X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Sender: To: lml@lancaironline.net Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2014 13:11:25 -0400 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from nm16-vm1.bullet.mail.ne1.yahoo.com ([98.138.91.47] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 6.0.9e) with ESMTPS id 6853170 for lml@lancaironline.net; Wed, 30 Apr 2014 12:54:02 -0400 Received-SPF: none receiver=logan.com; client-ip=98.138.91.47; envelope-from=rjones2000@sbcglobal.net Received: from [98.138.101.130] by nm16.bullet.mail.ne1.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 30 Apr 2014 16:53:25 -0000 Received: from [98.138.226.125] by tm18.bullet.mail.ne1.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 30 Apr 2014 16:53:25 -0000 Received: from [127.0.0.1] by smtp204.mail.ne1.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 30 Apr 2014 16:53:25 -0000 X-Yahoo-Newman-Id: 408170.35530.bm@smtp204.mail.ne1.yahoo.com X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3 X-YMail-OSG: vXft9HQVM1mgcWkn7NeorCXOoUazkA7HfOgF4x2Rm1gt24B D3t3AtHGpEWlqT0EM.tL7iSr.Lsmb0Psq1EXOQ5RVVuNn6vvFbKUzkyyJ0mP OQLJ7U21mn_FQVWhbow5pXMTGzEvNA1PxJ2rGcwu6BZcCh6wqkzpqdL77pNA A48zpS9EoKpsvueQ1qvWp3J4O9nwTa_Dg4Pxlv1Gg.GqpU4Bm2Cs_xmju9j6 sQitnVC8eE.f4SI5.dCbKGCLUKIlkgm7TTQRZbvv4FVmglut1_xzCftWfD9Z v8Lo19HcZ1.ynAwnRG3YM3MphsYfKts7ncZntYemIrxYk_YXLtd7DwQPxMbs _XaN1J3L6naKCTkDQEUnJCkcoJ1JyAjPppytzezWyFzHGQtdUv_KyFcGSYTV l1lnt_v4hsaj6FQNFV_sfXkd.1Qg7JogZfGhC.a8P5wTpYohbte4cedYyyjR rE5vh5TS0PHsRrImdQcsH5MQapo.AunULKUdc0WeCyP0FZCI7oIwStqKEEuh 2NGWvPWVZkvvxuaWVQAXsOh5oIwn1xuduCDzp_ow- X-Yahoo-SMTP: qom3qKeswBCS7l.XERKRbiNwk_aq93o2mA-- X-Rocket-Received: from [192.168.1.80] (rjones2000@108.251.69.218 with plain [63.250.193.228]) by smtp204.mail.ne1.yahoo.com with SMTP; 30 Apr 2014 09:53:25 -0700 PDT From: Ron Jones Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-D1105937-13CE-4A33-9806-B3D5A74D1C36 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) Subject: Re: [LML] Re: Legacy White Paper X-Original-Message-Id: <3C18C8B0-9AD1-422F-950A-CBE64D3ABB55@sbcglobal.net> X-Original-Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2014 09:53:23 -0700 References: In-Reply-To: X-Original-To: Lancair Mailing List X-Mailer: iPad Mail (11D167) --Apple-Mail-D1105937-13CE-4A33-9806-B3D5A74D1C36 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Valin, Your Canopy Safety Issue Paper is outstanding. It should be read by all Lega= cy owners and pilots. Your reply to the recent criticisms is equally well written and well reasone= d. For all of those who think that they are so sharp and such fantastic aviator= s that their personal, outstanding use of checklists solves most ills, well,= I just wish you would get out of Lancair's entirely. Not only are you an ac= cident just waiting to happen, you are driving up all our insurance rates wi= th such arrogant, short-sighted thinking. Is this to harsh? Maybe. But spouting all this nonsense about infallible che= cklists really gets me annoyed. How many lives have to be lost before folks w= ise up? Of course checklists are wonderful tools and add to a safe flight, b= ut do they solve all ills? The record of Lancair accidents suggest otherwise= . I suggest we all pledge to more carefully follow our checklists. I also sugg= est we actually read this canopy paper and appreciate all the hard work and t= alent that it represents. It could save your life. Ron Jones Sent from my iPad > On Apr 30, 2014, at 5:05 AM, "Valin & Allyson Thorn" wrote: >=20 > Jon, > =20 > It seems you haven=E2=80=99t had a chance to give the paper a thorough rea= ding yet. If you only read one section of the paper, I recommend starting o= n page 23 with Fred Moreno=E2=80=99s outstanding discussion on human perform= ance. As this relates to check lists, the bottom line is that well trained,= rested, and focused people will still eventually miss items on the lists =E2= =80=93 even if they=E2=80=99ve had several million dollars in military fligh= t training.