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My only issue is that we're not focused on the problem and the problem isn't the canopy or the latch.
This paper I think keeps us from focusing on the real issue. Just because an event occurred and someone got hurt or killed thereafter doesn't mean the event is the cause.
In my opinion, this paper makes it seem like an open canopy means certain death. This is wrong, and someone with some power is going to over react and we're going to suffer because of it.
We need accurate, informative, empirical test data. Should we put canopy warning system on? Sure, it can't hurt. But I feel the tone of the paper will be detrimental to how others view this airplane and this could have real consequences.
Let's make sure we know what the real problem is, what is really hurting people.
Look, I don't mean to disagree, and I appreciate Valin's effort and everone else's into this. But these kinds of things can have consequences that we may not like and may not be warranted.
Thanks
Kevin
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From: Lancair Mailing List [lml@lancaironline.net] On Behalf Of Ron Jones [rjones2000@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, April 30, 2014 11:11 AM
To: lml@lancaironline.net
Subject: [LML] Re: Legacy White Paper
Valin,
Your Canopy Safety Issue Paper is outstanding. It should be read by all Legacy owners and pilots.
Your reply to the recent criticisms is equally well written and well reasoned.
For all of those who think that they are so sharp and such fantastic aviators that their personal, outstanding use of checklists solves most ills, well, I just wish you would get out of Lancair's entirely. Not only are you an accident just waiting to happen, you are driving up all our insurance rates with such arrogant, short-sighted thinking.
Is this to harsh? Maybe. But spouting all this nonsense about infallible checklists really gets me annoyed. How many lives have to be lost before folks wise up? Of course checklists are wonderful tools and add to a safe flight, but do they solve all ills? The record of Lancair accidents suggest otherwise.
I suggest we all pledge to more carefully follow our checklists. I also suggest we actually read this canopy paper and appreciate all the hard work and talent that it represents. It could save your life.
Ron Jones
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 30, 2014, at 5:05 AM, "Valin & Allyson Thorn" <thorn@starflight.aero<mailto:thorn@starflight.aero>> wrote:
Jon,
It seems you haven’t had a chance to give the paper a thorough reading yet. If you only read one section of the paper, I recommend starting on page 23 with Fred Moreno’s outstanding discussion on human performance. As this relates to check lists, the bottom line is that well trained, rested, and focused people will still eventually miss items on the lists – even if they’ve had several million dollars in military flight training.
If missing an item results in an increased probability of creating a catastrophic hazardous condition, then best design practice is to provide other means of ensuring the hazardous condition is not allowed. As flying machine designers we basically want to put obstacles between a flight crew and each catastrophic hazard until those risks are properly controlled. Critical hazards are not acceptably controlled (meaning reduced in probability of occurrence) by checklist use alone given the error rates of humans. Human performance testing shows that a well-trained, rested, and focused human is going to average an error one out of every 100 actions. It gets much worse if they are not trained, rested, and distracted…
I’m pretty sure that the designers of the military aircraft you flew went through the same design safety assessment. If your military aircraft were taken airborne without the canopy latched and that was likely to result in loss of crew and vehicle, that hazard would not be “controlled” only by use of a check list. There would be caution and warnings to help prevent the hazardous condition and if a C&W system doesn’t reduce the probability of occurrence enough, other more significant vehicle design changes would likely be undertaken.
In the case of the Legacy’s canopy, a simple and inexpensive warning system and very minor modification to the latching mechanism can significantly lower the probability of even tired and distracted pilots from taking a Legacy to flight with the canopy unlatched.
I’d like to see the community of Lancair Legacy builders and pilots grow. My view is that any prospective builders/pilots conducting due diligence on the airplane and its safety history would be happy to see that the cause of a considerable portion of the accidents and fatalities can be essentially eliminated by incorporating simple, inexpensive measures.
Valin Thorn
From: Lancair Mailing List [mailto:lml@lancaironline.net] On Behalf Of Jon Socolof
Sent: Monday, April 28, 2014 1:38 PM
To: lml@lancaironline.net<mailto:lml@lancaironline.net>
Subject: [LML] Legacy White Paper
The Legacy canopy design is not unsafe or inadequate and does the job exactly as Lancair intended. In all my training in the Legacy, attention to the canopy has always been stressed. It’s a check list item and as in my military jet, a verification item by pushing on the canopy prior to takeoff. After the tragic Lakeland accident Lancair incorporated an additional canopy safety warning into the design. If a builder wants to change the design, that’s a judgment call.
I don’t believe there is a case of a “secured” canopy opening in flight and it has been demonstrated here, the plane can be flown with the canopy open. These are high performance airplanes, deserve respect and require skill to operate. Yes, some pilots failed to secure their canopies before fight. Some recovered their airplanes and some had lesser results.
Human factors are the issue here and unfortunately, failures will occur. Failure to use checklists or missing items, rushing, complacency and non-standard procedures, continuing takeoffs with the canopy unsecured, operating on runways with insufficient Accelerate Stop Distances, etc.
I am concerned how a paper like this may be perceived. Will it scare off potential builders and buyers or be interpreted to indicate a design flaw? I don’t believe this paper presents anything new or unknown. As far as I know, there is no record of an in-flight breakup or failure of a Legacy, yet the airframe has developed a certain reputation by biting a few unwary pilots, but just how does this paper help?
FWIW
Jon
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