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References: From: vtailjeff@aol.com Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-55422B03-88C3-4E77-93F4-E4375CB5D621 X-Mailer: iPad Mail (9B206) X-Original-Message-Id: X-Original-Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2012 21:13:36 -0500 X-Original-To: Lancair Mailing List Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) x-aol-global-disposition: G X-AOL-SCOLL-SCORE: 1:2:522206688:93952408 X-AOL-SCOLL-URL_COUNT: 13 x-aol-sid: 3039ac1d2906506cf0d3385b X-AOL-IP: 24.107.65.42 --Apple-Mail-55422B03-88C3-4E77-93F4-E4375CB5D621 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Think you will never have to ditch? Think it will only involve an engine f= ailure? Sent from my iPad Begin forwarded message: > From: Mastery Flight Training, Inc. > Date: October 3, 2012 8:54:16 PM CDT > To: > Subject: Flying Lessons Weekly > Reply-To: Mastery Flight Training, Inc. >=20 > If you prefer, read FLYING LESSONS online. >=20 >=20 > Unsubscribe vtailjeff@aol.com | Update your profile | Forward to a friend >=20 > =20 >=20 > FLYING LESSONS for October 4, 2012 =20 >=20 > FLYING LESSONS uses the past week's aircraft mishap reports to consider wh= at might have contributed to accidents, so you can make better decisions if y= ou face similar circumstances. Verify all technical information before appl= ying it to your aircraft or operation, with manufacturer's data and recommen= dations taking precedence. YOU are the pilot-in-command, and are solely res= ponsible for the decisions you make. > This week=E2=80=99s lessons > The FAA preliminary report gives few details on the crash of a Beech Baron= twin: >=20 > AIRCRAFT CRASHED INTO THE WATER, COAST GUARD RECOVERED THE 2 PERSONS ON BO= ARD WITH UNKNOWN INJURIES, WRECKAGE LOCATED 75 MILES FROM GRAND ISLE, LA. >=20 > The true story, however, is quite astounding. The pilot permits FLYING LE= SSONS to quote his first-person account of his amazing story: >=20 > We topped the aircraft off with fuel at Baytown airport (KHPY) on the east= side of Houston, Texas. I departed VFR and picked up our IFR clearance from= Houston Approach en-route, prior to reaching SBI (Sabine VOR). I was cleare= d as filed, SBI LLA LEV Q100 SRQ KSRQ [Sarasota, Florida, directly across th= e Gulf of Mexico]. >=20 > We leveled of at 11,000 ft. After crossing LEV, we received lost comms pro= cedures from Houston Center, which I am quite familiar with as standard oper= ating procedure on our altitude and routing, having flown this exact flight m= any times in the past, including in [the accident airplane]. In approximatel= y the vicinity of REDFN intersection, I noticed a small amount of smoke in t= he cockpit. I quickly alerted ATC that we had a problem before shutting off t= he master (in hopes that I had an electrical short which would be resolved b= y doing so). The amount of smoke increased exponentially almost immediately.= >=20 > Not being able to see very much, I popped the cabin door open and also the= pilot storm window. While having the door open sucked out most of the smoke= and made it possible to breathe, it was still nearly impossible to see anyt= hing. My passenger then yelled "Flames! Flames!" and just at that time I als= o noticed flames through the gap between the panel and glare shield. At that= point, I immediately pulled both engines to idle and pushed the nose over i= nto a dive. I activated the aircraft's 406.1mHz beacon in the dive. >=20 > By now, it was getting a bit toasty in the cockpit! It was nearly impossib= le to see out the windshield, so I flew the airplane by looking out the pilo= t storm window. Thankfully, it seemed that most of the smoke was being sucke= d out of the cabin door. I leveled the airplane about 100 ft above the water= , saw a large yacht which I attempted to get as close as I could to without e= ndangering, then touched down in the water. We skipped off the water, went a= bout 30 ft in the air, and the next time we came down, the water grabbed us p= retty hard. We stopped quickly enough that my prescription sunglasses were t= hrown off my face (they fit very tightly). I was able to keep the wings leve= l, and we came to a stop in the same direction we were pointed in, right sid= e up. I popped our seatbelts and we exited the aircraft. >=20 > By the time we removed our seatbelts, the water inside the cabin was nearl= y up to the seats. We stepped out onto the wing and I grabbed our inflatable= PFDs [Personal Floatation Devices] and "ditch bag." By the time we had them= inflated and around our necks, we were up to our necks in water. I estimate= the aircraft fully sank within 2 minutes of touchdown. I carry PFDs for ev= ery passenger. They were not really suitable for offshore use. I knew this w= hen I purchased them, but went with this style due to size and ease of use. I= would have loved to have offshore jackets, but it seems a bit ridiculous to= carry them around in your airplane all the time. >=20 > We kept getting swamped with waves over our heads, even though the seas we= re relatively calm. I activated my SPOT upon entering the water (I have carr= ied one with my since they were first introduced). The yacht never saw us. W= e waved and waved until the disappeared. We bobbed around in the Gulf for ne= arly 3 hours. A CBP [Customs and Border Protection] fixed wing aircraft was d= oing a search pattern for 30 minutes before the USCG [US Coast Guard] helico= pter showed up. They both flew right over the top of us many times and never= spotted us. The USCG chopper flew right over us about 6 times before they s= potted us. This was where I started to become a bit worried. We could see th= em, but they could not see our heads in the water. We watched them fly over a= nd waved at them, while I watched the sun setting. I knew if they didn't fin= d us within 30 minutes, we would be staying the night out there and our odds= for survival would drop drastically. >=20 > I am not sure how cold the water was, but into the second hour, we were bo= th cold and shivering. Finally they spotted us. The USCG did an excellent j= ob on the pickup. It was the swimmer's first water rescue. They were very pr= ofessional. Later over a bite to eat, they told me that they had expected to= find either nothing, or a couple of bodies. The commander attributed our su= rvival to being =E2=80=9Cextremely well prepared.=E2=80=9D (I disagree with t= his a bit, more on that below.) >=20 > When I owned my [Beechcraft] Bonanza, I carried a life raft with me for th= ese crossings. I fly regularly to Florida and Mexico across the Gulf during a= ll times of year. I always carry a PFD for each passenger and a =E2=80=9Cdit= ch=E2=80=9D bag with water and Cliff Bars in it. My SPOT is always within re= ach. When I moved to a twin, after the first few overwater flights, I sold t= he life raft on eBay. I looked at it as unnecessarily taking up space. After= all, I can lose and engine and still fly to my destination! That was a big m= istake. I would have given [anything] to have a life raft out there. Not onl= y would it have been much more comfortable, but it would have made us much m= ore easy to locate. Two heads bobbing around is tough to see, especially com= pared to a big colorful raft. >=20 > What I learned (or already knew): > If you fly over water like I do, bring a raft. If you don't own one, borro= w one. > Carry a PFD for each passenger. > Have a small ditch bag prepared with food and water. > Carry a PLB [Personal Locator Beacon] or SPOT on your person. > My Baron was equipped with double shoulder harnesses. Without them, we pro= bably would have been knocked out and drowned. At the very least, I would ha= ve serious facial lacerations and/or a broken nose. I will not get into an a= irplane without them. I do not care if it is for a quick ride around the pat= tern. It is not going to happen. > I consider myself having been (barely) adequately prepared for this. =E2=80= =9CWell-prepared,=E2=80=9D as the USCG Commander put it, to me would have me= ant being in a life raft.