94d64959510849044a4ad29c0 X-UNTD-OriginStamp: L941HVjjYzDhN3itp//mkDOLvleblfpKvknxWDgTa1XJ8zxV2xaLJQ== X-UNTD-Peer-Info: 10.181.42.32|smtpout02.vgs.untd.com|smtpout02.vgs.untd.com|alwick@juno.com This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0072_01C9E53C.942E71C0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable My area of expertise is failure prevention. I hope you guys will = consider my analysis: First, I don't want to detract from the excellent analysis so far. Very = open minded, willing to consider multiple causes. I particularly like = the diode concept, because it makes the plane insensitive to the cause. = You admit it will happen again, but change the design so the failure = can't affect the plane. Good stuff. You guys might be saving a life.=20 Consider this: Both Al and Eds failures have the exact same design = oversight. Your planes have only a handful of switches that are flight = critical. Both of you had switches in the wrong position. Both of you = were ignorant of the incorrect switching. This is a system error. You = fell into the trap of designing your plane in traditional method.=20 These are not freak occurrences. Al's failure is the leading cause for = Cozy deaths. 7 or 8 so far. I know of at least two other guys that fell = into Ed's trap. Both of these could have been fatalities.=20 Solution: Flight critical switches need to be designed in very thorough = manner. You need everything headed in your favor. Ed, move your = emergency switch to the corner of your panel. You don't want any routine = switch activities to be anywhere near your emergency one. When you = operate your emergency switch, it needs to be an unfamiliar hand = movement to different area of your panel. Place a switch guard on it = (NOT one of those red aircraft latch switches, they cause more failures = than they prevent). Place a flashing LED above it that says "Alternator = Disabled". Al, checklists are very ineffective. They are traditional, lot's of = people believe in them. They are just highly unreliable. You need method = that is not sensitive to the distractions that periodically occur during = preflight and takeoff. My Plc method is the best approach. But any = method that includes visual, aural warning will work. As long as system = doesn't provide false warnings. Checklist should be used as backup = method.=20 I found a microswitch location on my canopy system that's very = effective. Switch is only activated when canopy is not latched. No false = warnings. Switch is protected from pilot egress damage.=20 Glad no one got hurt.=20 -Al Wick Cozy IV powered by Turbo Subaru 3.0R with variable valve lift and cam = timing.=20 Artificial intelligence in cockpit, N9032U 240+ hours from Portland, = Oregon Glass panel design, Subaru install, Prop construct, Risk assessment = info: http://www.maddyhome.com/canardpages/pages/alwick/index.html ----- Original Message -----=20 From: Al Gietzen=20 To: Rotary motors in aircraft=20 Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 2009 3:40 PM Subject: [FlyRotary] Lessons learned Ed set the example by pointing out contributing factors in his = 'incident', and for the sake off completeness I should do likewise. We were planning on being wheels up by 8:00 am; and making the roughly = 7 =BD hr flying time to Austin that day. But the airport was socked in = with unusually heavy marine layer - 400 ft ceiling. This generally = breaks up pretty early 20 miles inland at F70. We waited, and waited, = looking at the sky; no change. Finally, and rather suddenly we saw = breaks in the clouds. At 10:15 I decided we were good to go; we = strapped in, and headed out. Still some low clouds in the direction of = takeoff, but I saw we could be off, make a 180 and climb. =20 IF the cause was that the door latch was not fully engaged it was = because I was impatient to get going; not thorough on the pre-takeoff = checklist. Hey, I had closed and latched that door 100 times - of = course it was fully latched. Don't ever be in a hurry when you are going flying. Don't ever be in a = hurry when you are going flying. Al G -Al Wick Cozy IV powered by Turbo Subaru 3.0R with variable valve lift and cam = timing.=20 Artificial intelligence in cockpit, N9032U 240+ hours from Portland, = Oregon Glass panel design, Subaru install, Prop construct, Risk assessment = info: http://www.maddyhome.com/canardpages/pages/alwick/index.html ------=_NextPart_000_0072_01C9E53C.942E71C0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
My area of expertise is failure = prevention. I hope=20 you guys will consider my analysis:
First, I don't want to detract from the = excellent=20 analysis so far. Very open minded, willing to consider multiple causes. = I=20 particularly like the diode concept, because it makes the plane = insensitive to=20 the cause. You admit it will happen again, but change the design so the = failure=20 can't affect the plane. Good stuff. You guys might be saving a life.=20
 
