X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Sender: To: lml@lancaironline.net Date: Sat, 18 Aug 2007 23:33:04 -0400 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from imo-m24.mx.aol.com ([64.12.137.5] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 5.1.11) with ESMTP id 2271483 for lml@lancaironline.net; Sat, 18 Aug 2007 22:08:27 -0400 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=64.12.137.5; envelope-from=VTAILJEFF@aol.com Received: from VTAILJEFF@aol.com by imo-m24.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v38_r9.2.) id q.d46.114b11bb (39954) for ; Sat, 18 Aug 2007 22:07:44 -0400 (EDT) From: VTAILJEFF@aol.com X-Original-Message-ID: X-Original-Date: Sat, 18 Aug 2007 22:07:44 EDT Subject: Re: [LML] Re: Straight Shot article in SWA Spirit Magazine X-Original-To: lml@lancaironline.net MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="-----------------------------1187489264" X-Mailer: AOL 9.0 VR sub 165 X-Spam-Flag: NO -------------------------------1187489264 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Language: en Colyn, =20 I would start with O' Hare arrival and departure information that is listed= =20 on their web site at=20 _http://www.flychicago.com/statistics/stats/0607SUMMARY.pdf_ (http://www.fly= chicago.com/statistics/stats/0607SUMMARY.pdf)=20 =20 You can see that only 2% of the traffic at O'Hare is GA. Kinda makes you =20 wonder why Dailey closed Meigs. =20 Here's more language found at:=20 _https://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/air_traffic/arrival_authorizations/= media/OHareRule.pdf_=20 (https://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/air_traffic/arrival_authorizations/= media/OHareRule.pdf)=20 "Resurgence of Unacceptable Levels of Congestion As a result of the 2000 legislation, the slot restrictions of the HDR lapse= d=20 at O=E2=80=99Hare as of July 1, 2002. The absence of these restrictions allowe= d=20 airlines operating at the airport to add flights, which over time led to a dramatic increase in=20 airline delays. These delays reverberated throughout the national air transportation=20 system.Initially, lifting the HDR had a minimal impact on delays due to the= lingering effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on airline passenger traffic. But by=20 2003, the two air carriers operating hubs at O=E2=80=99Hare, American Airlines (=E2=80=9CAmer= ican=E2=80=9D) and=20 United Airlines (=E2=80=9CUnited=E2=80=9D), had added a large number of operations and reti= med other=20 flights, resulting in congestion during peak hours of the day. From April 2000 through November =20 2003, American increased its scheduled operations at O=E2=80=99Hare between the ho= urs of=20 12:00 p.m. and 7:59 p.m. by nearly 10.5 percent. Over the same period, United increase= d=20 its scheduled operations at O=E2=80=99Hare by over 41 percent. The increases in operations by American and United did not result in a corresponding increase in seat capacity. During the peak period, these two =20 carriers added 375 regional jet operations per day. Overall, American and United added ove= r=20 600 regional jet operations per day. At the same time as they added regional je= t=20 operations, they reduced mainline jet operations. The result was actually a decrease in= =20 seat capacity by each carrier at O=E2=80=99Hare of more than 5.5 percent from April 2000=20= to=20 November 2003 while flights increased by an average of 150 per day. In November 2003, mor= e=20 than 40 percent of American=E2=80=99s and United=E2=80=99s O=E2=80=99Hare flights we= re operated with =20 regional jets, many to large and medium hubs. The significant increases in scheduled=20 operations during this time period resulted in excessive delays and congestion at O= =E2=80=99 Hare. By November 2003, O=E2=80=99Hare had the worst on-time performance of any m= ajor airport. O=E2=80=99Hare arrivals were on time only 57 percent of the time,=20= well=20 below the FAA goal of 82 percent. Departures were little better. They were on time only 6= 7=20 percent of the time, well below the average of 85 percent at other major airports.=20 These delays averaged about an hour in duration. Published schedules for February 2004=20 indicated that the problem would be exacerbated by the addition of even more flights. Recognizing congestion was again becoming a significant issue, Congress=20 enacted legislation that included a mechanism to help reduce delays and improve the= =20 movement of air traffic at congested airports (49 U.S.C. 41722). That statutory=20 provision authorized the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) to request that scheduled air=20 carriers meet with the FAA to discuss flight reductions at severely congested airports to= =20 reduce overscheduling and flight delays during hours of peak operation, if the Administrator determines that it is necessary to convene such a meeting and the Secretary= =20 determines that the meeting is necessary to meet a serious transportation need or=20 achieve an important public benefit. In early 2004, the Secretary and the FAA Administrator determined that a schedule reduction meeting was necessary to deal with congestion-related=20 delays at O=E2=80=99Hare. Before such a meeting could be convened, however, United an= d=20 American each agreed in separate discussions with agency officials to reduce their =20 scheduled flights voluntarily. Accordingly, the schedule reduction meeting was deferred.=20 Instead, the FAA issued an order implementing the voluntary agreement of the two air=20 carriers, Docket FAA-2004-16944-55; 69 FR 5650 (2004). The FAA order required a 5=20 percent reduction in the two carriers=E2=80=99 scheduled operations. This reduction= was to=20 be effective between 1:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. for six-months, beginning no later than=20 March 4, 2004. The FAA again reviewed O=E2=80=99Hare=E2=80=99s on-time performance in Marc= h 2004 in light of the ordered schedule reductions... On July 8, 2005, the FAA published in= =20 the Federal Register Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 105, =E2= =80=9C Reservation System for Unscheduled Operations at Chicago=E2=80=99s O=E2=80=99Hare International Airport,=E2=80=9D (70 FR 396= 10). This SFAR limits=20 unscheduled arrivals [GA] at the airport to four per hour and provides an allocation =20 mechanism for operators to obtain reservations for those operations." FAA=20 =20 Even the FAA acknowledges that the congestion problem is NOT GA but the=20 airlines intelligent choices to retire big aircraft and big aircraft driver= s and r eplace them with more small aircraft.=20 =20 =20 Jeff ************************************** Get a sneak peek of the all-new AOL a= t=20 http://discover.aol.com/memed/aolcom30tour -------------------------------1187489264 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Language: en
Colyn,
 
I would start with O' Hare arrival and departure information that=20 is listed on their web site at http://w= ww.flychicago.com/statistics/stats/0607SUMMARY.pdf
 
You can see that only 2% of the traffic at O'Hare is GA. Kinda makes yo= u=20 wonder why Dailey closed Meigs.
 
