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From: Kevin Stallard <kevin@arilabs.net>
Subject: RE: [LML] Re: Legacy White Paper
Thread-Topic: [LML] Re: Legacy White Paper
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My only issue is that we're not focused on the problem and the problem isn'=
t the canopy or the latch.

This paper I think keeps us from focusing on the real issue.  Just because =
an event occurred and someone got hurt or killed thereafter doesn't mean th=
e event is the cause.

In my opinion, this paper makes it seem like an open canopy means certain d=
eath.  This is wrong, and someone with some power is going to over react an=
d we're going to suffer because of it.

We need accurate, informative, empirical test data.   Should we put canopy =
warning system on? Sure, it can't hurt.  But I feel the tone of the paper w=
ill be detrimental to how others view this airplane and this could have rea=
l consequences.

Let's make sure we know what the real problem is, what is really hurting pe=
ople.=20

Look, I don't mean to disagree, and I appreciate Valin's effort and everone=
 else's into this.  But these kinds of things can have consequences that we=
 may not like and may not be warranted.

Thanks
Kevin


________________________________________
From: Lancair Mailing List [lml@lancaironline.net] On Behalf Of Ron Jones [=
rjones2000@sbcglobal.net]
Sent: Wednesday, April 30, 2014 11:11 AM
To: lml@lancaironline.net
Subject: [LML] Re: Legacy White Paper

Valin,

Your Canopy Safety Issue Paper is outstanding. It should be read by all Leg=
acy owners and pilots.

Your reply to the recent criticisms is equally well written and well reason=
ed.

For all of those who think that they are so sharp and such fantastic aviato=
rs that their personal, outstanding use of checklists solves most ills, wel=
l, I just wish you would get out of Lancair's entirely. Not only are you an=
 accident just waiting to happen, you are driving up all our insurance rate=
s with such arrogant, short-sighted thinking.

Is this to harsh? Maybe. But spouting all this nonsense about infallible ch=
ecklists really gets me annoyed. How many lives have to be lost before folk=
s wise up? Of course checklists are wonderful tools and add to a safe fligh=
t, but do they solve all ills? The record of Lancair accidents suggest othe=
rwise.

I suggest we all pledge to more carefully follow our checklists. I also sug=
gest we actually read this canopy paper and appreciate all the hard work an=
d talent that it represents. It could save your life.

Ron Jones

Sent from my iPad

On Apr 30, 2014, at 5:05 AM, "Valin & Allyson Thorn" <thorn@starflight.aero=
<mailto:thorn@starflight.aero>> wrote:

Jon,

It seems you haven=92t had a chance to give the paper a thorough reading ye=
t.  If you only read one section of the paper, I recommend starting on page=
 23 with Fred Moreno=92s outstanding discussion on human performance.  As t=
his relates to check lists, the bottom line is that well trained, rested, a=
nd focused people will still eventually miss items on the lists =96 even if=
 they=92ve had several million dollars in military flight training.

If missing an item results in an increased probability of creating a catast=
rophic hazardous condition, then best design practice is to provide other m=
eans of ensuring the hazardous condition is not allowed.  As flying machine=
 designers we basically want to put obstacles between a flight crew and eac=
h catastrophic hazard until those risks are properly controlled.  Critical =
hazards are not acceptably controlled (meaning reduced in probability of oc=
currence) by checklist use alone given the error rates of humans.  Human pe=
rformance testing shows that a well-trained, rested, and focused human is g=
oing to average an error one out of every 100 actions.  It gets much worse =
if they are not trained, rested, and distracted=85

I=92m pretty sure that the designers of the military aircraft you flew went=
 through the same design safety assessment.  If your military aircraft were=
 taken airborne without the canopy latched and that was likely to result in=
 loss of crew and vehicle, that hazard would not be =93controlled=94 only b=
y use of a check list.  There would be caution and warnings to help prevent=
 the hazardous condition and if a C&W system doesn=92t reduce the probabili=
ty of occurrence enough, other more significant vehicle design changes woul=
d likely be undertaken.

In the case of the Legacy=92s canopy, a simple and inexpensive warning syst=
em and very minor modification to the latching mechanism can significantly =
lower the probability of even tired and distracted pilots from taking a Leg=
acy to flight with the canopy unlatched.

I=92d like to see the community of Lancair Legacy builders and pilots grow.=
  My view is that any prospective builders/pilots conducting due diligence =
on the airplane and its safety history would be happy to see that the cause=
 of a considerable portion of the accidents and fatalities can be essential=
ly eliminated by incorporating simple, inexpensive measures.

Valin Thorn


From: Lancair Mailing List [mailto:lml@lancaironline.net] On Behalf Of Jon =
Socolof
Sent: Monday, April 28, 2014 1:38 PM
To: lml@lancaironline.net<mailto:lml@lancaironline.net>
Subject: [LML] Legacy White Paper

The Legacy canopy design is not unsafe or inadequate and does the job exact=
ly as Lancair intended. In all my training in the Legacy, attention to the =
canopy has always been stressed. It=92s a check list item and as in my mili=
tary jet, a verification item by pushing on the canopy prior to takeoff. Af=
ter the tragic Lakeland accident Lancair incorporated an additional canopy =
safety warning into the design.  If a builder wants to change the design, t=
hat=92s a judgment call.

I don=92t believe there is a case of a =93secured=94 canopy opening in flig=
ht and it has been demonstrated here, the plane can be flown with the canop=
y open.  These are high performance airplanes, deserve respect and require =
skill to operate. Yes, some pilots failed to secure their canopies before f=
ight. Some recovered their airplanes and some had lesser results.

Human factors are the issue here and unfortunately, failures will occur. Fa=
ilure to use checklists or missing items, rushing, complacency and non-stan=
dard procedures, continuing takeoffs with the canopy unsecured, operating o=
n runways with insufficient Accelerate Stop Distances, etc.

I am concerned how a paper like this may be perceived. Will it scare off po=
tential builders and buyers or be interpreted to indicate a design flaw?   =
I don=92t believe this paper presents anything new or unknown.  As far as I=
 know, there is no record of an in-flight breakup or failure of a Legacy, y=
et the airframe has developed a certain reputation by biting a few unwary p=
ilots, but just how does this paper help?

FWIW

Jon