Consider this: Both Al and Eds failures = have the=20 exact same design oversight. Your planes have only a handful of switches = that=20 are flight critical. Both of you had = switches in=20 the wrong position. Both of you were ignorant of the incorrect = switching. This=20 is a system error. You fell into the trap of designing your plane in = traditional=20 method.
 
These are not freak occurrences. Al's = failure is=20 the leading cause for Cozy deaths. 7 or 8 so far. I know of at least two = other=20 guys that fell into Ed's trap. Both of these could have been fatalities. =
 
Solution: Flight critical switches need = to be=20 designed in very thorough manner. You need everything headed in your = favor. Ed,=20 move your emergency switch to the corner of your panel. You don't want = any=20 routine switch activities to be anywhere near your emergency one. When = you=20 operate your emergency switch, it needs to be an unfamiliar hand = movement to=20 different area of your panel. Place a switch guard on it (NOT one of = those red=20 aircraft latch switches, they cause more failures than they prevent). = Place a=20 flashing LED above it that says "Alternator Disabled".
 
Al, checklists are = very ineffective. They are=20 traditional, lot's of people believe in them. They are just highly = unreliable.=20 You need method that is not sensitive to the distractions that = periodically=20 occur during preflight and takeoff. My Plc method is the best approach. = But any=20 method that includes visual, aural warning will work. As long as system = doesn't=20 provide false warnings. Checklist should be used as backup method. =
I found a microswitch location on my = canopy system=20 that's very effective. Switch is only activated when canopy is not = latched. No=20 false warnings. Switch is protected from pilot egress damage. =
 
Glad no one got hurt.
 
-Al Wick
Cozy IV powered by Turbo = Subaru 3.0R=20 with variable valve lift and cam timing.
Artificial intelligence in = cockpit,=20 N9032U 240+ hours from Portland, Oregon
Glass panel design, Subaru = install,=20 Prop construct, Risk assessment info:
htt= p://www.maddyhome.com/canardpages/pages/alwick/index.html
 
 
 
----- Original Message -----
From:=20 Al = Gietzen=20
Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 2009 = 3:40=20 PM
Subject: [FlyRotary] Lessons=20 learned

Ed set = the example=20 by pointing out contributing factors in his =91incident=92, and for = the sake off=20 completeness I should do likewise.

 

We were = planning on=20 being wheels up by 8:00=20 am; and = making the=20 roughly 7 =BD hr flying time to Austin that = day.=20  But the airport was socked in with unusually heavy marine layer = =96 400 ft=20 ceiling.  This generally breaks up pretty early 20 miles inland = at=20 F70.  We waited, and waited, looking at the sky; no change. = Finally, and=20 rather suddenly we saw breaks in the clouds.  At = 10:15 I = decided we were=20 good to go; we strapped in, and headed out. Still some low clouds in = the=20 direction of takeoff, but I saw we could be off, make a 180 and = climb. =20

 

IF=20 the cause = was that=20 the door latch was not fully engaged it was because I was impatient to = get=20 going; not thorough on the pre-takeoff checklist.  Hey, I had = closed and=20 latched that door 100 times =96 of course it was fully=20 latched.

 

Don=92t = ever be in a=20 hurry when you are going flying. Don=92t ever be in a hurry when you = are going=20 flying.

 

Al=20 G

-Al Wick
Cozy IV powered by Turbo Subaru 3.0R with variable = valve lift=20 and cam timing.
Artificial intelligence in cockpit, N9032U 240+ = hours from=20 Portland, Oregon
Glass panel design, Subaru install, Prop construct, = Risk=20 assessment info:
htt= p://www.maddyhome.com/canardpages/pages/alwick/index.html
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