Here's more language found at: https://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/air_traf= fic/arrival_authorizations/media/OHareRule.pdf
"Resurgence of Unacceptable Levels of Congestion
As a result of the=20= 2000=20 legislation, the slot restrictions of the HDR lapsed at
O=E2=80=99Hare as= of July 1,=20 2002. The absence of these restrictions allowed airlines=20 operating at
the airport to add flights, which over time led to a dramati= c=20 increase in airline delays.
These delays reverberated throughout the nati= onal=20 air transportation system.Initially, lifting the HDR had a minimal impact on= =20 delays due to the lingering
effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on airl= ine=20 passenger traffic. But by 2003, the two air
carriers operating hubs at=20 O=E2=80=99Hare, American Airlines (=E2=80=9CAmerican=E2=80=9D) and United Ai= rlines
(=E2=80=9CUnited=E2=80=9D), had=20 added a large number of operations and retimed other flights, resulting=20 in
congestion during peak hours of the day. From April 2000 through Novem= ber=20 2003,
American increased its scheduled operations at O=E2=80=99Hare betwe= en the hours=20 of 12:00 p.m.
and 7:59 p.m. by nearly 10.5 percent. Over the same period,= =20 United increased its
scheduled operations at O=E2=80=99Hare by over 41=20 percent.
The increases in operations by American and United did not resul= t in=20 a
corresponding increase in seat capacity. During the peak period, these=20= two=20 carriers added
375 regional jet operations per day. Overall, American and= =20 United added over 600
regional jet operations per day. At the same time a= s=20 they added regional jet operations,
they reduced mainline jet operations.= The=20 result was actually a decrease in seat capacity
by each carrier at O=E2= =80=99Hare of=20 more than 5.5 percent from April 2000 to November 2003
while flights=20 increased by an average of 150 per day. In November 2003, more than=20 40
percent of American=E2=80=99s and United=E2=80=99s O=E2=80=99Hare flig= hts were operated with=20 regional jets,
many to large and medium hubs. The significant increases i= n=20 scheduled operations
during this time period resulted in excessive delays= and=20 congestion at O=E2=80=99Hare.
By November 2003, O=E2=80=99Hare had the wo= rst on-time=20 performance of any major
airport. O=E2=80=99Hare arrivals were on time on= ly 57=20 percent of the time, well below the FAA
goal of 82 percent. Departures we= re=20 little better. They were on time only 67 percent of
the time, well below=20= the=20 average of 85 percent at other major airports. These delays
averaged abou= t an=20 hour in duration. Published schedules for February 2004 indicated that
th= e=20 problem would be exacerbated by the addition of even more=20 flights.
Recognizing congestion was again becoming a significant issue,=20 Congress enacted
legislation that included a mechanism to help reduce del= ays=20 and improve the movement
of air traffic at congested airports (49 U.S.C.=20 41722). That statutory provision authorized
the Secretary of Transportati= on=20 (Secretary) to request that scheduled air carriers meet
with the FAA to=20 discuss flight reductions at severely congested airports to reduce=20 overscheduling
and flight delays during hours of peak operation, if the=20 Administrator
determines that it is necessary to convene such a meeting a= nd=20 the Secretary determines
that the meeting is necessary to meet a serious=20 transportation need or achieve an
important public benefit.
In early 2= 004,=20 the Secretary and the FAA Administrator determined that a
schedule reduct= ion=20 meeting was necessary to deal with congestion-related delays at
O=E2=80= =99Hare.=20 Before such a meeting could be convened, however, United and American=20 each
agreed in separate discussions with agency officials to reduce their= =20 scheduled flights
voluntarily. Accordingly, the schedule reduction meetin= g=20 was deferred. Instead, the
FAA issued an order implementing the voluntary= =20 agreement of the two air carriers,
Docket FAA-2004-16944-55; 69 FR 5650=20 (2004). The FAA order required a 5 percent
reduction in the two carriers= =E2=80=99=20 scheduled operations. This reduction was to be effective
between 1:00 p.m= .=20 and 8:00 p.m. for six-months, beginning no later than March 4, 2004.
The=20= FAA=20 again reviewed O=E2=80=99Hare=E2=80=99s on-time performance in March 2004 in= light
of the=20 ordered schedule reductions... On July 8, 2005, the FAA published in the Fed= eral=20 Register Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 105, =E2=80=9CReservatio= n System for=20 Unscheduled Operations at
Chicago=E2=80=99s O=E2=80=99Hare International=20= Airport,=E2=80=9D (70 FR=20 39610). This SFAR limits unscheduled
arrivals [GA= ] at=20 the airport to four per hour and provides an allocat= ion=20 mechanism for operators
to obtain reservations for those operations." FAA= =20
 
Even the FAA acknowledges that the congestion problem is NOT= =20 GA but the airlines intelligent choices to retire big aircraft=20= and=20 big aircraft drivers and replace them with more small aircraft.
 
 
Jeff



Get a sneak peek= of the all-new AOL.com.
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