=20 >=20 > Things in our favor were the relatively warm water temperature, the relati= vely calm sea state, the pretty good weather in the area, my emergency conta= cts knowing exactly what to tell the emergency responders [as a result of th= e SPOT activation]. Also, having lived aboard and cruised my sailboat for 2.= 5 years and being a USCG licensed captain, I have had extensive water surviv= al training. That definitely helped. Did my seaplane rating help? Probably n= ot (even though my seaplane instructor would like to believe it did!). > =20 > I have no idea with certainty what caused the fire. The OAT [Outside Air T= emperature at cruise altitude] was in the low 40s [Fahrenheit] and I had tur= ned on the heater approximately 5-10 minutes before the first smoke appeared= . Turning it and the master off did not change the situation. It could have b= een many things, but I can only speculate. >=20 > Everyone tells me I am very lucky. I tell them that if I was at all lucky,= my airplane wouldn't have caught fire. Something else I have given some th= ought to: If this would have happened just 4-5 flight hours earlier, I would= not be writing this post. A few days before this flight, I spent an entire d= ay bouncing around the southeast almost all IMC and every approach to minimu= ms or near minimums. I am trying to keep a good attitude about the whole thi= ng, but I would be a liar if I didn't admit that I am slightly shaken up ove= r this ordeal. >=20 > In addition to the pilot=E2=80=99s self-critique, what other FLYING LESSON= S does his experience teach us? > Know the airplane=E2=80=99s fire procedures. Electrical and engine fires o= ften extinguish by removing the source of heat (electricity) or fuel.=20 > Think beyond the checklists. The Baron=E2=80=99s Electrical Fire checklis= t calls for ventilating the cabin, but it doesn=E2=80=99t specifically tell y= ou how. The pilot opened the storm window and the forward cabin door, which= will evacuate a smoky cabin quite rapidly. Obviously the pilot had thought a= bout how he=E2=80=99d remove smoke from a burning cabin before needing to do= so. > Know the emergency descent procedure. Any number of emergencies may requi= re you get down in a big hurry. See the Emergency Procedures section of you= r Pilot=E2=80=99s Operating Handbook (POH) or Approved Flight Manual (AFM)=E2= =80=94chances are there=E2=80=99s a checklist procedure you can practice wit= h an instructor experienced in your airplane type. > Consider not only the likelihood of an emergency, but also the consequence= s. The pilot felt he was unlikely to have to ditch after moving from a one-= engine to a twin. He sold off some of his emergency equipment as a result. = The chance of a ditching was remote, but the consequences of a successful d= itching are the same regardless of the number of engines. Ironically, in th= e airplane more capable of carrying the added equipment, it was not availabl= e. > A personal locator beacon may be a lifesaver=E2=80=94if you have time (and= remember) to activate it, and if someone on the receiving end is tracking i= n real time, and briefed on how to immediately notify the proper authorities= with the precise location information transmitted by the beacon. > A strobe light, waterproof flares or other signaling device is at least as= important as a transmitter beacon. > Speculation, which is all we'll ever have, is that the fire was electrical= , the result of a fuel leak in the combustion heater in the nose, or ignitio= n of flammable baggage or other materials by the cabin heater. I know when I= was flying Barons I kept a couple of spare quarts of oil and greasy rags us= ed during preflight in the nose baggage compartment. The possibility that t= his Baron went down because something flammable in the nose baggage compartm= ent, near the combustion heater and hot cabin heat ducts, makes me rethink t= his practice. >=20 > The pilot's skill in handling this emergency is matched only by his genero= sity in letting us learn from his experience. Great job, pilot. And thank y= ou. >=20 > Comments? Questions? Tell us what you think at mastery.flight.training@c= ox.net. >=20 > Thanks to AVEMCO Insurance for helping bring you FLYING LESSONS Weekly.=20= > If you wish to help cover the expenses of bringing you FLYING LESSONS free= each week, you may contribute using the secure PayPal button at www.mastery= -flight-training.com. Thank you, generous supporters. =20 > Debrief: Readers write about recent FLYING LESSONS >=20 > Reader David Heberling comments on last week=E2=80=99s LESSONS about IFR c= urrency: >=20 > A very interesting subject. In my early career, I was blessed with enough= IFR flying and approaches to be able to meet the letter of the law to keep c= urrent. When I flew with the commuters, none of the airplanes had autopilot= s and everything was hand flown. I have often said, that when I flew in the= commuters, I was at my best flying IFR. We flew straight ILSs, localizer b= ackcourse approaches, NDBs, VOR approaches from a DME arc, and my all time f= avorite, ILS at night to a circle to land maneuver at an airport on a platea= u away from town (KBFD). =20 >=20 > Since my commuter days, I have had recurrent training on an annual basis e= ver since. Captains used to have to do this every six months, but that has c= hanged. In addition, we always back up our visual approaches with some sort= of electronic guidance. We also fly our visuals exactly the way we fly the= ILS. What it comes down to is making the procedure second nature so that y= ou are never at a loss to where you are and what you are doing. =20 > In over 25,000 hours of flying I have never had a partial panel experience= . In my own airplane, my vacuum pump failed in VFR conditions. I work extr= a hard to avoid flying my airplane in low IFR weather. All of my flying in m= y airplane is leisure flying. As such, my motto is: Do not recreate your da= y job. This does not mean that a partial panel will never happen to me. It= just means that I have been extraordinary lucky. =20 >=20 > I think with the advent of lower cost simulators, like the Red Bird, there= is no excuse to becoming non-current IFR. Also, it is impossible to legisla= te currency of any kind. It only becomes apparent after an incident has hap= pened. This is part of the risk assessment all pilots should contemplate. H= ow will my lack of currency affect me or my family? =20 >=20 > Introspection is natural to an introvert. Extroverts are naturally outwar= d looking. Obviously, this is a generalization and there is true variation i= n both of these personality types. However, there is enough evidence that p= eople do not take currency seriously enough, even though their lives depend u= pon it. The flying public has no idea what is involved here. All they see i= s small planes having accidents every week of the year. When they do climb i= nto an airplane, they have absolute trust that the pilot has met every requi= rement of the law. When that trust is broken, innocent people die. The pub= lic just thinks that GA airplanes are dangerous. The truth is mechanical fa= ilures are rare, and pilot error is rampant. >=20 > Thank you, David. Simulators are not umbiquitous yet, but as they become m= ore readily available--and used properly--they should have a positive impact= on the pilot error record. >=20 > Reader Tom Allen relates a personal experience after a FLYING LESSON about= engine failures on takeoff: >=20 > I had just dropped off my friend at the end of about a 1.5-hour return fli= ght from a pancake breakfast fly-in. The engine was running fine, so [there w= ere] no clues that anything was wrong. I taxied out to the runway and ran th= e engine up just like always. With checklist complete, I taxied onto the run= way for takeoff and started turning in the power. Everything was looking goo= d, sounding good, and I was about to rotate when the sound stopped suddenly,= i.e. no sputter, no nothing. It was an extremely surreal feeling. I fortuna= tely had enough wherewithal to release the back pressure and roll to a stop.