X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Sender: To: lml@lancaironline.net Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2014 10:07:32 -0400 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from omr-d09.mx.aol.com ([205.188.108.133] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 6.0.9e) with ESMTPS id 6852881 for lml@lancaironline.net; Wed, 30 Apr 2014 09:33:31 -0400 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=205.188.108.133; envelope-from=vtailjeff@aol.com Received: from mtaout-mbd01.mx.aol.com (mtaout-mbd01.mx.aol.com [172.26.252.13]) by omr-d09.mx.aol.com (Outbound Mail Relay) with ESMTP id CC70570264265 for ; Wed, 30 Apr 2014 09:32:56 -0400 (EDT) Received: from [10.165.155.208] (mobile-166-137-182-243.mycingular.net [166.137.182.243]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES128-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mtaout-mbd01.mx.aol.com (MUA/Third Party Client Interface) with ESMTPSA id 8102A380000A2 for ; Wed, 30 Apr 2014 09:32:55 -0400 (EDT) From: Jeff Edwards Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-C52CBF3E-D0D4-422C-8E88-C1F1CB06B116 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) Subject: Re: [LML] Re: Legacy White Paper X-Original-Message-Id: <929B09E4-737F-49B8-822C-D6DBADB9D68E@aol.com> X-Original-Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2014 06:32:53 -0700 References: In-Reply-To: X-Original-To: Lancair Mailing List X-Mailer: iPad Mail (11B511) x-aol-global-disposition: G x-aol-sid: 3039ac1afc0d5360fb87482f X-AOL-IP: 166.137.182.243 --Apple-Mail-C52CBF3E-D0D4-422C-8E88-C1F1CB06B116 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Valin, Well said. We cannot accept losing pilots and airplanes. Your paper informs o= wner pilots of the hazards and ways to mitigate them. Great contribution! Jeff Edwards Sent from my iPad > On Apr 30, 2014, at 5:05 AM, "Valin & Allyson Thorn" wrote: >=20 > Jon, > =20 > It seems you haven=E2=80=99t had a chance to give the paper a thorough rea= ding yet. If you only read one section of the paper, I recommend starting o= n page 23 with Fred Moreno=E2=80=99s outstanding discussion on human perform= ance. As this relates to check lists, the bottom line is that well trained,= rested, and focused people will still eventually miss items on the lists =E2= =80=93 even if they=E2=80=99ve had several million dollars in military fligh= t training.=20 > =20 > If missing an item results in an increased probability of creating a catas= trophic hazardous condition, then best design practice is to provide other m= eans of ensuring the hazardous condition is not allowed. As flying machine d= esigners we basically want to put obstacles between a flight crew and each c= atastrophic hazard until those risks are properly controlled. Critical haza= rds are not acceptably controlled (meaning reduced in probability of occurre= nce) by checklist use alone given the error rates of humans. Human performa= nce testing shows that a well-trained, rested, and focused human is going to= average an error one out of every 100 actions. It gets much worse if they a= re not trained, rested, and distracted=E2=80=A6 > =20 > I=E2=80=99m pretty sure that the designers of the military aircraft you fl= ew went through the same design safety assessment. If your military aircraf= t were taken airborne without the canopy latched and that was likely to resu= lt in loss of crew and vehicle, that hazard would not be =E2=80=9Ccontrolled= =E2=80=9D only by use of a check list. There would be caution and warnings t= o help prevent the hazardous condition and if a C&W system doesn=E2=80=99t r= educe the probability of occurrence enough, other more significant vehicle d= esign changes would likely be undertaken. > =20 > In the case of the Legacy=E2=80=99s canopy, a simple and inexpensive warni= ng system and very minor modification to the latching mechanism can signific= antly lower the probability of even tired and distracted pilots from taking a= Legacy to flight with the canopy unlatched.=20 > =20 > I=E2=80=99d like to see the community of Lancair Legacy builders and pilot= s grow. My view is that any prospective builders/pilots conducting due dili= gence on the airplane and its safety history would be happy to see that the c= ause of a considerable portion of the accidents and fatalities can be essent= ially eliminated by incorporating simple, inexpensive measures. > =20 > Valin Thorn > =20 > =20 > From: Lancair Mailing List [mailto:lml@lancaironline.net] On Behalf Of Jon= Socolof > Sent: Monday, April 28, 2014 1:38 PM > To: lml@lancaironline.net > Subject: [LML] Legacy White Paper > =20 > The Legacy canopy design is not unsafe or inadequate and does the job exac= tly as Lancair intended. In all my training in the Legacy, attention to the c= anopy has always been stressed. It=E2=80=99s a check list item and as in my m= ilitary jet, a verification item by pushing on the canopy prior to takeoff. A= fter the tragic Lakeland accident Lancair incorporated an additional canopy s= afety warning into the design. If a builder wants to change the design, tha= t=E2=80=99s a judgment call. > =20 > I don=E2=80=99t believe there is a case of a =E2=80=9Csecured=E2=80=9D can= opy opening in flight and it has been demonstrated here, the plane can be fl= own with the canopy open. These are high performance airplanes, deserve res= pect and require skill to operate. Yes, some pilots failed to secure their c= anopies before fight. Some recovered their airplanes and some had lesser res= ults. > =20 > Human factors are the issue here and unfortunately, failures will occur. Fa= ilure to use checklists or missing items, rushing, complacency and non-stand= ard procedures, continuing takeoffs with the canopy unsecured, operating on r= unways with insufficient Accelerate Stop Distances, etc. > =20 > I am concerned how a paper like this may be perceived. Will it scare off p= otential builders and buyers or be interpreted to indicate a design flaw? I= don=E2=80=99t believe this paper presents anything new or unknown. As far a= s I know, there is no record of an in-flight breakup or failure of a Legacy,= yet the airframe has developed a certain reputation by biting a few unwary p= ilots, but just how does this paper help? > =20 > FWIW > =20 > Jon > =20 > =20 > =20 --Apple-Mail-C52CBF3E-D0D4-422C-8E88-C1F1CB06B116 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Valin,