=20 > =20 > If missing an item results in an increased probability of creating a catas= trophic hazardous condition, then best design practice is to provide other m= eans of ensuring the hazardous condition is not allowed. As flying machine d= esigners we basically want to put obstacles between a flight crew and each c= atastrophic hazard until those risks are properly controlled. Critical haza= rds are not acceptably controlled (meaning reduced in probability of occurre= nce) by checklist use alone given the error rates of humans. Human performa= nce testing shows that a well-trained, rested, and focused human is going to= average an error one out of every 100 actions. It gets much worse if they a= re not trained, rested, and distracted=E2=80=A6 > =20 > I=E2=80=99m pretty sure that the designers of the military aircraft you fl= ew went through the same design safety assessment. If your military aircraf= t were taken airborne without the canopy latched and that was likely to resu= lt in loss of crew and vehicle, that hazard would not be =E2=80=9Ccontrolled= =E2=80=9D only by use of a check list. There would be caution and warnings t= o help prevent the hazardous condition and if a C&W system doesn=E2=80=99t r= educe the probability of occurrence enough, other more significant vehicle d= esign changes would likely be undertaken. > =20 > In the case of the Legacy=E2=80=99s canopy, a simple and inexpensive warni= ng system and very minor modification to the latching mechanism can signific= antly lower the probability of even tired and distracted pilots from taking a= Legacy to flight with the canopy unlatched.=20 > =20 > I=E2=80=99d like to see the community of Lancair Legacy builders and pilot= s grow. My view is that any prospective builders/pilots conducting due dili= gence on the airplane and its safety history would be happy to see that the c= ause of a considerable portion of the accidents and fatalities can be essent= ially eliminated by incorporating simple, inexpensive measures. > =20 > Valin Thorn > =20 > =20 > From: Lancair Mailing List [mailto:lml@lancaironline.net] On Behalf Of Jon= Socolof > Sent: Monday, April 28, 2014 1:38 PM > To: lml@lancaironline.net > Subject: [LML] Legacy White Paper > =20 > The Legacy canopy design is not unsafe or inadequate and does the job exac= tly as Lancair intended. In all my training in the Legacy, attention to the c= anopy has always been stressed. It=E2=80=99s a check list item and as in my m= ilitary jet, a verification item by pushing on the canopy prior to takeoff. A= fter the tragic Lakeland accident Lancair incorporated an additional canopy s= afety warning into the design. If a builder wants to change the design, tha= t=E2=80=99s a judgment call. > =20 > I don=E2=80=99t believe there is a case of a =E2=80=9Csecured=E2=80=9D can= opy opening in flight and it has been demonstrated here, the plane can be fl= own with the canopy open. These are high performance airplanes, deserve res= pect and require skill to operate. Yes, some pilots failed to secure their c= anopies before fight. Some recovered their airplanes and some had lesser res= ults. > =20 > Human factors are the issue here and unfortunately, failures will occur. Fa= ilure to use checklists or missing items, rushing, complacency and non-stand= ard procedures, continuing takeoffs with the canopy unsecured, operating on r= unways with insufficient Accelerate Stop Distances, etc. > =20 > I am concerned how a paper like this may be perceived. Will it scare off p= otential builders and buyers or be interpreted to indicate a design flaw? I= don=E2=80=99t believe this paper presents anything new or unknown. As far a= s I know, there is no record of an in-flight breakup or failure of a Legacy,= yet the airframe has developed a certain reputation by biting a few unwary p= ilots, but just how does this paper help? > =20 > FWIW > =20 > Jon > =20 > =20 > =20 --Apple-Mail-D1105937-13CE-4A33-9806-B3D5A74D1C36 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Valin,