= Five seconds later and this would have been a very different story. Sitting= on the runway, I primed and restarted the engine. I started to spin up the p= ower and it stopped again. I started it again and it continued to run, but v= ery rough and not really above about 1500 rpm. >=20 > So, I taxied back to the hangar, demonstrated this to my friend and called= my mechanic. >=20 > Interestingly, my mechanic came over a few days later and it ran as smooth= ly as ever. We could not find anything wrong. We decided to rebuild the fue= l pump and flow divider. A few days after that I decided to fly it and the f= uel injector on cylinder #6 was plugged and not developing any power [as see= n on the engine monitor]. We cleaned #6 and it has run fine ever since. It a= ppears that something got loose in the fuel system. >=20 > Now days, I do a fair amount of assessment before takeoff. On shorter str= ips with fewer choices, I hold the brakes and develop full power before roll= ing. I keep my figure on the fuel boost pump. I checked and know that the e= ngine will continue running if the pump is on with full throttle. I climb ou= t straight ahead if possible and do not make power changes until over 1,000 f= eet. I have some idea about where we are going to put down if we have to. I= select the takeoff tank before cranking the engine. I select the approach a= nd landing tank at initial descent [and not closer to the ground.] >=20 > Thank you for relating your experience and the LESSONS you=E2=80=99ve lear= ned, Tom. >=20 > Reader Woodie Diamond adds to the discussion: >=20 > Great training routines outlined in [last] week=E2=80=99s FLYING LESSONS! = For multiengine drivers, I might suggest one more. Like you very wisely po= inted out, perform this maneuver at altitude (8000 feet for ME aircraft) and= always with a flight instructor that is qualified in the aircraft being flo= wn. >=20 > Configure the aircraft for landing, gear down, full flaps, significantly r= educed power, over-the-fence speed. Initiate the flare and go-around with on= e engine. Be ready for a big surprise! When a multiengine aircraft is appr= oaching the runway, configured for landing, the engines are already at or ne= ar zero thrust settings. At this point, it is practically impossible to ide= ntify a failed engine; rpm will be at or near the same as the operating engi= ne, and the MP will show the pressure of the air at the engine. Only when t= he throttles are advanced to initiate the go-around, will the pilot know an e= ngine has failed. >=20 > During a go-around, I would quickly advance both throttles. My flight ins= tructor hated that and constantly told me that from a low power setting, fir= st gradually advance throttles to a setting where the engines should both be= producing power (about 18=E2=80=9D in my airplane), then go to full power. = Failure to listen to him produced the above drill. I=E2=80=99m sure you ca= n guess the results. >=20 > Thanks for your comments, Woodie. You have a wise instructor. More on en= gine failures on takeoff and in a go-around, from reader Bob Butt: >=20 > I have a flight training manual from 1940 extolling the reliability of "To= day=E2=80=99s Engines." A graphical depiction of [a] dotted line turning ba= ck to a skull and crossbone and a dotted line straight ahead to a mug of bee= r.=20 >=20 > Seventy years later nothing has changed. The [FLYING LESSONS] comment of l= anding as slow as possible rings true from experience of others, and recover= ing of wreckage. Oftentimes even very experienced pilots choose to make ques= tionable departure decisions in an effort to save the aircraft in case of an= emergency. It belongs to the insurance company at that point. Emergency par= achutes descend at 500 feet per minute, many even faster. The aircraft forwa= rd speed makes the difference between survival or not. Oh yea, a shoulder h= arness will make a difference also. >=20 > Nice imagery. Thanks, Bob. And from reader Scott Jackson: >=20 > Good points on practising the "engine failure on departure" drill. During= flight tests here in Canada, it is mandatory to verbally review the "Engine= failure on the runway" and "Engine failure right after takeoff" handling pr= ocedures (called EFOTO and EFATO, respectively) before commencing the takeof= f roll. >=20 > While not as dire an emergency, the first drill is actually quite importan= t as there is one step in it that is not intuitive: that of pulling the thro= ttle of the dead engine to idle. This eliminates the rare-but not unheard of= -problem of the engine suddenly roaring back to full power as the airplane c= oasts off the runway onto a taxiway. Retracting the flaps to increase the w= eight on the wheels, thereby permitting heavier braking, is also part of the= drill. >=20 > For the failure right after takeoff case, I teach the military method summ= ed up by the acronym "SLAM". After the customary, initial moment of shock, a= nyone, no matter what their stress level, can recall "Straight ahead, Lower t= he nose, Airspeed (best glide) and Mayday. Just the one word, forget the ful= l, formal transmission. >=20 > While this acronym does not include manipulating the engine controls in an= attempt to get the windmilling engine to start producing power again, as do= some of the other methods, I prefer it as it concentrates on the primary ta= sk of flying the airplane instead of dividing the pilot's attention at a per= iod of low energy coupled with little time and options. >=20 > Were the engine to recover as you adjust the throttle, mixture and carbure= tor heat, just as the airplane approaches the only decent area to touchdown,= then the pilot is faced with an awful decision: whether to continue with th= e forced landing or climb away. This, too, has happened before and too ofte= n resulted in yet-another power loss but this time with no suitable landing a= rea available. Your astute readers will correctly surmise that this occurs w= ith fuel-delivery issues in those airplanes equipped with gravity-fed system= s. >=20 > It is an interesting exercise, at altitude, to transition from at climb at= Vy to a descent at best glide, while executing a 180-degree turn. Not only= is the altitude lost noteworthy, but also the best technique for the course= reversal: whether to turn into or away from a crosswind, whether to make it= all one turn or turn initially one way and then the other to avoid having a= large bank angled attitude near the ground. >=20 > Thank you for provoking a helpful exchange on this issue. >=20 > Thank you as well, Scott. I like your acronym SLAM. One point: the Airsp= eed for an engine failure immediately after takeoff would not necessarily be= Best Glide. Unless you need to travel some distance to get to a landing ar= ea, slow to Landing Without Power speed as discussed in the FLYING LESSONS t= hat prompted this discussion. Landing Without Power speed (sometimes called= Emergency Power-Off