Well s= aid. We cannot accept losing pilots and airplanes. Your paper informs owner p= ilots of the hazards and ways to mitigate them. Great contribution!

Jeff Edwards

Sent from my iPad

On Apr 3= 0, 2014, at 5:05 AM, "Valin & Allyson Thorn" <thorn@starflight.aero> wrote:

Jon,

 

It seems you haven=E2=80=99= t had a chance to give the paper a thorough reading yet.  If you only read one section of the paper, I reco= mmend starting on page 23 with Fred Moreno=E2=80=99s outstanding discussion o= n human performance.  As this r= elates to check lists, the bottom line is that well trained, rested, and foc= used people will still eventually miss items on the lists =E2=80=93 even if t= hey=E2=80=99ve had several million dollars in military flight training. 

 

If missing an item results= in an increased probability of creating a catastrophic hazardous condition,= then best design practice is to provide other means of ensuring the hazardo= us condition is not allowed.  A= s flying machine designers we basically want to put obstacles between a flig= ht crew and each catastrophic hazard until those risks are properly controll= ed.  Critical hazards are not a= cceptably controlled (meaning reduced in probability of occurrence) by check= list use alone given the error rates of humans.  Human performance testing shows that a well-trained, reste= d, and focused human is going to average an error one out of every 100 actio= ns.  It gets much worse if they= are not trained, rested, and distracted=E2=80=A6

 

I=E2=80=99m pretty s= ure that the designers of the military aircraft you flew went through the sa= me design safety assessment.  I= f your military aircraft were taken airborne without the canopy latched and t= hat was likely to result in loss of crew and vehicle, that hazard would not b= e =E2=80=9Ccontrolled=E2=80=9D only by use of a check list.  There would be caution and warnings to help pr= event the hazardous condition and if a C&W system doesn=E2=80=99t reduce= the probability of occurrence enough, other more significant vehicle design= changes would likely be undertaken.

 

In the case of the Legacy=E2=80=99= s canopy, a simple and inexpensive warning system and very minor modificatio= n to the latching mechanism can significantly lower the probability of even t= ired and distracted pilots from taking a Legacy to flight with the canopy un= latched. 

 

I=E2=80=99d l= ike to see the community of Lancair Legacy builders and pilots grow.  My view is that any prospective build= ers/pilots conducting due diligence on the airplane and its safety history w= ould be happy to see that the cause of a considerable portion of the acciden= ts and fatalities can be essentially eliminated by incorporating simple, ine= xpensive measures.

 

Valin Thorn

 

 

From: Lancair Mailing List [mailto:lml@lancaironline.net] On Behalf Of = Jon Socolof
Sent: Monday, April 28, 2014 1:38 PM
To: lml@lancaironline.net
Subject= : [LML] Legacy White Paper

 

The Legacy canopy des= ign is not unsafe or inadequate and does the job exactly as Lancair intended= . In all my training in the Legacy, attention to the canopy has always been s= tressed. It=E2=80=99s a check list item and as in my military jet, a verific= ation item by pushing on the canopy prior to takeoff. After the tragic Lakel= and accident Lancair incorporated an additional canopy safety warning into t= he design.  If a builder wants to change the design, that=E2=80=99s a j= udgment call.

 

I don=E2=80=99t believe there is a case of a =E2=80=9Csec= ured=E2=80=9D canopy opening in flight and it has been demonstrated here, th= e plane can be flown with the canopy open.  These are high performance a= irplanes, deserve respect and require skill to operate. Yes, some pilots fai= led to secure their canopies before fight. Some recovered their airplanes an= d some had lesser results.

 =

Human factors are the issue here and unfort= unately, failures will occur. Failure to use checklists or missing items, ru= shing, complacency and non-standard procedures, continuing takeoffs with the= canopy unsecured, operating on runways with insufficient Accelerate Stop Di= stances, etc.

 

I am concerned how a paper like this may be perceived. Wi= ll it scare off potential builders and buyers or be interpreted to indicate a= design flaw?   I don=E2=80=99t believe this paper presents anythi= ng new or unknown.  As far as I know, there is no record of an in-fligh= t breakup or failure of a Legacy, yet the airframe has developed a certain r= eputation by biting a few unwary pilots, but just how does this paper help? <= o:p>

 

FWIW

 

Jon

 

 

&nb= sp;

= --Apple-Mail-C52CBF3E-D0D4-422C-8E88-C1F1CB06B116--