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It seems that 19 hours transition into a complex Turboprop is not enough time to launch into serious IFR. In this case it killed the pilot and his whole family..... In a way it is similar to the TBM that came out of TEB ICED UP and was dead within 17 minutes.
TOO MUCH AIRPLANE FOR THE PILOT AND HIS SKILL LEVEL
The Pilatus PC-12 is a large certified turboprop single. with a Stall speed of 67 knots
Similar to the Lancair 4P Turbine in demands on the pilot. Probably somewhat less demanding than the Lancair due to the lower stall speed, predicable stall, stick shaker and FAA certification.
I SUPPOSE THAT MY RELATING ACCIDENTS HAS A TWOFOLD PURPOSE.the first is any small addition to caution , may save a life.the otheris insurance, i would like Lancairs to have a better safety record so that we could get affordable insurance.
WHERE WERE THE BASIC SKILLS?did he forget, or never know "recovery from unusual attitudes"Did he forget "first fly the airplane"
WHAT TO DO:1. level wings2. check airspeed, (adjust power accordingly)
3. level airplaneandfly home safely
MY PERCEPTION IS,
THIS COULD HAPPEN TO A low time LANCAIR 4P Turbine pilot.and i don't want that to happenand the Pilatus is more forgiving and easier to fly than the Lancair
THE REPORT:An NTSB investigation
determined that a Pilatus PC-12 broke up over Florida not because of
adverse weather, but loss of control in instrument meteorological
conditions by a pilot relatively unfamiliar with his recently acquired
aircraft.
The Bramlage family had departed Fort Pierce, Florida, after a
customs stop, and were headed home to Junction City, Kansas, when the
trouble began. Ronald Bramlage first flew his 2006 PC-12/47 a month
before the June 7, 2012, crash that killed him, along with his wife and
four children.
Investigators concluded Bramlage, who completed transition training
in May 2012 that included ground and simulator instruction and 19 hours
of dual instruction in the aircraft, was qualified under the regulations
to act as pilot in command, though “his lack of experience in the make
and model airplane was evidenced by the fact that he did not maintain
control of the airplane after the autopilot disengaged.”
Exactly why the autopilot disengaged (an event recorded by
avionics) in the midst of a right turn to avoid weather ahead remains
unknown. Investigators noted that Bramlage had activated propeller
de-icing and inertial separator during the climb, but not the de-icing
boots. The autopilot disengaged while the aircraft was banked about 25
degrees right, in instrument meteorological conditions, and Bramlage
attempted to troubleshoot the autopilot as the bank angle increased to
50 degrees and the aircraft began to descend.
The bank angle increased to between 75 and 100 degrees as the
aircraft descended rapidly from 25,000 feet in the final seconds of the
flight. After descending about 10,000 feet and reaching 338 knots—about
175 knots above maneuvering speed—“the pilot likely applied either
abrupt or full aft elevator control input, resulting in overstress
fracture of both wings,” the NTSB summary states.
Investigators estimate, based on logbook and aircraft data, that
Bramlage had logged about 755 hours total time, the vast majority of it
in piston singles (NTSB study of the pilot’s logbook revealed
record-keeping errors) before launching on the flight home from the
Bahamas. By the time he launched his final flight, Bramlage had flown
about 38 hours in the Pilatus, investigators estimate. He had not logged
any actual instrument time in the seven years before buying the Pilatus
and obtaining training that included an instrument proficiency check.
 Investigators
subpoenaed a student who trained with Bramlage. While this pilot, a
retired airline captain, had high praise for the training program and
instructors, and was reluctant to criticize Bramlage’s competence, “when
asked if he thought based on his experience that the accident pilot was
behind the airplane, he said he would have to say yes.”
Bramlage told another pilot, who flies a PC-12/45, that it took a
long time to perform tasks “because he does the checklist twice.”
Bramlage asked that pilot questions about use of the inertial separator
prior to departure on the accident flight.
Investigators found no evidence that mechanical failure contributed
to the crash. The NTSB ruled Nov. 24 that the probable cause of the
crash was: “The failure of the pilot to maintain control of the airplane
while climbing to cruise altitude in instrument meteorological
conditions (IMC) following disconnect of the autopilot. The reason for
the autopilot disconnect could not be determined during post-accident
testing. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's lack of experience
in high-performance, turbo-propeller airplanes and in IMC.” demands on the pilot. probably somewhat less
than the Lancair due to a lower stall speed and precictable stall
characturistics.
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