Landing Speed or similar) results in the lowest vertica= l speed and near the lowest safe forward speed on touchdown=E2=80=94both hig= hly desirable conditions for surviving an off-airport landing. >=20 > David Heberling is back with an experience to close out this week=E2=80=99= s Debrief: >=20 > I had my own experience with an engine failure on take off. This happene= d a long time ago when I was instructing two pilot students going for their C= FI ride. I was in the left seat with one student in the right seat and the o= ther in the back seat in a Cherokee Arrow. We had come back in from the pra= ctice area to do some pattern work. We planned on doing a short field landi= ng, followed by a short field takeoff [on runway 25]. As we lifted away fro= m the runway, we pulled up the gear and reduced the power back to 25 squared= [per the POH]. At this time, the engine made some growling, grinding noise= s. =20 >=20 > Now, we were not very high off the ground when this happened. We were jus= t passing the control tower. I had always heard that an engine is most like= ly to misbehave upon the first power reduction. I made note of that and imm= ediately took control of the airplane. My plan was to jink a little to the r= ight to do a base and final to the remainder of runway 22, which crosses the= take off path of traffic off of runway 25. To do so, I had to lower the no= se to see my point of intended touchdown. It never worked out that way. As= soon as I got pointed at runway 22, we heard a very loud BANG! Then, all o= f the oil emptied out of the engine onto my windshield. Talk about surprise= d! I did not know quite what to do. I watched for the ground out of my lef= t side window, lowered the gear, and waited. As the ground neared, the airp= lane started to yaw to the left, so I applied full right rudder and flared. = We touched down in the grass between the parallel taxiway and Runway 22. >=20 > Looking back, I realize how lucky we all were that day. My initial reacti= on to lower the nose to see the runway ahead of us saved us from a truly gru= esome accident. My actual altitude is unknown when the scenario unfolds. I= never looked at any of the instruments. I know we had to be less than 200 f= eet because we did not travel very far before landing again. I did =E2=80=9C= the big push,=E2=80=9D not because I knew that was what I should be doing, b= ut because I wanted to see where I was going. The end result was the same. = I know better now. >=20 > That was indeed fortuitous, David. Your LESSON illustrates something I po= int out to all my students: a turn back to the airport following an engine f= ailure immediately after takeoff might possibly get you back onto a crossing= runway, or a parallel taxiway, or at least the grassy or level area of the a= irport. In a retractable gear airplane, if the gear=E2=80=99s already up yo= u may not have time to put the wheels back down=E2=80=94and trying to will n= egatively impact your glide performance. So you may land wheels up. But do= n=E2=80=99t expect to turn around and make an otherwise uneventful rolling l= anding on the reciprocal runway. Touch down Wings level, Under control, at t= he Slowest Safe speed (a WUSS landing) straight ahead or after a turn and ch= ances are good (if occupants are wearing shoulder harnesses) you and your pa= ssengers will walk away.=20 >=20 > What do you think? Let us hear from you at mftsurvey@cox.net. > The FAA Safety Team reminds us of a LESSON we=E2=80=99ve discussed many ti= mes: >=20 > What We Hear =E2=80=93 Expectation Bias > A pilot calls the tower and reports ready for departure on Runway 10. The= controller clears the pilot for takeoff on Runway 17. The pilot reads back= his clearance for takeoff on Runway 10 =E2=80=93 and then stops on the runw= ay when he spots an aircraft inbound, opposite direction for his runway. >=20 > The Air Traffic Control System is heavily dependent upon verbal communicat= ion to exchange information between controllers and pilots. Hearing what we= expect to hear is frequently listed as a causal factor for pilot deviations= that occur both on the ground and in the air. In the scenario above - the p= ilot expected to be cleared for takeoff on Runway 10 =E2=80=93 and the contr= oller expected to hear from an aircraft that had been taxied to Runway 17. T= hese professionals were captured by their own expectations. >=20 > Eurocontrol defines ATC expectation bias as =E2=80=9CHaving a strong belie= f or mindset towards a particular outcome=E2=80=9D. A recent analysis of ru= nway incursion data shows that expectation bias is one of the most common ca= usal factors for pilot deviations. Data from the Air Traffic Safety Action P= rogam [sic] confirms this fact. >=20 > What can you do as a pilot to mitigate expectation bias? Understand that= expectation bias often affects the verbal transmission of information. Whe= n issued instructions by ATC =E2=80=93 focus on listening and repeat to your= self exactly what is said in your head =E2=80=93 and then apply that informa= tion actively. Does the clearance make sense? If something doesn=E2=80=99t= make sense (incorrect call sign, runway assignment, altitude, etc.) =E2=80=93= then query the controller about it. >=20 > Don=E2=80=99t let your expectations lead to a pilot deviation. Listen car= efully =E2=80=93 and fly safe! > Share safer skies. Forward FLYING LESSONS to a friend. > More to say? Let us learn from you, at mftsurvey@cox.net. >=20 >=20 > =20 > Aviation: Freedom. Choices. Responsibility. >=20 > Thomas P. Turner, M.S. Aviation Safety MCFI > 2010 National FAA Safety Team Representative of the Year > 2008 FAA Central Region Flight Instructor of the Year >=20 > I welcome your comments and suggestions. Contact mastery.flight.training@= cox.net. If someone has forwarded this message to you and you want to have = FLYING LESSONS sent directly to you each week, you may subscribe for free. = =20 >=20 > Holder of an ATP certificate with instructor, CFII and MEI ratings and a M= asters Degree in Aviation Safety, 2010 National FAA Safety Team Representati= ve of the Year and 2008 FAA Central Region CFI of the Year, Master CFI Thoma= s P. Turner has been Lead Instructor for Bonanza pilot training program at t= he Beechcraft factory; production test pilot for engine modifications; aviat= ion insurance underwriter; corporate pilot and safety expert; Captain in the= United States Air Force; and contract course developer for Embry-Riddle Aer= onautical University. He now directs the education and safety arm of a 9300= -member pilots=E2=80=99 organization. With over 3700 hours logged, includin= g more than 2400 as an instructor, Tom writes, lectures and instructs extens= ively from his home at THE AIR CAPITAL--Wichita, Kansas.=20 >=20 > Subscribe >=20 > For piston Beechcraft pilots >=20 > The Beech Weekly Accident Update is now posted. >=20 > =20 > FLYING LESSONS 10/4/2012 > =C2=A92012 Mastery Flight Training, Inc.=20 > All rights reserved.=20 >=20 > =20 >=20 > Contact mastery.flight.training@cox.net for reprint permission. >=20 >=20 >=20 > =20 > 10 Tips for Avoiding Gear Up and Gear Collapse Mishaps >=20 >=20 > You are receiving this email because you have subscribed to the free Flyin= g Lessons weekly e-newsletter from Mastery Flight Training, Inc. >=20 > Mastery Flight Training, Inc. > 247 Tiffany Street > Rose Hill, KS 67133 >=20 > Add us to your address book > Copyright (C) 2012 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. All rights reserved. >=20 > =20 --Apple-Mail-55422B03-88C3-4E77-93F4-E4375CB5D621 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Think you will never have t= o ditch? Think it will  only  involve an engine failure?

