A factual report
on the Feb. 3, 2012, crash that killed Micron Technology CEO Steve
Appleton released Aug. 12 by the NTSB sheds new light on the
circumstances, though a determination of probable cause may still be
months away.
Investigators found no evidence of a
mechanical failure that would have precluded normal operation, though
there was significant corrosion in the fuel control unit; NTSB
investigators note that Appleton, who purchased the aircraft from a
previous owner less than two months before the crash, was relatively
unfamiliar with the complex systems of an aircraft that Appleton himself
described as "squirrely." While insurers required Lancair-specific
training at the time, there is no evidence cited in the report that
Appleton had sought such training.
Appleton’s Lancair IV-TP appears to have
suffered a power loss shortly after a takeoff attempted minutes after a
rejected takeoff; witnesses saw it pitch steeply and crash seconds after
liftoff.
Appleton held an airline transport
pilot certificate with category ratings for multiengine land,
multiengine sea, and single-engine land airplanes, along with various
type ratings, and had private pilot priviliges for single-engine
seaplanes. He had logged more than 3,600 hours by the time he prepared
for his final flight, though the NTSB report notes that flight data
recovered from the aircraft indicates Appleton had logged less than 14
hours in the aircraft he bought from the previous owner in December
2011.
Data recovered from the electronic flight
information system, recording in detail the accident flight as well as
previous flights, correlates to witness accounts and other evidence.
Following a rejected takeoff, Appleton requested a departure clearance
at Boise Air Terminal/Gowen Field
in Boise, Idaho, shortly before 9 a.m., the report states. The EFIS
data recorded a sharp drop in engine torque soon after liftoff,
corresponding to the time Appleton notified the tower of his intention
to turn back to the airport. During the last 16 seconds of the flight,
which reached a maximum altitude of 325 feet above ground level, engine
torque decreased to 14 percent—well below the normal operating range. A
post-crash examination uncovered corrosion within the fuel control unit,
WOULD YOU TURN BACK TO THE RUNWAY AT 300 FEET ABOVE THE AIRPORT? -IN A LANCAIR 4/4P/4PT
though the report notes that while “numerous parts could not be
examined due to the condition of the unit (corroded) precluding their
removal,” there was “no evidence of pre impact mechanical malfunction or
failure that would have precluded normal operation.”
Investigators interviewed experts
including an engineer formerly employed by Lancair, who said the
aircraft (modified to accommodate a turboprop engine) had a dramatically
higher wing loading than the original piston model, in the range of 40
to 45 pounds per square foot. The turboprop modifications exacerbated
the aircraft’s “already-existing aggressive stall characteristics,”
making the Lancair IV-TP a “challenging airplane to fly, which without
adequate training, makes it a dangerous airplane because it was not
designed for such a high-horsepower engine.”
A company pilot who had flown with
Appleton in the accident aircraft told NTSB investigators that Appleton
was “unfamiliar with the panel, which made the airplane even more
challenging.”
UNFAMILIAR WITH THE PANEL?
The former Lancair engineer told
investigators that a pilot has very little time to react to a power
reduction during or immediately after takeoff: Without an abrupt pitch
correction (to reduce the angle of attack), the airplane would become
“unrecoverable” within 5 seconds after a power loss during the initial
climb. The engineer opined that the aircraft would stall at more than 80
knots indicated, with a tendency to drop a wing, and told investigators
that he advises pilots to use a decision altitude of 1,500 feet agl,
landing straight-ahead in case of any power loss below that altitude.
The data, along with witness accounts and radio transcripts, shows Appleton attempted to turn back.
Appleton’s death drew significant media attention,
and some questioned whether key corporate employees should fly general
aviation aircraft. AOPA Foundation President Bruce Landsberg noted, days
after the accident, that the Lancair has a heavily loaded wing, and
higher stall speed than comparable certificated aircraft.
“Does this make Lancairs bad aircraft? Not
in my view. But before flying one pilots must understand the nature of
the animal they’re dealing with,” Landsberg wrote.
hi there, again
you know, the MU2 had a high rate of accidents attributed to the high wing loading and different flight attributes. did not make it a bad airplane; just a plane that needed a properly trained pilot. Likewise the Lancair 4 series.
(the MU2 autopilot problem is another story; another time)
a sad loss of a good person and a good airplane
peter