Your Canopy Safety Issue Paper is outstanding. It should be read by all Legac= y owners and pilots.

Your reply to the recent criticisms is equally well written and well rea= soned.

=
For all of= those who think that they are so sharp and such fantastic aviators that the= ir personal, outstanding use of checklists solves most ills, well, I just wi= sh you would get out of Lancair's entirely. Not only are you an accident jus= t waiting to happen, you are driving up all our insurance rates with such ar= rogant, short-sighted thinking.

Is this to harsh? Maybe. But spouting all this nonsense about= infallible checklists really gets me annoyed. How many lives have to be los= t before folks wise up? Of course checklists are wonderful tools and add to a= safe flight, but do they solve all ills? The record of Lancair accidents su= ggest otherwise.

= I suggest we all pledge to more carefully follow our checklists. I also sugg= est we actually read this canopy paper and appreciate all the hard work and t= alent that it represents. It could save your life.

Ron Jones

Sent from my iPad

On Apr 30, 2014, at 5:05 AM, "Valin &= Allyson Thorn" <thorn@starfligh= t.aero> wrote:

Jon,

 

It seems you haven=E2=80=99= t had a chance to give the paper a thorough reading yet.  If you only read one section of the paper, I reco= mmend starting on page 23 with Fred Moreno=E2=80=99s outstanding discussion o= n human performance.  As this r= elates to check lists, the bottom line is that well trained, rested, and foc= used people will still eventually miss items on the lists =E2=80=93 even if t= hey=E2=80=99ve had several million dollars in military flight training. 

 

If missing an item results= in an increased probability of creating a catastrophic hazardous condition,= then best design practice is to provide other means of ensuring the hazardo= us condition is not allowed.  A= s flying machine designers we basically want to put obstacles between a flig= ht crew and each catastrophic hazard until those risks are properly controll= ed.  Critical hazards are not a= cceptably controlled (meaning reduced in probability of occurrence) by check= list use alone given the error rates of humans.  Human performance testing shows that a well-trained, reste= d, and focused human is going to average an error one out of every 100 actio= ns.  It gets much worse if they= are not trained, rested, and distracted=E2=80=A6

 

I=E2=80=99m pretty s= ure that the designers of the military aircraft you flew went through the sa= me design safety assessment.  I= f your military aircraft were taken airborne without the canopy latched and t= hat was likely to result in loss of crew and vehicle, that hazard would not b= e =E2=80=9Ccontrolled=E2=80=9D only by use of a check list.  There would be caution and warnings to help pr= event the hazardous condition and if a C&W system doesn=E2=80=99t reduce= the probability of occurrence enough, other more significant vehicle design= changes would likely be undertaken.

 

In the case of the Legacy=E2=80=99= s canopy, a simple and inexpensive warning system and very minor modificatio= n to the latching mechanism can significantly lower the probability of even t= ired and distracted pilots from taking a Legacy to flight with the canopy un= latched. 

 

I=E2=80=99d l= ike to see the community of Lancair Legacy builders and pilots grow.  My view is that any prospective build= ers/pilots conducting due diligence on the airplane and its safety history w= ould be happy to see that the cause of a considerable portion of the acciden= ts and fatalities can be essentially eliminated by incorporating simple, ine= xpensive measures.

 

Valin Thorn

 

 

From: Lancair Mailing List [mailto:lml@lancaironline.net] On Behalf Of = Jon Socolof
Sent: Monday, April 28, 2014 1:38 PM
To: lml@lancaironline.net
Subject= : [LML] Legacy White Paper

 

The Legacy canopy des= ign is not unsafe or inadequate and does the job exactly as Lancair intended= . In all my training in the Legacy, attention to the canopy has always been s= tressed. It=E2=80=99s a check list item and as in my military jet, a verific= ation item by pushing on the canopy prior to takeoff. After the tragic Lakel= and accident Lancair incorporated an additional canopy safety warning into t= he design.  If a builder wants to change the design, that=E2=80=99s a j= udgment call.

 

I don=E2=80=99t believe there is a case of a =E2=80=9Csec= ured=E2=80=9D canopy opening in flight and it has been demonstrated here, th= e plane can be flown with the canopy open.  These are high performance a= irplanes, deserve respect and require skill to operate. Yes, some pilots fai= led to secure their canopies before fight. Some recovered their airplanes an= d some had lesser results.

 =

Human factors are the issue here and unfort= unately, failures will occur. Failure to use checklists or missing items, ru= shing, complacency and non-standard procedures, continuing takeoffs with the= canopy unsecured, operating on runways with insufficient Accelerate Stop Di= stances, etc.

 

I am concerned how a paper like this may be perceived. Wi= ll it scare off potential builders and buyers or be interpreted to indicate a= design flaw?   I don=E2=80=99t believe this paper presents anythi= ng new or unknown.  As far as I know, there is no record of an in-fligh= t breakup or failure of a Legacy, yet the airframe has developed a certain r= eputation by biting a few unwary pilots, but just how does this paper help? <= o:p>

 

FWIW

 

Jon

 

 

&nb= sp;

= --Apple-Mail-D1105937-13CE-4A33-9806-B3D5A74D1C36--