Se= nt from my iPad

Begin forwarded message:

From: Mastery Flight Training, Inc. <mastery.flight.training@cox.net= >
Date: October 3, 2012 8:54:16 PM CDT
To: <<= a href=3D"mailto:vtailjeff@aol.com">vtailjeff@aol.com>
Subject:= Flying Lessons Weekly
Reply-To: Mastery Flight Trainin= g, Inc. <mastery.fligh= t.training@cox.net>

=09 Flying Lessons Weekly =09 =09 =09

If you prefer,  read FLYING LESSONS online.
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FLYING LESSONS for October= 4, 2012  

FLYING LESSONS uses the past week's airc= raft mishap reports to consider what might have contributed to accidents, so= you can make better decisions if you face similar circumstances.  Veri= fy all technical information before applying it to your aircraft or operatio= n, with manufacturer's data and recommendations taking precedence.  YOU= are the pilot-in-command, and are solely responsible for the decisions you m= ake.

This week=E2=80=99s l= essons

The FAA prelimi= nary report gives few details on the crash of a Beech Baron twin:

AIRCRAFT CRASHED INTO THE WATER, COA= ST GUARD RECOVERED THE 2 PERSONS ON BOARD WITH UNKNOWN INJURIES, WRECKAGE LO= CATED 75 MILES FROM GRAND ISLE, LA.
The true story, however, is quite astounding. = ; The pilot permits FLYING LESSONS to quote his first-person accoun= t of his amazing story:

We topped the aircraft off with fuel= at Baytown airport (KHPY) on the east side of Houston, Texas. I departed VFR= and picked up our IFR clearance from Houston Approach en-route, prior to re= aching SBI (Sabine VOR). I was cleared as filed, SBI LLA LEV Q100 SRQ KSRQ [= Sarasota, Florida, directly across the Gulf of Mexico].

We leveled of at 11,000 ft. After crossing LEV, we received lost co= mms procedures from Houston Center, which I am quite familiar with as standa= rd operating procedure on our altitude and routing, having flown this exact f= light many times in the past, including in [the accident airplane]. In appro= ximately the vicinity of REDFN intersection, I noticed a small amount of smo= ke in the cockpit. I quickly alerted ATC that we had a problem before shutti= ng off the master (in hopes that I had an electrical short which would be re= solved by doing so). The amount of smoke increased exponentially almost imme= diately.

Not being able to see very much, I popped the cabin door open and a= lso the pilot storm window. While having the door open sucked out most of th= e smoke and made it possible to breathe, it was still nearly impossible to s= ee anything. My passenger then yelled "Flames! Flames!" and just at that time I also noticed flames through the gap between the pa= nel and glare shield. At that point, I immediately pulled both e= ngines to idle and pushed the nose over into a dive. I activated th= e aircraft's 406.1mHz beacon in the dive.

By now, it was getting a bit toasty in the cockpit! It was nearly i= mpossible to see out the windshield, so I flew the airplane by looking out t= he pilot storm window. Thankfully, it seemed that most of the smoke was bein= g sucked out of the cabin door. I leveled the airplane about 100 ft above th= e water, saw a large yacht which I attempted to get as close as I could to w= ithout endangering, then touched down in the water. We skipped off the water= , went about 30 ft in the air, and the next time we came down, the water gra= bbed us pretty hard. We stopped quickly enough that my prescription sunglass= es were thrown off my face (they fit very tightly). I was able to keep the w= ings level, and we came to a stop in the same direction we were pointed in, r= ight side up. I popped our seatbelts and we exited the aircraft.

By the time we removed our seatbelts, the water inside the cabin wa= s nearly up to the seats. We stepped out onto the wing and I grabbed our inf= latable PFDs [Personal Floatation Devices] and "ditch bag." By the time we h= ad them inflated and around our necks, we were up to our necks in water. I e= stimate the aircraft fully sank within 2 minutes of touchdown.  I carry= PFDs for every passenger. They were not really suitable for offshore use. I= knew this when I purchased them, but went with this style due to size and e= ase of use. I would have loved to have offshore jackets, but it seems a bit r= idiculous to carry them around in your airplane all the time.

We kept getting swamped with waves over our heads, even though the s= eas were relatively calm. I activated my SPOT upon entering the water (I hav= e carried one with my since they were first introduced). The yacht never saw= us. We waved and waved until the disappeared. We bobbed around in the Gulf f= or nearly 3 hours. A CBP [Customs and Border Protection] fixed wing aircraft= was doing a search pattern for 30 minutes before the USCG [US Coast Guard] h= elicopter showed up. They both flew right over the top of us many times and n= ever spotted us. The USCG chopper flew right over us about 6 times before th= ey spotted us. This was where I started to become a bit worried. We could se= e them, but they could not see our heads in the water. We watched them fly o= ver and waved at them, while I watched the sun setting. I knew if they didn'= t find us within 30 minutes, we would be staying the night out there and our= odds for survival would drop drastically.

I am not sure how cold the water was, but into the second hour, we w= ere both cold and shivering. Finally they spotted us.  The USCG did an e= xcellent job on the pickup. It was the swimmer's first water rescue. They we= re very professional. Later over a bite to eat, they told me that they had e= xpected to find either nothing, or a couple of bodies. The commander attribu= ted our survival to being =E2=80=9Cextremely well prepared.=E2=80=9D (I disa= gree with this a bit, more on that below.)

When I owned my [Beechcraft] Bonanza, I carried a life raft with me= for these crossings. I fly regularly to Florida and Mexico across the Gulf d= uring all times of year. I always carry a PFD for each passenger and a =E2=80= =9Cditch=E2=80=9D bag with water and Cliff Bars in it. My SPOT is always wit= hin reach. When I moved to a twin, after the first few overwater flights, I s= old the life raft on eBay. I looked at it as unnecessarily taking up space. A= fter all, I can lose and engine and still fly to my destination! That was a b= ig mistake. I would have given [anything] to have a life raft out there. Not= only would it have been much more comfortable, but it would have made us mu= ch more easy to locate. Two heads bobbing around is tough to see, especially= compared to a big colorful raft.

