Posted for Laurie Fitzgerald:
As the video has turned up on the LML I guess a description of the event may provide some useful information for those interested. Please feel free to post the following:
VH-FTZ is an Australian registered Aircraft constructed from a Lancair IV-P fast build kit and heavily modified to accept the Walter M601D Turbine.
The aircraft is not entirely the same as a factory Propjet as it was conceived and built prior to Lancair releasing a Propjet. Construction commenced in June 1999 and the first flight was June 2003.
The Aircraft is based at Jandakot airport in Perth Western Australia and has flown just short of 500 hours.
Prior to this event there have only two maintenance issues firstly a broken spring on the nose gear
was ingested by the turbine requiring a compressor rebuild (thanks Diemech) and second was a cracked windscreen due to the Australian sun in the outback causing temperatures sufficient to soften the perspex which then cracked when cooled. The windscreen was replaced with a 1/2 inch screen.
I am the owner, builder and pilot of FTZ and in the absence of organisations such as LOBO in Australia have personally researched and filtered all available information to enable me establish a safe operating regime for my aircraft.
I am a relatively low time private pilot with 1650 hours total time. 1000 hours on a Glasair 1RG and 500 on the Lancair.
For the record, FTZ approaches a stall at 80 knots clean at 14000 feet. On normal operations I rotate for take off at 90 knots and touch down at 100 knots.
On February 7, 2010 I conducted a return flight from the south coast
of Western Australia, shortly after takeoff on climb through 5000 ft at 200 knots I heard a distinct sound that I soon realised was hydraulic fluid escaping, the hydraulic pressure gauge was indicating a rapid loss of pressure. I immediately shut the throttle, held the nose up attitude and selected gear down as the airspeed decayed below 160knots. The gear dropped but there was insufficient hydraulic pressure to extend or lock the gear. I pulled the hydraulic pump breaker and levelled out and maintained 130 knots and exercised the manual hydraulic pump, this confirmed that hydraulic pressure could not be maintained and that a gear extension was not possible.
I held overhead an 1800 metre runway and assessed the situation. I was carrying 300 litres of JetA1 and the annunciator panel indicated the main doors were open with no greens.
I contacted ATC and advised them of my
situation and arranged to transit back to Jandakot Airport where emergency services were available.
On arrival at Jandakot I conducted a low level pass and ATC confirmed the nose gear was half extended and no mains were visible and the main doors appeared closed.
I left the control zone and burnt off the excess fuel, during the hour and a half taken to reduce the fuel load I slowed the aircraft to 100 knots to determine whether the nose gear gas strut would lock the nose gear at touchdown speeds, transferred all fuel from the belly tank and briefed myself for a wheels up landing.
I returned to Jandakot with approximately 50 litres of fuel per side and conducted a final fly past the tower to confirm no change to the gear configuration and then joined the circuit for a landing. I flew a three mile final (flapless) with 450 ft per minute descent and
at one and a half miles reduced to 200 ft per min descent.
At 500 metres from touchdown I was indicating 115 knots and shut down the turbine and turned off the master switch, I did not attempt to flare but held off slightly to lose as much speed as possible. The tail contacted the runway lightly and I released back pressure on the control and let the propellor contact the runway.
At this point I was surprised that the aircraft did not have sufficient mass or inertia to immediately bend the blades which I had left in fine pitch to facilitate braking and I thought in this configuration they would bend rather that dig in.
On each rotation of the windmilling propellor the nose of the aircraft was walked right on the tip of the blades causing a significant yawing. Full rudder slowed but would not arrest the yaw. When the blades finally bent sufficient to allow the
belly of the aircraft to settle on the runway the rudder authority was adequate to steer the aircraft on to the centreline and maintain a straight ahead line.
The aircraft stopped sliding and I exited uninjured, largely due to the fact that the energy was all dissipated during the slide on the runway and there was no real vertical component.
The Aircraft was raised, I pulled the wheels from their wells and pushed them to the locked position and towed the aircraft to my hanger.
The aircraft sustained remarkably little damage:
Abrasion damage to the belly tank and just behind the wing spar down to the nomex core.
Paint damage to the gear doors and left wing.
Require new Pitot and TX antenna
Require one aileron hinge and rod end.
Paint damage to tail.
And the big one
require new prop and engine overhaul.
The cause of the hydraulic failure was a failed flare fitting on the main hydraulic line between the pump and the hydraulic valve that actuates gear and flaps.
The cause of the flare fitting failure is not yet finally determined but the flare was correctly manufactured, however over torquing or repeated torquing may have assisted the failure.
My research to date has revealed that single flares are not adequate for aluminium lines below 3/8 of an inch and that lines of this size should be double flared. I will be replacing all high pressure lines with double flares. I intend to liase with Fred Moreno and study the failed flare, one of us will report on this list the final outcome.
Although a little off topic I need to address Scott's comment "Yes, very professional looking chap flying shoeless." Without wishing to be over sensitive that comment would be acceptable if I
were British. As an Australian the following would be more correct. "Yes, very
professional looking Bloke flying shoeless."
On the matter of flying sans shoes I adopted this habit when flying the Glasair 1RG, as shoes, boots and wooden legs interfered with the operation of the toe brakes and on occasions passengers managed to put their number 9's up into the wiring behind the rather tight panel.
I maintained the habit (although I usually wear socks) in the Lancair after seeing a pilot badly burnt after an accident when their feet and legs where trapped under the panel and they could not extricate themself.
Also I have often puzzled at the reason for wearing footwear as in most accidents I have witnessed, the shoes are found many metres away from the owner. Finally if a flying suit, boots, helmet and visor made us more professional I'd probably have felt better at the post landing media circus.
Safe flying to all
Regards
Laurie Fitzgerald