What I learned (or already knew):
  1. If you fly over= water like I do, bring a raft. If you don't own one, borrow one.
  2. Carry a PFD for= each passenger.
  3. Have a small di= tch bag prepared with food and water.
  4. Carry a PLB [Pe= rsonal Locator Beacon] or SPOT on your person.
  5. My Baron was eq= uipped with double shoulder harnesses. Without them, we probably would have b= een knocked out and drowned. At the very least, I would have serious facial l= acerations and/or a broken nose. I will not get into an airplane without the= m. I do not care if it is for a quick ride around the pattern. It is not goi= ng to happen.
I consider myself havin= g been (barely) adequately prepared for this. =E2=80=9CWell-prepared,=E2=80=9D= as the USCG Commander put it, to me would have meant being in a life raft.&= nbsp;

Things in our favor were the relatively warm water temperature, the= relatively calm sea state, the pretty good weather in the area, my emergenc= y contacts knowing exactly what to tell the emergency responders [as a resul= t of the SPOT activation]. Also, having lived aboard and cruised my sailboat= for 2.5 years and being a USCG licensed captain, I have had extensive water= survival training. That definitely helped. Did my seaplane rating help? Pro= bably not (even though my seaplane instructor would like to believe it did!)= .
 
I have no idea with certainty what caused the fire. The OAT [Outsid= e Air Temperature at cruise altitude] was in the low 40s [Fahrenheit] and I h= ad turned on the heater approximately 5-10 minutes before the first smoke ap= peared. Turning it and the master off did not change the situation. It could= have been many things, but I can only speculate.

Everyone tells me I am very lucky. I tell them that if I was at all= lucky, my airplane wouldn't have caught fire.  Something else I have g= iven some thought to: If this would have happened just 4-5 flight hours earl= ier, I would not be writing this post. A few days before this flight, I spen= t an entire day bouncing around the southeast almost all IMC and every appro= ach to minimums or near minimums. I am trying to keep a good attitude about t= he whole thing, but I would be a liar if I didn't admit that I am slightly s= haken up over this ordeal.

In addition to the pilot=E2=80=99s s= elf-critique, what other FLYING LESSONS does his experience teach u= s?
  • Know the airplane=E2= =80=99s fire procedures.  Electrical and engine fires often ex= tinguish by removing the source of heat (electricity) or fuel. <= /li>
  • Think beyond the checklists.  The Baron=E2=80=99s Electrical Fire checkli= st calls for ventilating the cabin, but it doesn=E2=80=99t specifically tell= you how.  The pilot opened the storm window and the forward cabin door= , which will evacuate a smoky cabin quite rapidly. Obviously the pilot had t= hought about how he=E2=80=99d remove smoke from a burning cabin before needi= ng to do so.
  • Know the emergency d= escent procedure.  Any number of emergencies may require you g= et down in a big hurry.  See the Emergency Procedures section of your P= ilot=E2=80=99s Operating Handbook (POH) or Approved Flight Manual (AFM)=E2=80= =94chances are there=E2=80=99s a checklist procedure you can practice with a= n instructor experienced in your airplane type.
  • Consider not only th= e likelihood of an emergency, but also the consequences.&n= bsp; The pilot felt he was unlikely to have to ditch after moving from a one= -engine to a twin.  He sold off some of his emergency equipment as a re= sult.  The chance of a ditching was remote, but the consequences of a s= uccessful ditching are the same regardless of the number of engines.  I= ronically, in the airplane more capable of carrying the added equipment, it w= as not available.
  • A personal locator b= eacon may be a lifesaver=E2=80=94if you have time (and rem= ember) to activate it, and if someone on the receiving end is track= ing in real time, and briefed on how to immediately notify the proper author= ities with the precise location information transmitted by the beacon.
  • A strobe light, waterproof flares or other signaling device is at least as important as= a transmitter beacon.
Speculation, which is all we'll ever have, is that the fire was electrical, the re= sult of a fuel leak in the combustion heater in the nose, or ignition of fla= mmable baggage or other materials by the cabin heater.  I know when I w= as flying Barons I kept a couple of spare quarts of oil and greasy rags used= during preflight in the nose baggage compartment.  The possibility tha= t this Baron went down because something flammable in the nose baggage compa= rtment, near the combustion heater and hot cabin heat ducts, makes me rethin= k this practice.

The pilot's skill in handling this emergency is ma= tched only by his generosity in letting us learn from his experience.  = Great job, pilot.  And thank you.

Comments?  Q= uestions?  Tell us<= span style=3D"font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif"> what you think at mastery.flight.training@cox.net.3D""

Thanks to AVEMC= O Insurance for helping bring you FLYING LESSONS Weekly. <= br> If you wish to help cover the expenses of bringing you FLYING L= ESSONS free each week, you may contribute using the secure PayPal butto= n at www.m= astery-flight-training.com.    Thank you, generous supporters. &= nbsp;
Debrief: Readers write about recent FLYING LESSONS

Reader David Heberling c= omments on last week=E2=80=99s LESSONS about IFR currency:

A very interesting subject.  In= my early career, I was blessed with enough IFR flying and approaches to be a= ble to meet the letter of the law to keep current.  When I flew with th= e commuters, none of the airplanes had autopilots and everything was hand fl= own.  I have often said, that when I flew in the commuters, I was at my= best flying IFR.  We flew straight ILSs, localizer backcourse approach= es, NDBs, VOR approaches from a DME arc, and my all time favorite, ILS at ni= ght to a circle to land maneuver at an airport on a plateau away from town (= KBFD).  

Since my commuter days, I have had recurrent training on an annual b= asis ever since.  Captains used to have to do this every six months, bu= t that has changed.  In addition, we always back up our visual approach= es with some sort of electronic guidance.  We also fly our visuals exac= tly the way we fly the ILS.  What it comes down to is making th= e procedure second nature so that you are never at a loss to where you are a= nd what you are doing.  
In over 25,000 hours of flying I have never had a partial panel exp= erience.  In my own airplane, my vacuum pump failed in VFR conditions. &= nbsp;I work extra hard to avoid flying my airplane in low IFR weather.  = ;All of my flying in my airplane is leisure flying.  As such, my motto i= s: Do not recreate your day job.  This does not mean that a partial pan= el will never happen to me.  It just means that I have been extraordina= ry lucky.  

I think with the advent of lower cost simulators, like the Red Bird= , there is no excuse to becoming non-current IFR. Also, it is impossible to l= egislate currency of any kind.  It only becomes apparent after an incid= ent has happened.  This is part of the risk assessment all pilots shoul= d contemplate.  How will my lack of currency affect me or my fa= mily?  

Introspection is natural to an introvert.  Extroverts are natu= rally outward looking.  Obviously, this is a generalization and there i= s true variation in both of these personality types.  However, there is= enough evidence that people do not take currency seriously enough, even tho= ugh their lives depend upon it.  The flying public has no idea what is i= nvolved here.  All they see is small planes having accidents every week= of the year.  When they do climb into an airplane, they have absolute t= rust that the pilot has met every requirement of the law.  When that tr= ust is broken, innocent people die.  The public just thinks that GA air= planes are dangerous.  The truth is mechanical failures are rare, and p= ilot error is rampant.

Thank you, David.  Simulators a= re not umbiquitous yet, but as they become more readily available--and u= sed properly--they should have a positive impact on the pilot error rec= ord.

Reader Tom Allen relates a personal experience after a FLYING L= ESSON about engine failures on takeoff:

I had just dropped off my friend at t= he end of about a 1.5-hour return flight from a pancake breakfast fly-in. Th= e engine was running fine, so [there were] no clues that anything was wrong.= I taxied out to the runway and ran the engine up just like always. With che= cklist complete, I taxied onto the runway for takeoff and started turning in= the power. Everything was looking good, sounding good, and I was about to r= otate when the sound stopped suddenly, i.e. no sputter, no nothing. It was a= n extremely surreal feeling. I fortunately had enough wherewithal to release= the back pressure and roll to a stop. Five seconds later and this would hav= e been a very different story. Sitting on the runway, I primed and restarted= the engine. I started to spin up the power and it stopped again. I started i= t again and it continued to run, but very rough and not really above about 1= 500 rpm.

So, I taxied back to the hangar, demonstrated this to my friend and= called my mechanic.

Interestingly, my mechanic came over a few days later and it ran as= smoothly as ever.  We could not find anything wrong. We decided to reb= uild the fuel pump and flow divider. A few days after that I decided to fly i= t and the fuel injector on cylinder #6 was plugged and not developing any po= wer [as seen on the engine monitor]. We cleaned #6 and it has run fine ever s= ince. It appears that something got loose in the fuel system.

Now days, I do a fair amount of assessment before takeoff.  On= shorter strips with fewer choices, I hold the brakes and develop full power= before rolling.  I keep my figure on the fuel boost pump. I checked an= d know that the engine will continue running if the pump is on with full thr= ottle. I climb out straight ahead if possible and do not make power cha= nges until over 1,000 feet.  I have some idea about where we are going t= o put down if we have to.  I select the takeoff tank before cranking th= e engine.  I select the approach and landing tank at initial descent [a= nd not closer to the ground.]

Thank you for relating your experien= ce and the LESSONS you=E2=80=99ve learned, Tom.

Reader Woodie Diamond adds to the discussion:

Great training routines outlined in [= last] week=E2=80=99s FLYING LESSONS!  For multiengine drivers,= I might suggest one more.  Like you very wisely pointed out, perform t= his maneuver at altitude (8000 feet for ME aircraft) and always with a fligh= t instructor that is qualified in the aircraft being flown.

Configure the aircraft for landing, gear down, full flaps, signific= antly reduced power, over-the-fence speed. Initiate the flare and go-around w= ith one engine.  Be ready for a big surprise!  When a multiengine a= ircraft is approaching the runway, configured for landing, the engines are a= lready at or near zero thrust settings.  At this point, it is practical= ly impossible to identify a failed engine; rpm will be at or near the same a= s the operating engine, and the MP will show the pressure of the air at the e= ngine.  Only when the throttles are advanced to initiate the go-around,= will the pilot know an engine has failed.

During a go-around, I would quickly advance both throttles.  M= y flight instructor hated that and constantly told me that from a low power s= etting, first gradually advance throttles to a setting where the engines sho= uld both be producing power (about 18=E2=80=9D in my airplane), then go to f= ull power.  Failure to listen to him produced the above drill.  I=E2= =80=99m sure you can guess the results.

Thanks for your comments, Woodie.&nb= sp; You have a wise instructor.  More on engine failures on takeoff and= in a go-around, from reader Bob Butt:

I have a flight training manual from= 1940 extolling the reliability of "Today=E2=80=99s Engines."  A graphi= cal depiction of [a] dotted line turning back to a skull and crossbone and a= dotted line straight ahead to a mug of beer. 

Seventy years later nothing has changed. The [FLYING LESSONS] comment of landing as slow as possible rings true from experience of oth= ers, and recovering of wreckage. Oftentimes even very experienced pilots cho= ose to make questionable departure decisions in an effort to save the aircra= ft in case of an emergency. It belongs to the insurance company at that poin= t. Emergency parachutes descend at 500 feet per minute, many even faster. Th= e aircraft forward speed makes the difference between survival or not. = Oh yea, a shoulder harness will make a difference also.

Nice imagery.  Thanks, Bob.&nbs= p; And from reader Scott Jackson:

Good points on practising the "engin= e failure on departure" drill.  During flight tests here in Canada, it i= s mandatory to verbally review the "Engine failure on the runway" and "Engin= e failure right after takeoff" handling procedures (called EFOTO and EFATO, r= espectively) before commencing the takeoff roll.

While not as dire an emergency, the first drill is actually quite i= mportant as there is one step in it that is not intuitive: that of pulling t= he throttle of the dead engine to idle. This eliminates the rare-but not unh= eard of-problem of the engine suddenly roaring back to full power as the air= plane coasts off the runway onto a taxiway.  Retracting the flaps to in= crease the weight on the wheels, thereby permitting heavier braking, is also= part of the drill.

For the failure right after takeoff c= ase, I teach the military method summed up by the acronym "SLAM". After the c= ustomary, initial moment of shock, anyone, no matter what their stress level= , can recall "Straight ahead, Lower the no= se, Airspeed (best glide) and Mayday. Just= the one word, forget the full, formal transmission.

While this acronym does not include m= anipulating the engine controls in an attempt to get the windmilling engine t= o start producing power again, as do some of the other methods, I prefer it a= s it concentrates on the primary task of flying the airplane instead of divi= ding the pilot's attention at a period of low energy coupled with little tim= e and options.

Were the engine to recover as you ad= just the throttle, mixture and carburetor heat, just as the airplane approac= hes the only decent area to touchdown, then the pilot is faced with an awful= decision: whether to continue with the forced landing or climb away.  T= his, too, has happened before and too often resulted in yet-another power lo= ss but this time with no suitable landing area available. Your astute reader= s will correctly surmise that this occurs with fuel-delivery issues in those= airplanes equipped with gravity-fed systems.

It is an interesting exercise, at al= titude, to transition from at climb at Vy to a descent at best glide, while e= xecuting a 180-degree turn.  Not only is the altitude lost noteworthy, b= ut also the best technique for the course reversal: whether to turn into or a= way from a crosswind, whether to make it all one turn or turn initially one w= ay and then the other to avoid having a large bank angled attitude near the g= round.

Thank you for provoking a helpful exchange on this issue.
Thank you as well, Scott.  I li= ke your acronym SLAM.  One point: the Airspeed for an engine failure im= mediately after takeoff would not necessarily be Best Glide.  Unless yo= u need to travel some distance to get to a landing area, slow to Landing Wit= hout Power speed as discussed in the FLYING LESSONS that prompted t= his discussion.  Landing Without Power speed (sometimes called Emergenc= y Power-Off Landing Speed or similar) results in the lowest vertical speed a= nd near the lowest safe forward speed on touchdown=E2=80=94both highly desir= able conditions for surviving an off-airport landing.

David Heberling is back with an experience to close out this week=E2= =80=99s Debrief:

I had my own experience with an engi= ne failure on take off.   This happened a long time ago when I was inst= ructing two pilot students going for their CFI ride.  I was in the left= seat with one student in the right seat and the other in the back seat in a= Cherokee Arrow.  We had come back in from the practice area to do some= pattern work.  We planned on doing a short field landing, followed by a= short field takeoff [on runway 25].  As we lifted away from the runway= , we pulled up the gear and reduced the power back to 25 squared [per the PO= H].  At this time, the engine made some growling, grinding noises. &nbs= p;

Now, we were not very high off the g= round when this happened.  We were just passing the control tower. &nbs= p;I had always heard that an engine is most likely to misbehave upon the fir= st power reduction.  I made note of that and immediately took control o= f the airplane.  My plan was to jink a little to the right to do a base= and final to the remainder of runway 22, which crosses the take off path of= traffic off of runway 25.  To do so, I had to lower the nose to see my= point of intended touchdown.  It never worked out that way.  As s= oon as I got pointed at runway 22, we heard a very loud BANG!  Then, al= l of the oil emptied out of the engine onto my windshield.  Talk about s= urprised!  I did not know quite what to do.  I watched for the gro= und out of my left side window, lowered the gear, and waited.  As the g= round neared, the airplane started to yaw to the left, so I applied full rig= ht rudder and flared.  We touched down in the grass between the paralle= l taxiway and Runway 22.

Looking back, I realize how lucky we= all were that day.  My initial reaction to lower the nose to see the r= unway ahead of us saved us from a truly gruesome accident.  My actual a= ltitude is unknown when the scenario unfolds.  I never looked at any of= the instruments.  I know we had to be less than 200 feet because we di= d not travel very far before landing again.  I did =E2=80=9Cthe big pus= h,=E2=80=9D not because I knew that was what I should be doing, but because I= wanted to see where I was going.  The end result was the same.  I= know better now.

That was indeed fortuitous, David.&n= bsp; Your LESSON illustrates something I point out to all my studen= ts: a turn back to the airport following an engine failure immediately after= takeoff might possibly get you back onto a crossing runway, or a parallel t= axiway, or at least the grassy or level area of the airport.  In a retr= actable gear airplane, if the gear=E2=80=99s already up you may not have tim= e to put the wheels back down=E2=80=94and trying to will negatively impact y= our glide performance.  So you may land wheels up.  But don=E2=80=99= t expect to turn around and make an otherwise uneventful rolling landing on t= he reciprocal runway.  Touch down Wings level, Under control, at the Slowest Sa= fe speed (a WUSS landing) straight ahead or after a turn and chances are goo= d (if occupants are wearing shoulder harnesses) you and your passengers will= walk away. 

What do you think? &= nbsp;Let us hear from you at mftsurvey@cox.net.=
The FAA Safety Team reminds us of a <= em>LESSON we=E2=80=99ve discussed many times:

What We Hear =E2=80=93 Expectation Bias
A pilot calls the tower and reports ready for departure on Runway 1= 0.  The controller clears the pilot for takeoff on Runway 17.  The= pilot reads back his clearance for takeoff on Runway 10 =E2=80=93 and then s= tops on the runway when he spots an aircraft inbound, opposite direction for= his runway.

The Air Traffic Control System is heavily dependent upon verbal com= munication to exchange information between controllers and pilots.  Hea= ring what we expect to hear is frequently listed as a causal factor for pilo= t deviations that occur both on the ground and in the air.  In the scen= ario above - the pilot expected to be cleared for takeoff on Runway 10 =E2=80= =93 and the controller expected to hear from an aircraft that had been taxie= d to Runway 17.  These professionals were captured by their own expecta= tions.

Eurocontrol defines ATC expectation bias as =E2=80=9CHaving a stron= g belief or mindset towards a particular outcome=E2=80=9D.  A recent an= alysis of runway incursion data shows that expectation bias is one of the mo= st common causal factors for pilot deviations.  Data from the Air Traff= ic Safety Action Progam [sic] confirms this fact.

What can you do as a pilot to mitigate expectation bias? =   Understand that expectation bias often affects the verbal transmissio= n of information.  When issued instructions by ATC =E2=80=93 focus on l= istening and repeat to yourself exactly what is said in your head =E2=80=93 a= nd then apply that information actively.  Does the clearance make sense= ?  If something doesn=E2=80=99t make sense (incorrect call sign, runway= assignment, altitude, etc.) =E2=80=93 then query the controller about it.
Don=E2=80=99t let your expectations lead to a pilot deviation. = ; Listen carefully =E2=80=93 and fly safe!
Share safer skies.&nbs= p; Forward FLYING LESSONS to a= friend= .
More to say?=   Let us learn from you, at<= /span> mftsurvey@cox.net= .

3D""
 
Aviation: Freedom. Choices. Responsibility.

Thomas P. Turner, M.S. Aviation Safety MCFI
2010 National FAA Safety Team Representative of the= Year
2008 FAA Central Region Flight Instructor of the Ye= ar

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Holder of an ATP certificate with instructor, CFII a= nd MEI ratings and a Masters Degree in Aviation Safety, 2010 National FAA Sa= fety Team Representative of the Year and 2008 FAA Central Region CFI of the Y= ear, Master CFI Thomas P. Turner has been Lead Instructor for Bonanza pilot t= raining program at the Beechcraft factory; production test pilot for engine m= odifications; aviation insurance underwriter; corporate pilot and safety exp= ert; Captain in the United States Air Force; and contract course developer f= or Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.  He now directs the education a= nd safety arm of a 9300-member pilots=E2=80=99 organization.  With over= 3700 hours logged, including more than 2400 as an instructor, Tom writes, l= ectures and instructs extensively from his home at THE AIR CAPITAL--Wichita,= Kansas. 

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10 Tips for Avoiding Gear U= p and Gear Collapse Mishaps

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